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Preface 
 
European gas market liberalisation has been a long-running story which, for most observers, has 
yielded disappointingly slow results. Most of the academic literature on this subject focuses on 
the EU Directives or the detail of one or two countries. Therefore when Nadine Haase asked 
whether she could spend time at the Oxford Institute to complete a part of her PhD work on 
comparing national regulatory regimes for gas across the “old” EU member states, my response 
was one of delight, but also caution due to the difficulty of gathering information and the 
complexity involved in constructing a framework which would allow a comparison of 
developments across countries through time.  
 
I believe that Nadine has achieved this very difficult task with distinction and I am delighted that 
we are publishing what I believe is one of the first detailed academic assessments of the EU gas 
liberalisation process across the whole range of regulatory functions. Nadine spent six months 
with us carrying out part of this research and returned to the University of Twente to complete 
the work. I am very grateful to her for seeing it through to the end and producing an excellent 
work of reference for students of the EU energy liberalisation process. 
 
 
Jonathan Stern        April 2008 
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Summary 
 
This study has assessed the evolution of regulatory regimes in European gas markets on the basis 
of panel data from the old member states (EU15) for the period between 2000 and 2005. The 
methodology used enabled us to assess whether regulatory regimes are converging. In this 
context, an index has been developed to measure the extent to which member states are closing 
the gap between their regulatory regime and a best-practice model. Due to the discretion allowed 
within the framework regulations of the Gas Directives, member states can choose which 
regulatory instruments to apply. As a consequence, the reforms have resulted in diverging 
regulatory regimes within the framework for gas market organisation in the European Union. 
Our analysis suggests that the old member states have only achieved 54% of best practice in 
terms of European regulation for competition. During the final two years of our study period, 
member states became increasingly reluctant to apply best practice. In fact, no country followed 
the UK example and achieved what could be categorised as best practice. The majority of 
countries did, however, improve their regulatory regimes. At the end of 2005, Denmark, Spain, 
the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Austria, Ireland and France could be put in a group that were 
moving towards best practice. Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden appeared less enthusiastic, 
with minimal convergence throughout the entire period.  
 
Although national regulatory agencies have been granted many more competencies during recent 
years, regulatory decision-making structures differ considerably across Europe. Economic 
governance of European gas market regulation is still characterised by multi-authority structures 
at the national level. On the European level, member states voted against the creation of a 
common energy regulator and, instead, tried to increase the regulatory impact through enhancing 
co-operation among national regulators.   
 
The main drivers for a convergence of regulatory regimes are the European legal provisions. The 
detailed specifications in European law have had an effect on the application of best-practice 
approaches. Complementing this, the Madrid Forum contributed to building a consensus and 
greater uniformity in tariff structures, thereby promoting best practice. After reviewing the 
evolution of general and energy specific policy objectives, we conclude that they are important. 
In 2000, and again in 2005, the European Union’s Lisbon Agenda stimulated further moves 
towards liberalisation. However, despite liberalisation now having been on the political agenda 
since the late 1980s, it runs the risk of being overtaken by more current policy objectives of 
security of energy supply and climate change. Since at least 2000, the European Energy Strategy 
has followed a holistic approach in striving to achieve a sustainable, competitive and secure 
energy supply. We would argue that once the security of supply enters the policy framework, 
regulations are less likely to follow competitive market models. Anticipating an increase in 
future geopolitical uncertainties together with a greater import dependency on fewer suppliers, 
energy supply security seems likely to move up on the political agenda and needs to balance its 
position vis-à-vis carbon reduction objectives.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the 1980s and 1990s, privatisation and liberalisation of European gas markets emerged on the 
political agenda. Back then, “many of the established actors in European gas industry still 
regarded the introduction of liberalisation as the equivalent of the end of civilisation” (Stern, 
1998: 91). Ever since, attempts to liberalise European gas markets were facing strong opposition 
and resistance from the industry and industry-oriented governments, aiming to maintain the 
status quo of market organisation. Initially ambitious regulatory targets from the European 
Commission boiled down to a very basic introduction of competition and liberalisation in form 
of the first gas directive. However, the European gas reform marks the starting point for 
restructuring the gas sector and its economic governance. European gas markets have gone 
through profound restructuring processes in the last 10 years. In 1998, the European gas market 
resembled a patchwork of national markets with highly heterogeneous regulatory regimes. Since 
then, a European gas market reform attempted to integrate and harmonise gas markets while 
asking for country-specific solutions to take into account different national characteristics. In 
early 2000, the European Commission (EC) expressed the over-optimistic expectation of 
reaching full liberalisation by 2004. Two years later, the European gas market reform was 
described as a “patchy process” (see EC Inform-Energy, 2002: 16). In 2007, the EC officially 
spoke out about what many observers were claiming for years: European gas markets lacked 
competition, cross-border integration, and harmonisation. Due to the discretion of the European 
framework regulation, member states could choose to a large extent which regulatory 
instruments to apply. As a consequence, the reform brought about a divergent convergence of 
regulatory regimes which now functions as a framework for natural gas market organisation in 
the European Union. This study aims to assess the degree and direction of policy convergence 
applied to regulatory regimes that came into existence in order to realise European gas market 
liberalisation. 
 
We assess the regulatory regimes of national gas markets in Europe over time, covering the gas 
market regulation in the old member states. We concentrate on policies affecting the downstream 
part of the gas value chain that is subject to the reform. The period under study begins with the 
implementation of the first Gas Directive in 2000 and lasts until the end of 2005. Our leading 
question is ‘Are regulatory regimes moving towards convergence?’ Complementarily, we 
explore common patterns or paths that member states follow. To capture the dimension of rate 
and degree of convergence, the following sub-questions guide our analysis: ‘Are some countries 
moving towards a best-practice model faster than others?’ (rate of convergence) and ‘how much 
do the member states decrease the distance of their regulatory regime towards a best-practice 
model?’ (degree of convergence). The second question necessitates developing a methodology 
which allows the deduction of a so-called best-practice model from the European legislation and 
economic theory (chapters 2, 5, & 6) and then measures the distance of the regulatory regimes 
towards this best-practice model (chapter 7). The research design is guided by New Institutional 
Theory, combining insights from European Public Policy Studies and New Institutional 
Economics. With reference to Williamson’s four layer model (chapter 2), we identify 
institutional factors that shape regulation. The focus is on two factors: European law and 
European energy policy. By investigating the evolution of European legal provisions and energy 
4 
 
policy related to the gas market liberalisation (chapters 4 & 5) we try to explore whether these 
factors promote regulatory convergence.  
 
The assessment of regulatory regimes in European gas markets faces two main limitations. First, 
the scope of our assessment may be criticised for being too formalistic, because our analysis 
takes into account only formal aspects of regulation. The study assesses the choice of regulatory 
instruments, but their practical application is not researched. Moreover, we do not show how 
cross-border harmonisation works in practice. Those are valid objections underlining the 
necessity to clarify the scope of the study and its results. At the same time, the objections 
indicate subjects for further research in European natural gas markets.  
 
Second, the idea of market integration and harmonisation is often challenged by reform 
opponents who raise the fundamental question of why natural gas market regulation should be 
harmonised in the first place. This position is based on the argument that regulatory instruments 
induce different effects in different countries. Certainly, characteristics of national gas markets 
such as market size, existing networks, or import infrastructure and market structure do matter. 
One among several reasons why the EU voted for a framework regulation as the main legal 
instrument of the European gas market liberalisation was to ensure that national characteristics 
can be taken into account to set up an appropriate regulatory regime. In general, the European 
Commission did not take a dogmatic point of view in this regard, but at the same time advocated 
the idea of liberal market integration which necessitates a certain degree of harmonisation to 
allow interoperability of European gas markets. As a consequence, the EC did not directly 
prescribe a coherent best-practice model, but instead expressed preferences with regard to 
individual regulatory instruments. With the help of our methodology we try to make this implicit 
best-practice model explicit. At the end of the day, European gas market liberalisation has to 
balance out the harmonisation of European gas markets, and the optimal functioning of national 
gas markets. Nevertheless, our assessment takes the harmonisation goal as the main angle and 
starting point to increase the understanding of evolving gas market regulation in the process of 
European gas market liberalisation.   
 
 
Literature 
Dorigoni, S., & Portatadino, S. (2006, 7-10 June 2006). Gas Liberalisation in Europe and 
Security of Supply: Big challenge. Paper presented at the 29th IAEE International 
Conference, Potsdam/Germany. 
EC Inform-Energy. (2002). Commission reports only patchy progress in energy markets opening. 
EC Inform-Energy(108), 4-5. 
Molle, W. (2006). The Economics of European Integration. Theory, Practice, Policy. Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
2.1 Goals and neoclassical assumptions of the European gas reform  
The following paragraph sketches the reform goals and references their theoretical underpinning. 
This is necessary because our methodology is grounded on these theoretical assumptions that ex 
ante structured the market reform by determining certain traditional principles.  
  
The main reform objectives are twofold: completing the internal market and establishing a 
competitive natural gas market. The EU also aims to increase efficiency, reduce prices, raise 
standards of service, and increase competition (see European Commission, 1998: Recital 1-3; 
European Commission, 2003: Recital 2). In short: a new governance arrangement shall bring 
about long term benefits for consumers (see Joskow, 2006: 3). The means enhancing overall 
welfare by trying to influence the economic performance in the energy sector is deduced from 
the structure-conduct-performance paradigm (see Bain, 1968a; Graham, 2000; E.  Mason, 1939; 
E. Mason, 1957). According to the prevailing model in industrial organisation studies, economic 
performance depends on the conduct of buyers and sellers. Business conduct incorporates not 
only pricing policies and practices but also spans most corporate activities such as marketing 
strategies or research and development plans. Conduct in turn is influenced by the market 
structure. Market structure is characterised by 
  
the number and size of sellers and buyers, the degree of physical or subjective differentiation distinguishing 
competing sellers’ products, the presence or absence of barriers to the entry of new firms, the shapes of cost 
curves, the degree to which firms are vertically integrated from raw material production to retail 
distribution, and the extent of firms’ production line diversification (conglomeration). (Scherer & Ross, 
1990: 4-5) 
 
 The model foresees market structure as determined by basic conditions grouped into supply and 
demand side indicators. The supply side for instance, is characterised by the gas supply situation, 
the nature of the relevant technology and business attitudes; price elasticity, availability of 
product substitutes, and rate of growth account for the demand side. The causal flow suggested 
in the context of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm does not follow one direction per 
se, but instead foresees feedback from each variable in the model.  
 
Public policy in general and the European gas market reform in particular bring leverage to bear 
indirectly on economic performance by influencing market structure and conduct (see Bain, 
1968b; Scherer & Ross, 1990: 5). This is in line with two broad conceptions of competition, one 
of which emphasises market structure while the other stresses the conduct of sellers and buyers 
(see Scherer & Ross, 1990: 15-18). Liberalising European gas markets self-evidently necessitates 
introducing competition, but what are the sufficient conditions to call a market competitive? 
Scherer & Ross (1990) offer the following general definition:   
 
In modern economic theory, a market is said to be competitive (or more precisely, purely competitive) when 
the number of firms selling homogenous commodity is so large, and each individual firm’s share of the 
market is so small, that no individual firm finds itself able to influence appreciably the commodity’s price by 
varying the quantity of output it sells. (Scherer & Ross, 1990: 16) 
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The European Union applied several principles of market reform such as access, competition, 
unbundling, and independent regulators to reach this degree of competition. To minimise the 
barriers for the market entry of new firms, the European legal provisions regulate network access 
conditions for the transmission and distribution levels. Trading activities are not in the regulatory 
scope, although Joskow identifies the existence of mature trading facilities as a key component 
for the development of competitive markets. Despite the fact that trading might not be regulated, 
Joskow (2006) stresses the important role spot markets and trading hubs play in allocating scarce 
network transmission capacity and ensuring an effective balancing of demand and supply in 
electricity markets (see Joskow, 2006: 4-5). Some member states chose to influence conduct by 
employing incentive regulation in form of a price-cap regulation which restricts the pricing 
behaviour of the companies when setting tariffs for their networks. Most of the employed 
regulatory instruments such as legal market opening and third party access, target changing 
market structure. Additionally, vertical separation of trade and transport (so called unbundling) 
promises to break up prevailing market structures. Here, the underlying assumption is that 
transport and trade companies have different profit interests, and therefore follow other incentive 
structures. Under perfect market conditions, it is anticipated that a transport company in its own 
right strives to diversify its customer portfolio by offering transparent tariffs and access 
conditions. On the contrary, the transport arm of an integrated incumbent is to have an incentive 
to prevent competitors from competing with its own trading schemes. A separation of trade and 
transport companies has not become a reality in most of the European gas markets. Due to the 
lack of perfect market conditions, a considerable amount of competition introducing measures 
try to enhance transparency and decrease the information asymmetry between incumbents and 
new market entrants on the one hand and vis-à-vis the regulator on the other hand. As a result, 
transparency has crystallised as a keyword for lessening the information asymmetry.    
 
With the liberalisation of markets, independent regulatory agencies evolved on the national and 
European levels. The restructuring of various industry sectors was accompanied by the 
transferral of regulatory power to those agencies. Although the superiority of independent 
agencies such as regulators towards governmental administrations is contested, a number of 
considerations convinced governments to establish regulators and endow them with the 
necessary competencies. During the 1980s and early 1990s, experiences in the UK demonstrated 
that “in many cases, privatisation would only mean the replacement of public by private 
monopolies unless the newly privatised companies were subjected to public regulation of profits, 
prices, and entry and service conditions” (Majone, 1998: 199). In the process of redefining the 
functions of the state, several justifications are put forward regarding why independent agencies 
seem to be more appropriate than governmental departments to exert regulatory power in 
Europe. The most central one points to the enormous information asymmetry between industry 
and regulatory authorities. Sector regulation often necessitates expertise in highly complex or 
technical matters to design appropriate rules and fulfil its judicative role. Although the 
information asymmetry can be significantly decreased by strengthening the regulators 
competencies and staff, the disparity cannot be fully abrogated. Moreover, due to separation of 
power, governmental bodies tend to be inappropriate to exert judicative functions. Courts in turn 
are not supposed to take over legislative or regulatory action. Establishing separate entities from 
government, promised to decrease the influence of partisan politics and party political influence 
on regulatory decisions. As opposed to cabinets, the institutional structure of regulators is 
independent from legislative periods; the hope is therefore to enhance stability and credibility of 
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regulation. Furthermore, proponents of independent agencies claim that public participation is 
easier to facilitate, “[…] while the opportunity for consultations by means of  public hearings is 
often denied to government departments because of the conventions under which they are 
operate” (ibid). Last but not least, agencies are able to focus public attention on controversial 
issues because they are more distant from political or governmental agendas. Our list is certainly 
neither exhaustive nor reflecting a balanced discussion. Instead, the main justifications why 
regulators are considered better suited to promote regulation for competition than other state 
entities are summarized. Considering whether an independent regulator or governmental body is 
the designated regulatory authority, the crucial the question remains if the authority takes on an 
enacting or enforcing role in liberalising the natural gas market.   
2.2 Institutional change in the light of New Institutional Theory 
The next section fulfils two functions. First, we define the variables of this analysis and show 
how they are theoretically embedded. Second, we deduce two contrary expectations on the basis 
of the theoretical explanations that the New Institutional Theory offers. Drawing on New 
Institutional Economics and European Comparative Studies of New Institutional provenience 
enables us to account for divergence and convergence of regulatory patterns.     
 
2.3 Williamson’s conceptual framework of institutional change 
In general, New Institutional Economics perceives institutional change as a gradual and 
incremental process evolving over a long time. Williamson’s four-layer model falls in this 
evolutionary tradition which helps to understand how the regulatory framework and the market 
are related to each other. Williamson’s conceptual framework initially intended to illustrate the 
position of New Institutional Economics within different levels of social analysis. Recently, 
scholars have discovered the framework helps explain differences in economic governance from 
an evolutionary perspective (see Correljé & de Vries, 2007; de Vries & Correljé, 2006; 
Groenewegen & Künneke, 2005; International Gas Union, 2006). More precisely, the framework 
contributes to understanding “why economic institutions have emerged that way they did and not 
otherwise” (Oliver E.  Williamson, 1998: 25) by offering a set of categorical variables. 
Williamson distinguishes between four endogenous variables representing different levels of 
analysis. In short, those variables are informal institutions (level 1), formal institutional 
environment (level 2), institutional arrangements (level 3), and (market) behaviour (level 4). 
Exogenous variables are not explicitly linked to the framework, but are usually included with or 
without reference to the structure-conduct-performance paradigm which foresees basic 
conditions or market characteristics as part of the research equation (see Correljé & de Vries, 
2007).  
 
Williamson assumed the main direction of influence starting from the first level where the beliefs 
and norms are located and feeding through down to the fourth level, describing economic 
performance. The implicit assumption is that other causal relationships may possibly arise, but 
are less strong (see Oliver E.  Williamson, 1998: 26). “The basic causality in this model flows 
from the top towards the behavioural layer. But it should be clear that via processes of learning, 
lobbying, technical development and societal change in the broader sense, there is also an 
upwards influence on the form and content of the basic values and beliefs” (International Gas 
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Union, 2006: 23). So far, interaction between the levels, or feedback processes have hardly been 
subject of empirical research (see de Vries & Correljé, 2006; Oliver E.  Williamson, 1998). 
Consequently, the explanatory power of Williamson’s conceptual framework has still to be 
tested to clarify its benefits and limitations. One may describe the state of research with reference 
to an allegory stemming from chemistry: the main substances are determined, but the 
composition of the substances and the chemical processes are not fully understood. The strength 
of the framework is to show which institutional variables are at stake. At the same time, the 
model does not account for variables describing actor’s behaviour in a more systematic way 
(Oliver E. Williamson, 1975, p.: xiii). New institutional theory grounds on the micro foundation 
of economics. Actor’s preferences are characterised by bounded rationality and opportunism 
(Oliver E. Williamson, 1996, p.6). It is assumed that actors are striving for maximising their 
profit and thereby preferences are supposed to be defined. New institutional theory has therefore 
been criticised for not identifying key actors and fully accounting for the nature of agency. “As a 
result, institutional theory has struggled to explain how change comes about when existing 
structures embedded in the broader environment are so constraining upon human actions.” 
(Frumkin & Kaplan, 2000) 
 
2.4 Conceptual applications to the European gas market reform 
In the next section, we will discuss Williamson’s framework and its possible application to the 
European gas market reform in more detail. The next section shows that the initial model from 
Williamson and its recent application deviates in the process of application and interpretation 
from the original model.  
We do so, by contrasting our application to those put forward by Dutch scholars researching the 
economics of energy infrastructure. The aim of this section is to embed our analysis 
theoretically. The figure visualises an applied version of Williamsons conceptual framework to 
the gas market, which we will elaborate on (see Groenewegen, 2005). 
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Figure 1: The regulatory framework and the market 
 
Market design
Market structure and functioning
Regulation
Energy policy objectives &
Market reform principles
Policy & 
Regulation
Market reality 
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Source: (IGU/CIEP 2006: 23) – Adaption of Williamson (1998) and Groenewegen (2005)  
 
The first level represents informal institutions such as broad beliefs, values and norms (see 
Oliver E.  Williamson, 1998: 27). North subsumes under informal constraints also sanctions, 
taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct (1991). Those informal institutions are 
supposed to be stable and change only occurs within a long time period. According to 
Williamson’s proposition, they change every 100 years or even after longer time periods. When 
applying Williamson’s four-layer model to the gas sector, the author group from the Clingendael 
International Energy Programme (hereafter CIEP) identifies potential drivers for beliefs, values, 
or norms related to the gas market. Accordingly, those are triggered by “perceptions about 
sovereignty over national energy resources, equity, scarcity and resource independence, the 
environment, in/exclusion of social and ethnical groups, beliefs about states versus markets” 
(International Gas Union, 2006: 22). Variation of the attitude regarding these principles or issues 
often stems from the  
 
presence or lack of energy resources, the role of natural gas in the energy portfolio, the openness of the 
economy, political culture, norms of ‘good governance’ and the involvement of the interest group in society 
via ‘deep’ political principles and beliefs (ibid). 
 
CIEP specified the first level by labelling it ‘energy policy objectives and market reform 
principles’. On this level, principles of liberal market reform such as unbundling, access, and 
competition on the one hand and energy policy objectives on the other are considered pivotal in 
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shaping market design processes. We distinguish between general policy, energy, and even 
sector specific policy objectives. Such general policy objectives may be overarching socio-
economic development goals such as employment and economic growth. Energy specific 
objectives often refer to guaranteeing security of energy supply, or competitive energy prices. 
Additionally, the general attitude towards liberalisation of markets or overarching economic 
objectives may influence the establishment or reformulation of regulatory regimes in the gas 
sector (see ibid). Moreover, beliefs about state versus market are ultimately expressed by 
member states attitude towards liberalisation.  
 
In the Second level, Williamson placed the rules of the game. Those formal institutions comprise 
the polity, judiciary, and bureaucracy of government. Here, “the laws regarding property rights – 
their definition and enforcement – are prominently featured.” (Oliver E.  Williamson, 1998: 27). 
In addition to international treaties, national laws, and constitutions, more elements of market 
design are determined within this layer. CIEP also suggests that the position of the regulator vis-
à-vis the administration and court is determined here (see International Gas Union, 2006: 22). 
The distinction between the second and third level and its labelling is not fully convincing or at 
least poses some demarcation problems. In a more general understanding, market design includes 
regulatory instruments applied and regulation incorporates legal provisions. In this way, the 
adapted version of Williamson’s model in figure 1 does not necessarily enhance the clarity of the 
framework. In some instances, the distinction between the second and the third levels is not as 
clear-cut as the framework appears to be at first glance. This is explained further in the next 
section.  
 
When applying the framework to the European electricity sector, de Vries and Correljé 
introduced the distinction between generic and sector specific institutions. The generic formal 
institutions are congruent with Williamson’s understanding of the rules of the game, whereas the 
sector specific institutions are determined by the scope of the European Directives and 
regulations (See de Vries & Correljé, 2006).  
 
The Third level is central for assessing the institutional arrangements, labelled ‘regulation’ in 
the figure. The play of the game is located in this layer. According to Williamson (1998), every 
one to 10 years one can observe the process of aligning governance structures with transactions 
(see Oliver E.  Williamson, 1998: 26). Under institutional arrangements we understand actual 
regulatory instruments and decisions (hands-on regulation), firms’ tariff structure and trading 
practices, forms of private public co operations, and contracts.  
 
The Fourth level, ‘market structure and functioning’, comprises classical economic performance 
and business conduct. Level 4 is characterised by interaction between actors with different 
objectives. Here prices, quantities, and investments are continuously determined by the business 
conduct of the engaged actors. Market strategies are chosen and deployed, lobbying comes into 
play, and buyer and seller exchange goods. Actual behaviour is circumscribed by the room the 
market design and regulation offers.  
2.5 Adjustments to the model  
Recent literature puts forward several criticisms to enhance the model. One concerns the 
direction of causal flows, another regards the assumption made with respect to the frequency of 
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institutional change. A third criticism emphasises the role exogenous factors may play in 
changing the endogenous. We suggest an additional fourth criticism, regarding the distinction 
between the second and third layers of the model. The fifth criticism addresses possible intra-
variable effects.  
 
First, De Vries and Correljé make a critique of Williamson’s idea about the duration of those 
institutions. They argue that a range from 100 years to a millennium for informal institutions or 
in general time constants based on a factor of 10 might be too long and static. Instead, most 
likely the proposed time spans are possibly inspired by aesthetic considerations rather than 
empirical observations. Second, the two authors emphasise the impact of exogenous factors on 
all levels. Consequently, exogenous factors should be taken into account, be they more general in 
nature or energy sector related. Third, De Vries and Correljé challenge the constitutive character 
of the four-layer model. Originally, the direction of causality is anticipated to feed through from 
the first to the second layer, from the second to the third and so forth. Although a backwards 
flow is mentioned, its impact is considered less effective or profound. Other intra-layer 
interactions, such as economic performance or other aspects of market behaviour feeding back to 
informal institutions or formal institutions, are not considered. De Vries and Correljé (2006) 
show that “feedback from the governance level to the level of informal institutions can have 
significant influence and can cause cultural changes at a much higher speed than Williamson 
suggests”. Consequently, a conservative interpretation of Williamson’s preferred direction of 
feedback is inappropriate and limits its explanatory power, especially when applying the model 
to explore causal relations. 
 
Fourth, when applying the four-layer model to the European gas market reform, the distinction 
between formal institutions and institutional arrangement was not as clear cut as the model 
assumed in the first place. In fact, de Vries and Correljé faced the same difficulty to stringently 
separate sector-specific formal institutions and institutional arrangements when applying the 
model. In their (2006) analysis of the European electricity reform, they refer to rules that a 
regulator releases in both levels. Moreover, they concede that the distinction between generic 
and sector-specific formal institutions is ambiguous. This leaves us asking what causes the lack 
of conceptual clarity in order to overcome this obstacle.    
     
What proved to be problematic can be summarised as follows: the same indicators occur in the 
sector-specific institutions set by the European Union on one variable side and institutional 
arrangements on the other. This conceptual ambiguity is illustrated by two examples. First, 
European provisions determine legal unbundling as minimum, but the national regulatory 
authority decides which degree of unbundling is in effect applied. Another example is the 
distribution of regulatory oversight. If the European law does not determine the position of the 
regulator vis-à-vis the government by prescribing the regulatory competencies, then their 
distribution has to be decided on the national level. On the one hand, the decision might be 
undertaken by the regulator which would qualify it as regulators actual decision (level 3). On the 
other, it could be perceived as national law that transferred the regulatory oversight of certain 
aspects of regulation to regulator, government, or/and transmission system operator. Depending 
on the case, the actual regulation might be a decision prescribed through national law, the 
decision of the regulatory authority, or through a two step progressing decision within both 
levels. To conclude, in the case of the European gas market reform the actual regulatory 
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functioning is finally determined on the level of institutional arrangements. First and foremost, 
the cause for conceptual ambiguity stems from the nature of regulation – process that involves 
several factors and levels. Second, the model in its raw version does not fully account for multi-
level governance. Striving for a general solution, it comes down to whether the classification of 
subjects to levels is primarily subject-related or primarily dependent on who decides those 
subjects. We do not offer a concluding clarification of which indicator is subsumed under formal 
institution or institutional arrangement that would allow a generalisation. The purpose of our 
analysis is explorative. We apply a research interest based solution by distinguishing between the 
European legal provisions of the Gas reform on the one hand and institutional arrangements 
determined by national authorities - be it in the form of law or regulation - on the other hand. 
This enables the identification of the convergence effect European law has on gas market 
regulation across Europe.  
 
Fifth, energy policy and member states’ beliefs expressed through attitudes towards liberalisation 
might change within an examination period and directly or simultaneously affect the institutional 
arrangements on the third level. In other words, while European energy policy or member states’ 
attitudes in moment ‘t1’ might be solely or predominantly focused on liberalisation, priorities 
and views might change in ‘t2’. If our first criticism holds that time factors might be 
considerably shorter or accidentally fall within an examination period, then intra-variable flows 
between the first and the third layers are theoretically possible. An impulse stemming from the 
first layer might affect both originally subordinated layers (second and third) simultaneously, or 
with little time delay after another. This might be caused by an extraordinary event (see Sine & 
David, 2003) or triggered by an accumulation of structural changes of basic market conditions 
(see Helm, 2005). Helm postulated the occurrence of an energy paradigm shift around 2000. 
Thereafter the objectives of energy policy shifted towards security of supply and climate change, 
whereas in the 1980s and 1990s, energy policy concentrated on privatisation, liberalisation, and 
competition (ibid.). In other words, there are indications for energy policy objectives and 
member states’ attitudes to change within the studies’ examination time.  
 
2.6 European harmonisation versus path dependency 
Two bodies of literature inform us about different expectations regarding the convergence of 
regulatory patterns. Whereas the logic of transaction cost economics suggests convergence 
through the process of European harmonisation, historical institutionalism counters with the 
concept of path dependency stressing the likelihood of divergence.  
 
The Single European Act (1986) functioned as a precondition for the creation of a common 
European internal market, to be accomplished by the energy market reforms. Perennially, market 
integration and harmonisation have been central ideas and its interpretation has been contested. 
European integration studies identify two distinctive understandings of economic integration, 
reflecting different degrees of depth and rate of the process. “In the dynamic understanding, it is 
the process whereby economic frontiers between member states are gradually eliminated […], 
with the formerly separate national economic entities gradually merging into a larger whole” 
(Molle, 2006: 4). The dynamic process results in a supranationalisation of competencies and 
convergence of policies and regulations. “In a static sense, it is the situation in which national 
components of a larger economic zone function together as one entity” (ibid). Unlike the first, 
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the static understanding of the European integration process is characterised by more or less 
coordinated markets. The latter view stresses persisting intergovernmental approaches and 
prevailing national market coordination. Although both views ultimately strive for full market 
integration, the static understanding takes into account experiences of European market 
integration processes where after the outcome of sectoral market integration often resembles a 
static integration approach.  
 
The main argument for creating common markets governed by common rules is borrowed from 
the transaction cost economics. Thereafter, the creation of general contracts and universal rules 
resulted in the lowering of transaction costs (see Molle, 2006: 19). According to Majone (1996), 
the general growth of community regulation is partly induced by “the interest of multi-national, 
export-oriented industries in avoiding inconsistent and progressively more stringent regulations 
in various EC and non-EC countries” (Majone, 1996: 1611). The incentive to vote for 
supranationalisation depends on the character of the public good. Once the Single European Act 
was in place and the decision for starting a gas market reform had been made, the causal 
mechanism of European harmonisation could unfold its effect. Accordingly, the stimulus of 
policy convergence is legal obligation by European law (see Holzinger & Knill, 2005: 778-782). 
The existence of legal provisions does not per se result in a convergence of policies or 
institutional arrangements. The success of harmonisation depends on the degree of legal 
specification. The more concretely European law sets targets or prescribes regulatory instruments 
the more likely convergence will happen. Holzinger and Knill (2005) point out, “convergence 
effects are less pronounced, by contrast, if legal rules are defined in a less rigid way, leaving 
member states broad leeway for selecting appropriate instruments to comply with international 
policy objectives” (Holzinger & Knill, 2005: 787). They distinguish between those formal 
institutions in form of European legislation that are objectively based or determine minimum 
standards opposed to those setting maximum standards. This insight derives from empirical 
results generated by comparative European studies and allows the formulation of a general 
hypothesis which will later be supplemented by more detailed expectations. Hypothesis 1: We 
expect those subjects (indicators) of the gas market reform more specified by European 
provisions (level 2), to converge towards best practice.   
 
The concept of path dependency was initially developed to allow a better understanding of 
technological innovation within industrial economics (Arthur, 1994; David, 1985). Later it was 
extended to explain institutional change in the economic and social sphere (see North, 1990) and 
applied within the discipline of political science (see Pierson, 2000). The idea of path 
dependency goes back to the explanation of why some superior technologies do not reach a 
dominant market position while suboptimal products do. Assuming that competition supporting 
regulation is by (reform) definition the superior market design, one may question why not all 
member states employ the most favourable regulation-for-competition.  
 
Opposed to European harmonisation, the concept of path dependency basically suggests that 
member states follow individual paths by taking into account national characteristics which in 
turn result in diverging regulatory patterns.  
 
 
In general, “path dependence is characterised as a self-reinforcing sequence of events with its own logic (see North, 
1990). A path has a distinct pattern of institutionally rooted constraints and incentives that create typically strategies, 
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routine approaches to problem and shared decisions and rules that produce predictable patterns of behaviour. A path 
constructs mental maps of actors, determines the problem actor perceive and solutions available” (Groenewegen & 
Künneke, 2005: 16). 
 
The prospect of increasing returns stemming from returns to scale (including high sunk costs - 
unrecoverable past expenditures), network externalities, learning, and coordination effects 
function as a lock-in to continue a path. If conditions conducive to path dependence are fulfilled, 
actors are less inclined to make (radical) change but instead desire the status quo as an 
equilibrium situation.    
 
We exemplify the argument of increasing returns from scale for the natural gas sector. Network 
based natural gas transport implies high sunk costs with increasing returns in the course of the 
investment cycle. By establishing transport capacity the company ensured the possible trade 
volume which in the end determined the market share. As a result, vertical integration of trade 
and transport was traditionally the dominant mode of organisation for natural gas undertakings. 
In the process of liberalising European gas markets, incumbents tend to be reluctant to share 
network access with competitors or towards regulation which decreases its rate of return. At the 
same time, governments and regulators have to ensure sufficient incentives for operating the 
natural gas network and for investments to fulfil their security of natural gas supply mandate. 
Investment incentives are strongly related to the rate of return. From this narrow point of view, 
there is little reason on either side to change the market structure by regulation in the first place. 
A further application of the concept to the European gas market reform would reveal that several 
characteristics or mechanism enforce the likelihood of path dependent regulatory inertia.    
 
On the basis of the first and fifth criticism of Williamson’s model (see previous section), the 
‘Northian’ inertia assumption can be specified for our purposes. Hypothesis 2: “If there are 
ambiguous or rivalling energy policy objectives on the European level throughout the gas market 
reform, the likelihood that member states adopt best practice decreases.”    
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3. RESEARCH OUTLINE   
This chapter begins by formulating the guiding questions of the analysis. Thereafter, we explain 
the two central concepts of our analysis. First, we clarify the concept of policy convergence and 
its application to the gas sector regulation. Second, we define regulatory regime and the concept 
of a comprehensive regulatory regime. Both clarifications are necessary because the operation is 
based on these two concepts.  
3.1 Research questions 
The main objective of this study is to assess the regulatory performance of national gas markets 
in Europe over time. We concentrate on policies affecting the downstream part of the gas value 
chain. Our lead question is ‘Are regulatory regimes moving towards convergence?’ (Q1). This is 
divided into two sub questions that aim to explore patterns of institutional change. The 
dimension of speed is addressed by asking whether some countries are moving towards a best-
practice model faster than others (Q2). Qualitative change in the sense of directional change is 
the subject of the third question which explores how much member states decrease the distance 
of their regulatory regime towards a best practice model (Q3).  
 
With reference to Williamson’s four layer model (see chapter 2), we identified institutional 
factors that are supposed to influence regulation. In our analysis we focus on two of those 
factors: the European law and European energy policy, and try to explore whether these induce 
convergence by investigating the development of the European provisions and energy policy 
related to the gas sector. On the basis of this inductive examination in chapter 3 and 4, we 
formulate expectations regarding the effect these variables may have on the convergence of 
regulation. The second set of research questions therefore states: do the European legal 
provisions for the gas market reform induce convergence of the national regulatory regime in the 
natural gas sector?  (Q4). And does energy policy affecting the gas sector reform have 
converging effects on regulatory regimes? (Q5). Answering the second sets of questions will not 
let us claim a causal relationship, but will indicate some of the dynamics evolving from the first 
and second layer of Williamson’s model.   
3.2 Policy convergence  
The next section starts defines the meaning of policy convergence and then introduces 
approaches for assessing policy convergence According to Knill  
 
policy convergence can be defined as any increase in the similarity between one or more characteristics of a 
certain policy (e.g. policy objectives, policy instruments, policy settings) across a given set of political 
jurisdiction (supranational institutions, states, regions, local authorities) over a given period of time. Policy 
convergence thus describes the end result of a process of policy change over time towards some common 
point, regardless of causal process. (Knill, 2005: 29-30) 
 
This remains close to the widely cited definition formulated by Bennett, but enriches it in two 
ways. In the first part, Knill renders it more precise by distinguishing between different types and 
levels of policies. This contributes to research stringency by drawing a clear line between policy 
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process and policy outcome on the one hand, while taking into account multi-level governance 
on the other. In the second part, the definition emphasises the dynamic nature of the concept. In 
this context, Jordan rightly puts forward, “…because policies are the same at a given point of 
time, does not necessarily confirm that policy convergence has occurred: they could have 
emerged independently but in similar forms” (Jordan, 2005: 946). To identify coincidental versus 
causal relations of policy convergence, it is therefore necessary to emphasise the temporal 
dimension of the convergence concept. Bennett: “There must be a movement over time towards 
a common point” (Jordan, 2005: 946).     
 
Our analysis concentrates on the policy outcome when analysing policy convergence with regard 
to regulatory regimes of European gas markets. In doing so, we analyse the policy and policy 
dimensions, and include those regulatory instruments or measures that are chosen and 
implemented in order to fulfil the obligations imposed by the Gas Directives. The analysis aims 
to assess the similarities of regulatory instruments member states chose over time.  
 
The comparative policy literature suggests several approaches to assess convergence. Basically 
there are four main approaches which with reference to the Greek alphabet are signified as 
sigma-, beta-, gamma-, and delta-convergence (Heichel et. al., 2005: 831-834). For our purposes 
we are concerned with three: sigma, gamma, and delta convergence. These three types use 
indicators that reflect the degree, direction, scope and speed of change (see Holzinger & Knill, 
2005). However, given the restricted number of European member states and the chosen case 
selection of the old member states, the indicator scope is not relevant for this analysis.  
 
Sigma-convergence describes in its classical form “decreasing coefficient of variance” and 
follows the logic of “growing together” (Heichel et. al., 2005: 831). The assessment of sigma-
convergence is often applied in studies on economic globalisation, but also to measure 
similarities of policies and regulatory instruments. Sigma-convergence occurs if there is a 
decrease in variation of policies among the countries under consideration (see Knill, 2005: 769). 
Most convergence studies of this kind adopt a quantitative design, but can be used for qualitative 
analyses or smaller number of cases as well. Sigma convergence occurs when there is a decrease 
of range and standard variation indicated by an increase in the number of countries that 
implement the same instrument.  
 
Whereas sigma-convergence does not cover the direction of change, beta-, gamma- and delta-
convergence describe three different aspects of qualitative change. Beta convergence is quite 
prominent in economic convergence literature to analyse for instance the economic progress of 
developing countries. Beta-convergence occurs when poor economies grow faster than rich ones 
for example, and is named after the growth coefficient. As such beta-convergence is applicable if 
the phenomenon of ‘catching up’ is to be detected. The mobility dimension here is covered by 
gamma-convergence, which is formulated in response to beta-convergence. As Heichel et al. 
point out, beta-convergence is criticised for not capturing sufficient aspects of cross-country 
dynamics. For instance, convergence trends generated by rich countries that are falling back, 
were not covered by applying beta-convergence but by gamma convergence. (See Heichel et. al., 
2005: 832). Gamma-convergence reflects mobility of countries with regard to the speed of 
implementing certain regulatory instruments.  
 
 
19 
 
For the analysis of gamma-convergence, country rankings for different points of time are compared to 
assess the mobility of countries. If countries in the first ranks fall behind or catch up over time, 
convergence occurs. (Heichel et. al., 2005: 832) 
 
 The analysis of gamma-convergence enriches the interpretation of sigma- and delta-convergence 
because it allows assessing changes of country rankings over time. Gamma-convergence is 
particularly helpful for the analysis of path dependency. The concept of path dependency 
suggests regulatory inertia of those countries that entered the European gas market reform with a 
highly monopolistic market structure. Accordingly, countries such as Germany are expected to 
make slow progress in liberalising their market by applying certain regulatory instruments.   
 
In general, gamma convergence occurs when a country catches-up or falls back. In this context, 
we introduce the distinction of positive and negative gamma convergence.. Hereafter, we speak 
of positive gamma convergence if one or more countries start with least favourite instruments or 
measures and implement the favourite instrument. Strong positive gamma convergence is given 
if this happens in the early stages of the reform. We speak of negative gamma convergence if one 
or more countries start with a favourable or even favourite instrument and then replace it with a 
less favourite instrument. From the indicator level this scheme can be levelled up to the regime 
level. If a country begins with a relatively low score of its regulatory regime and catches up by 
gaining relatively high scores, positive gamma convergence occurs. In turn, the absence of 
positive and negative gamma convergence may indicate path dependency, although it is not a 
sufficient condition to identify a path dependent outcome.  
 
The most sophisticated, but seldom applied variant is delta-convergence (see Heichel et. al., 
2005: 834). This type of analysis implies the direction of change. Ultimately, a decrease in 
variation of national policies is accompanied by an upward or downward shift. Holzinger and 
Knill observe, “the direction of convergence is usually related to the extent of state intervention 
or to the strictness of a regulation” (Holzinger & Knill, 2005: 777). Delta-convergence assesses 
not only the direction of change, but describes the ordinary ranking of countries. According to 
Knill’s definition, “we speak of delta-convergence when similarity change is operationalised by 
comparing countries distance changes to an exemplary model” (Knill, 2005: 769). In this study, 
the exemplary model serves as a best-practice model put into operation by the creation of an 
index in the methodology chapter (see chapter 6). Delta convergence occurs when a decrease of 
distance to the best-practice model can be identified. Observing trends from an indicator 
perspective, delta convergence occurs when an increasing number of countries (most) apply the 
instrument considered to be best practice and receive high scores. Translating this to the regime 
level, delta convergence is exhibited when an increasing number, the majority of countries, 
realises high scores.  
 
For all types of assessment discussed, convergence holds that they might occur simultaneously. 
In their portrayal of convergence literature, Heichel et al. (2005) stress “empirically, sigma- and 
delta-convergence often occur simultaneously. If countries reach total similarity relative to a 
policy model, variance between them is obviously reduced” (Heichel et. al., 2005: 833). 
Nevertheless, the different types of convergence can also occur in their own right.  
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3.3 Regulatory regimes in the context of European gas market reform 
The next section fulfils three purposes. First and foremost, we provide the working definition for 
regulatory regime. Second, we outline the concept comprehensiveness of regulatory regimes and 
third, provide a classification for regulatory models.  
  
Regulatory regime is defined as the bundle of institutional arrangements triggered by the 
liberalisation process in the context of the European gas reform. These institutional arrangements 
are mainly implemented on a national level in anticipation of meeting obligations imposed by the 
European Gas Directives. With reference to Williamson, we distinguish between formal 
institutions such as laws on one side and institutional arrangements on the other (see Oliver E.  
Williamson, 1998: 25-29). In general, institutional arrangements span actual regulatory 
instruments and decisions as well as contracts, forms of public and private cooperation, firms’ 
tariff structure, and trading practices (see International Gas Union, 2006: 22-23). Our analysis 
concentrates on the formal dimension, the actual regulatory instruments or so-called hands-on 
regulation (ibid). Regulatory practices are not included in the assessment of regulatory regimes. 
For the operation of regulatory regime we refer to the concept of regulatory comprehensiveness 
initially put forward by Genoud, coined jointly by Finger and Genoud, and then modified by 
Arentsen (Maarten Arentsen, 2004; Genoud, 2001; Genoud & Finger, 2004). Genoud 
conceptualised regulation in the context of electricity liberalisation reform to analyse the impact 
of privatisation on the regulatory performance in terms of coherence, efficiency, and 
effectiveness. Genoud takes a broader public policy perspective in response to the economically 
biased understanding of regulation as perceived in various theories of regulation. In his 
dominantly descriptive analytical framework, he suggests that existing regulation and 
privatisation shape the outcomes of regulatory games. In this context, it is necessary to assess 
and conceptualise coherence of regulation as independent and dependent variable. For the latter, 
he focuses on the coherence and efficiency aspects (see Genoud, 2001: 26-27).  
 
Within the process of conceptionalisation, Genoud made two important steps relevant for our 
analysis. Firstly, by taking a public policy perspective, Genoud was enabled to distinguish 
between the policy and polity dimension of the regulatory regime (see Genoud, 2001: 13). 
Arentsen labelled these two dimensions regulatory function and regulatory competencies (see 
Maarten Arentsen, 2004: 85). Second, Genoud introduces the idea of coherence of regulation and 
proposes criteria to assess this coherence. Later, Finger and Genoud coined and operated the 
concept of comprehensive regulation for the electricity reform (see Genoud & Finger, 2004). 
Arentsen (2004) applies it then to the European gas reform. The concept of regulatory 
comprehensiveness is embedded in the structure-conduct-performance paradigm when 
perceiving regulatory comprehensiveness as variable for regulation linked with the structure, 
business conduct, and performance triangle. According to Finger, Genoud, and Arentsen, 
regulatory comprehensiveness determines the degree of openness of gas markets. This is 
perceived as a basic condition for the degree of competition. In addition to regulation, market 
structure and business strategies also influence the degree of competitiveness of gas markets. The 
comprehensiveness of a regulation realizes itself in this two-dimensional concept: “One 
dimension referring to necessary regulatory functions and one dimension referring to regulatory 
competencies” (Maarten Arentsen, 2004: 85). Ultimately, the concept makes it possible “to 
assess whether or not the Member State’s legal reforms meet formal standards of a competition-
based gas market” (ibid). Applying the concept, Arentsen conducted a preliminary assessment of 
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the regulatory comprehensiveness induced by the European gas reform. On the basis of his 
empirical findings, he suggests a three-fold classification of regulatory models:  
  
1 The Comprehensive regulatory model, holding all (…) legal regulatory conditions for competition.  
2 The emerging regulatory model, still developing the (…) legal regulatory conditions for competition.  
3 The minimal regulatory model, holding only minimal (…) legal regulatory conditions. (Maarten Arentsen, 
2004: 90) 
Our analysis adopts the concept of regulatory comprehensiveness as developed by Finger, 
Genoud, and Arentsen. Using Arentsen’s first attempt to assess the regulatory performance as a 
starting point, the next chapter formulates a research methodology that allows us to analyse the 
convergence towards competition based regulatory regimes in the European gas markets.  
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4. EUROPEAN GAS MARKET REFORM, 1998 - 2007: A ROAD MAP 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the main developments of gas market reform, focusing on the European 
level. This broad outline certainly does not fill the gap or the need for an exhaustive analysis or 
history of gas sector reform in the European Union. It would be worth a book of its own, not to 
mention a book on European Energy policy incorporating the different energy policy fields. For 
the pre-liberalisation phase, there are only a few in-depth analyses on energy policies in general 
and gas sector reform in particular. Hanne Matlary, Peter Cameron, and Jonathan Stern proved to 
be the pioneers and distinguished connoisseurs of the European energy sector. Matlary (1997) 
offered a theory-guided analysis of the evolution of European Policy between 1985-1995, 
stressing the relative power distribution of EU actors on the one hand and actors such as state 
and market actors on the other. She explains why a common energy policy stranded before the 
single market act initiated in 1986 finally reached the gas and electricity sector by end of the 
1990s. Peter Cameron (2002) gives a comprehensive expose of how the legal framework of the 
gas and electricity framework evolved between 1988-1998. Jonathan Stern (1998) not only 
covers market developments in the 1990s and the evolution of the first Gas Directive, but 
analysed ex ante “how competition and liberalisation may emerge in Continental European 
countries, and to investigate how these models may differ from those of Britain and North 
America” (Stern, 1998: 201). Before assessing ex post the development of regulatory regimes as 
part of the market model, we first expose the road map of the European gas market reform, 
emphasising the policy dimension. The aim of this chapter is to identify impulses stemming from 
energy policy that stimulate convergence of regulatory regimes. For this reason, we explore 
whether major changes of general or energy policy objectives occurred. On the basis of this 
inductive approach, we then formulate expectations with regard to convergence of regulatory 
regimes.   
4.2 Evolution of the reform   
For the analyses of institutional change, Groenewegen and Künneke propose an evolutionary 
perspective to understand institutional reforms in infrastructure industry. The idea of 
evolutionary change of economic governance is based on institutional economics formulated by 
Williamson who suggests that internal institutional and external factors shape the emergence and 
revision of economic governance. In this more dynamic interpretation of institutional change, 
institutions are not only given constraints, “…but under certain conditions institutions can erode 
and discontinue.” (Groenewegen & Künneke, 2005: 12) Instead, “In processes of institutional 
change equilibrium and stability are considered to be the exception and contradiction and change 
are the rules” (ibid: 12). In this interpretation of institutional change, actors can influence and 
change institutions – a process which is constantly observable when analysing the European gas 
market reform.  
 
 
Applying this evolutionary perspective, we argue that the adoption of each relevant Directive and 
Regulation constituting the gas reform represents a moment of stability which might be 
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perceived as a kind of equilibrium situation. Hence, we can identify four moments of equilibria. 
Figure 2 shows these moments in time and indicates that the fifth moment has not yet been 
reached in summer 2007. The proposed allegory describing the reform process has its limitation. 
It suggests that there is a linear sequence of events or processes. On the contrary, we see that 
some discussions and processes either overlap or even take place in parallel. Although 
identifying equilibria may be a simplified way to describe the reform process, it allows us to 
define a path through what some people perceive as regulatory jungle. The road map of the 
European gas market reform is organised along these equilibra and distinguishes five phases. 
 
Figure 2: Evolutionary process of the European gas market reform 
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1. GD = First Gas Directive: 2. GD = Second Gas Directive; SosD = Security of Supply Directive; R1775 = Regulation 1775
Source: Applied version of Groenewegen and Künneke (2005)  
4.3 First phase – first Directive  
On 11 May 1998, the energy ministers adopted the first Gas Directive after the European 
Parliament (EP) had accepted the Council’s common position without any amendment. 
Thereafter, a period of relatively little activity on the community level followed; activity was 
supposed to take place at the national level. The old member states, except for Finland, Greece, 
and Portugal which were granted derogations, had time to transpose the first Gas Directive by 10 
August 2000. On the European level, the Madrid Forum (MF) had been established and the 
European Commission, the regulatory authorities, and industry representatives met for the first 
time 30 September 1999. The first Directive required the European Commission to monitor those 
harmonisation requirements, linked and not linked to the actual provisions to the Council and the 
European Parliament. Although it was only at the end of 2001 that the first official benchmarking 
report was published, earlier reports served as forerunners. For instance, on 23 November 1999 
the European Commission released a short report trying to grasp relevant regulatory issues. The 
report mainly paid a lot of attention to barriers for cross-border trade, and the impact of 
derogations due to ‘Take-or-pay’ arrangements on the introduction of effective third Party 
Access without providing any relevant insights or propositions (see EC Inform-Energy, 1999, 
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April: 2). The next real assessment of the regulatory reform to come was the review by the 
European Parliament and the European Council that was designated by the first Gas Directive. In 
the meantime, the Commission made use of the interim period and merged the formerly separate 
Directorate-General Energy and Transport into DG TREN - a step which had little influence on 
the reform as such, except directing some internal attention to the reorganisation.  
 
In early 2000, the European Union formulated a wider strategy at its summit held in Lisbon, 
reacting to a growing economic competition driven by globalisation processes. What became the 
‘Lisbon Strategy’ aimed for nothing less than “making the European Union (EU) the most 
competitive economy in the world and achieving full employment by 2010” (European 
Commission, 2006c). Equally ambitious was the input from the European Commission with 
regard to their energy related targets. To contribute to the Council meeting in March, the EC 
published a report in which they suggested “the date 2004 to be set for the full liberalisation and 
integration of European energy markets” (EC Inform-Energy, 2000, March: 3). The 
Commission’s proposed timetable evoked a chorus of surprise and harsh criticism. Considering 
the amount of work that still had to be done, the claim appeared to be at best unrealistic. 
Moreover, the liberalisation faced significant opposition across Europe. All in all, the 2004 target 
could not serve as a threat, but indicated a beginner’s mistake. The resistance of the incumbent 
industry and some governments did not considerably diminish. The summit on 23 and 24 March 
2000 did not suggest a clear roadmap for the acceleration of the gas reform, but instead the EC 
proposition was abandoned. The common denominator was only to agree on a call “…for rapid 
work to be undertaken to complete the internal market in both electricity and gas sectors to speed 
up liberalisation in these sectors with view to achieving a fully operational internal market” 
(Directive 2003/55/EC, Recital 3). Although member states did not withdraw their support in 
Lisbon, the summit certainly could not be considered breakthrough. The Commission gained 
more support later that summer when the European Parliament formulated a resolution on 6 July 
2000, “requesting the Commission to adopt a detailed timetable for the achievement of 
accurately defined objectives with a view to gradually but completely liberalising the energy 
market.” (See Directive 2003/55/EC, Recital 3). 
 
While there was political stagnation, the Madrid Forum turned out to be the relevant Forum to 
discuss regulatory instruments on the working level. Held on 11-12 May 2000, participants of the 
Madrid Forum discussed the results of the Brattle Group’s comprehensive study on tariff 
methodology, capacity rights, and balancing regimes (see Lapuerta & Moselle, 2002). This study 
had been commissioned by DG TREN and clearly took a stand that differed from the industries’ 
view presented by Eurogas. The Brattle Groups’ in-depth analysis allowed the regulators, 
including the EC, to decrease the information asymmetry between regulators and regulated. At 
the same meeting, another important move was made. The European Commission and the 
national regulators called the industry to form a separate association to represent the interest of 
the gas transmission operators. The underlying idea was that transmission operators do not 
necessarily share the same interests as shippers or traders. Following the motto Divide et 
impere!, the regulatory side invited the creation of GTE and thereby attempted to foster the 
formulation of independent positions of network operators on regulatory measures. Two months 
later, the Gas Transmission Europe (GTE) was set up within the structure of the Union of Gas 
Industry (Eurogas) and was placed literally under their roof (see EC Inform-Energy, July 2000, 
19).    
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The old member states had to implement the First Directive by the end of July 2000. The 
cornerstones of the First Directive are set by market opening and initial steps towards changing 
the industry structure and network access conditions by introducing legal unbundling and 
negotiated and regulated third party access. The legal provisions and their development in the 
course of the reform are described in detail in chapter 5. Therefore, our attention now focuses on 
the political activities on the community level in autumn 2000. At that point, the EC opened 
infringement procedures against France and Luxembourg for not transposing the first Gas 
Directive’s provisions into national law. Germany and Portugal were deferred with regard to 
their implementation, but an infringement proceeding was not opened, since the EC had been 
notified that the Gas Directive’s transposition was imminent (see EC Inform-Energy, 2001, 
January: 10). Later, France announced a delay of the transposition of the first Directive and the 
partial privatisation of Gaz de France until after the French parliamentary elections in 2002. 
Privatisation of the state-owned company was especially considered too highly politically 
charged to tackle during the election campaign. As a consequence, the European Commission 
brought the case to the Court of Justice on 7 May 2001 (see ibid; EC Inform-Energy, 2001, May: 
12). 
4.4 Acceleration phase: second Gas Directive  
The hope that the Council meeting in Stockholm in March 2001 or the Energy Council a month 
later would bring about a timetable, laying down the next steps to accelerate the gas reform, had 
been in vain (see EC Inform-Energy, 2001, April: 4, 2001, June: 2). No policy decisions on 
energy issues were made during either summit. The energy related discussions mainly centred on 
the Commission’s Green Paper (GP) on security of supply and the European Commission’s 
proposal amending the first Gas Directive. This time, the European Commission’s attempt to 
foster liberalisation policy in the gas sector was supported by a resolution of the European 
Parliament and from member states such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Spain. 
France and Germany prominently opposed any progress to be reached at the summit (see EC 
Inform-Energy, 2001, April: 4). In this context, EC Inform-Energy argues that there were strong 
indications that Germany and France coordinated on a bilateral summit and Germany assured its 
support of France’s liberalisation position. Moreover,  
 
the German Chancellor was quoted as saying that Germany did not want to turn the issue into a conflict 
with France, and the Finance Minister Hans Eichel was quoted as suggesting that the hard position of 
France would not change before the next elections” (ibid).  
 
Although the prevailing constellation within the Council remained a stalemate, the Commission 
was prepared to push further. In its proposal amending the first Gas Directive, the Commission 
called for a liberalised access for business consumers by 2004 and for all consumers by 2005. 
Additionally, the proposal looked to shift gas market regulation away from governmental 
supervision to control independent regulators. Moreover, the Directive is supposed to emphasise 
and introduce more public service obligations. The latter refer to security of supply measures, 
environmental, and social cohesion concerns (see EC Inform-Energy, 2001, March: 2). 
 
That summer offered another arena to push for liberalisation when the fourth meeting of the 
Madrid Forum was held. The meeting in July vividly demonstrated the MF’s function as a 
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platform where the constant battle to gain more information on the functioning of the market and 
its gas networks was fought to decrease the information asymmetry between the industry and the 
regulatory actors. The GTE was criticised by regulators, the EC, and most member states, for its 
unwillingness “to publish detailed indicative available capacities at all major entry and exit 
points” (EC Inform-Energy, 2001, July), requested during the last meeting of the Forum.  
 
The first official benchmarking report was published in December 2001 and confirmed the 
expected: market performance in terms of competition was disappointing. So far, European 
national gas markets were characterised by high prices and tariff differentials, a high degree of 
market concentration, insufficient unbundling, a lack of market based balancing regimes, and ex 
ante regulation to name just a few. The prices of gas and electricity were especially of concern. 
In some European countries, natural gas increases its share in electricity generation. During the 
1990’s the European industry was paying 40% more for its electricity than its American 
competitors (see EC Inform-Energy, 2004, September: 3). For instance, the average price for 
households or small commercial businesses in July 2001 ranged from €52 per MWh in Sweden 
to €122 per MWh in Germany. The same holds true for average large users in 2001. With €34 
per MWh Sweden has the lowest prices, whereas Italy comes in last with €77 per MWh (see EC 
Inform-Energy, 2001, December: 2). In this context it is noteworthy that the price level proved to 
be not only important for the European Commission as a strategic goal to enhance the European 
competitiveness, but also to prevent protests against rising energy prices, as had happened in the 
past when fuel prices went up.  
 
For a liberalisation enthusiast, the course of the liberalisation process in 2001 was certainly not 
encouraging. At the EU energy minister meeting in 4-5 December 2001, the reform stagnation 
persisted at first. Giving partially in, the then Commissioner De Palacio,  
 
told the Member states she was prepared to accept a more distant date than 2005 for completion of the 
internal gas and electricity markets for domestic consumers, but that she was inflexible on the final date for 
completion of 2003-04 for all professional (including small one-man businesses) and industrial consumers. 
(EC Inform-Energy, 2001, December: 5)   
 
After extensive discussions on appropriate tariff structures held in the context of the Madrid 
Forum, the Commission, Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), consumer 
organisations and traders formed an alliance and claimed at the fifth Madrid Forum “entry-exit” 
tariff structures to be most favourable. According to this view, entry-exit meets the principles of 
cost-reflectiveness and facilitates efficient gas trade, market liquidity and gas-to-gas competition. 
GTE did not share this clear cut preference. In contrast, gas transmission operators perceive it is 
a case-by-case question whether entry-exit or point-to-point tariff structures or combinations 
thereof are more appropriate. Another outcome has been the adoption of the “Guidelines for 
good practice regarding TPA services, tariff structures and balancing”. (See EC Inform-Energy, 
2002, February: 10); (Madrid Forum, 2001);  (Madrid Forum, 2002). 
 
The Barcelona summit on 5 March 2002 fulfilled the hopes that a Spanish EU presidency could 
bring dynamism back into the stalemate. And indeed, France accepted the market opening for the 
non-household costumers by 2004. Part of the deal was as well, that most member states had to 
accept that there will be no concrete implementation date for opening household markets. By 
offering larger commercial users like for instance the energy-intensive industry the possibility to 
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switch their supplier, the EU could achieve to introduce competition in 60% of the total market. 
If as a consequence gas prices for large commercial consumers would decrease at least 
decreasing the monopolistic rents of energy companies, the EU would have achieved increasing 
the competitiveness of European industry (See EC Inform-Energy, 2002, April: 4). 
 
Some headwind for the so-called acceleration, second Directive came from an unexpected side in 
2002. The EP’s plenary session on 13 March, closed with 160 amendments the first proposal for 
the second Directive by the European Commission.  Most relevant were the amendments 
concerning unbundling, and the regulatory authorities on the national and European level. 
Whereas the EP calls explicitly for ownership unbundling in the electricity sector, it was 
adherent measures to determine the degree of unbundling. Supporting the European 
Commissions proposal, the EP says simply “the transmission system operator must be de jure 
and de facto independent of the gas supply undertaking in regard to access to the assets necessary 
to maintain and develop the networks” (ibid: 6). The proposal of transferring national regulatory 
competencies to independent regulators was rejected. Instead, the EP opted for allowing also 
multi-authority structures by replacing the wording on the need for a national regulator to “one 
or more competent bodies as regulatory authorities’ in deference to Germany’s position” (ibid: 
5). It was also on this occasion that the EP introduced the idea to change the regulatory authority 
landscape on the Community level, while suggesting that the European Commission initiates a 
European Regulators Group. One year later, this idea resulted in the foundation of the European 
Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) (see European Commission, 2003b). 
Although the nature of ERGEG is best described as an intergovernmental body, it was regarded 
to become the nucleus for a Common European Energy Regulatory Authority. Hence at the 
current stage, ERGEG is mainly supposed to provide input to the regulatory process, in order to 
support the European Commission, but without questioning the Commissions right to initiate 
legislation. Taking into account the political statements made by the member states and the 
European Parliament, the EC went back to DG TREN’s headquarter in Rue du Mot to formulate 
a more consensual proposal.   
 
The publication of the second benchmarking Report on 1 October 2002 did not reveal any 
surprises. Referring to the considerable heterogeneity of regulatory regimes in the old member 
states, it criticises the overall “patchy progress” (EC Inform-Energy, 2002). Progressive 
developments in Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain were positively alluded to, whereas Germany 
was rebuked for its slow progress. Even by late autumn 2002, Germany had still not 
implemented the first Directive, although the deadline had been August 2001. German 
authorities had yet to draft legislation, but in the communications with the EC, there was no date 
stated for its adoption. Consequently, the EC finally decided on 16 October 2002 to bring the 
German case to the Court of Justice. (See EC Inform-Energy, 2002, November: 17).  
 
On 25 November 2002, the Energy Council brought about the final agreement on the opening of 
the market for households. At last, the opening for all users was set for 1 July 2007 (see EC 
Inform-Energy, 2002, December: 4). The tug of war between France and the Commission ended 
in a draw. One party could prevail delaying the adoption of the acceleration Directive, and the 
other could assert the date of the market opening for industrial consumers. Those left out in the 
cold were in fact the private household costumers. This outcome seemed to have actually 
encouraged rather than prevented France and Germany to push harder and soften the unbundling 
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provisions for Distribution System Operators (DSO). The compromise foresees two derogations 
for DSO’s, one called for a 100,000 customer exemption and the other a postponement option 
(see section 5.3.3). For proponents of a strict liberalisation policy, the provisions concerning the 
third party access to storage, linepack, and ancillary services were especially disappointing. 
Instead of introducing directly regulated TPA of storage, the second Directive follows the old 
hesitant scheme applied for the first Directive, allowing both negotiated and regulated third party 
access to storage.  
 
 
During the summer months, the proposed second Directive entered the usual legislative process 
on the EU level: an initial reading in the European Parliament on 12-13 May 2003 followed by a 
revised proposal from the European Commission, revisiting the European Parliament for the 
second reading on 4 June 2003 and entering the final stage by the Council statements and the 
Commissions formulation of a common position, finalising on 26 June 2003 with the adoption of 
the second Gas Directive. By the time the second Directive entered the legislative process all 
major decisions concerning the degree of intervention had been negotiated earlier and only fine 
tuning took place.   
 
   
The European Union took a little more than two years to reach a consensus on the acceleration 
Directive. Due to active resistance by France and Germany and the affirmative silence of some 
other member states, the qualitative progress achieved by the Directive is only limited. Overall 
the second Directive became a watered down version of the Commission’s initially ambitious 
aims. The market opening for households was carried out two years later than initially intended 
and the degree of unbundling was not changed in principle, but suggests only a functional 
improvement by introducing the concept of management unbundling. Moreover, the EC could 
not prevail with establishing independent regulators in the member states but allows regulatory 
authorities to share the sector regulation. Noteworthy in this context is that the second Directive 
places more emphasis on security of supply and other public service obligations. This has been 
one consequence of the ongoing security of supply debates which has been (re-) initiated by the 
publication of the Green Paper on security of supply. Ultimately, the second Directive also laid 
the foundation for the creation of ERGEG (see Directive 2003/55/EC, Recital 14). 
 
 
In 2003 Directorate-Generals Competition (DG COMP) and DG TREN restructured their 
internal organisation. Under the aegis of Competition Commissioner Mario Monti, the 
competition rules had been reformed and streamlined in 2003. Then, Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 
established a basis for cross-national sector investigations. In May 2003, the DG COMP entered 
the reorganisation phase to prepare for the rising work load induced by the enlargement of the 
EU in May 2004. According to 2001 estimations, the enlargement was supposed to increase the 
DG’s work load by 30% to 40% (see EC Inform-Energy, 2003, May: 10). However, the 
reorganisation can be also interpreted as a response to the new procedural rules for the 
enforcement of the anti-trust rules set out in Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty. The major change is 
that DG Competition was from then on based on sector-specific organisation of merger control in 
order to allow efficient anti-trust law enforcement. Looking back, the competence to conduct 
cross-national sector investigations and the sector-specific reorganisation turned out to form the 
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necessary precondition for DG COMP’s later activities in the context of the energy sector 
inquiry. DG TREN also partly reorganised due to the enlargement but unlike DG COMP no 
significant changes took place. (See EC Inform-Energy, 2005, March-b: 2; European 
Commission, 2005e) 
4.5 Security of Supply Directive 
After the internal market liberalisation went into the legislative process, the security of supply 
Directive moved up on the agenda. The EC had been trying since 2002 to harmonise oil stock 
and gas storage policies and thereby attempt to transfer more competencies to the supranational 
level. The proposal would have implied a substantial shift in economic governance of the natural 
gas market. So far, gas storage is treated as a commodity which is subject to trade and perceived 
as private property companies decide over. In turn, introducing strategic storage by regulation 
would have implied the transfer of substantial decision-making power from private to public. In 
this sense, the Security of Supply Directive proposed to treat gas storage as public property. 
During the spring Council meeting on 20-21 March 2003, the Council “underlined the 
importance of reaching rapidly an agreement on proposals reinforcing cooperation in managing 
EU gas and oil stocks” (EC Inform-Energy, 2003, April: 3). One would be mistaken to interpret 
this remark as unanimous approval of the Commission’s suggestions by the Council and 
European Parliament. Instead, the plenary session of the European Parliament on 22 September 
2003 revealed the extensive disapproval of establishing the European Commission as keeper of 
European security of supply, when even the Parliamentarians forcefully opposed the initiative. 
This was even truer for oil stocks than for gas provisions. One reason for the stronger opposition 
to create any common European oil stock mechanism might have been related to the fact that an 
international mechanism within the International Energy Agency framework was already in 
place. 
 
In the end, the Directive on petroleum products was rejected while the Directive on gas security 
of supply received 19 amendments but was finally approved (see EC Inform-Energy, 2003, 
October). The original proposal for the Directive on security of gas supply foresaw for instance 
that member states should impose minimum storage objectives on undertakings. Prescribing a 
certain amount of storage would have had an important impact on the gas sector. As the 
following citation shows, the Commission was not only aiming to intervene in the market, but 
also to control when to release stored gas. The European Economic and Social Committee refers 
in their opinion to the Commissions proposal to the Commission by saying,  
 
in the event of crises and in order to ensure solidarity between member states, the Commission wishes to be 
able to take decisions to release stocks of gas held in the member states and actually to interrupt supplies to 
the interruptible market. (European Commission, 2003c: 18) 
 
 The Commission also proposed the creation of a European Observation System for supply of 
hydrocarbons. Finally, all attempts to transfer decision competencies from the member states to 
the European Commission were jointly rejected in the Council, the Parliament, and involved 
Committees. When the Directive concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply was 
published, none of the ambitious aims were included. Instead, the EC increased their sector 
information by requiring the member states to report the contract durations of supply 
arrangements. Instead of a full-fledged European gas crisis group equipped with decision-making 
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power, a light version called the ‘gas coordination group’ was established to enhance the 
coordination and information exchange between the member states. (See Directive 2004/67/EC, 
Art. 7, 8). 
 
4.6 Regulation 1775 
The main topic during year six of the gas reform was the Guidelines for third party access and 
the Commission’s aim to translate them into a Regulation. These guidelines had been formulated 
and introduced on a voluntary non-binding basis by the Madrid Forum in February 2002. After 
their revision, the guidelines provoked controversy at the Energy Council in June 2004. The 
opposing camp at the Council put forward three criticisms concerning its timing, the chosen 
regulatory measure, and the scope of the measure. Firstly, some argued that the regulation came 
too soon, indirectly blaming the EC for regulatory over-eagerness. According to this line of 
reasoning, it should have waited until the acceleration Directive (Second Directive) reveals its 
effects. Second, some member states preferred framework regulation instead of immediate 
regulation because it offered more discretion and thereby decision-making power to the member 
states. A regulation reduces the member states influence on the comitology procedure, in which 
national experts fulfil an advisory role. Third, opponents criticised the scope of the regulation 
which should have been limited to cross-border access instead of applying to the whole gas 
network (see EC Inform-Energy, 2004, May: 5-6). In particular, industry associations have not 
been pleased with the proposal to incorporate the Guidelines and felt cheated, because those 
Measures had been developed under the premise of voluntariness.  
 
Regardless of the considerable effort with which opponents attacked the regulation, the European 
Commission was eager enough and equally successful “to tackle remaining barriers” (Regulation 
1775/2005) concerning network access conditions. As the EC justified in Regulation 1775 
“additional technical rules are necessary, in particular regarding third party access services, 
principles of capacity allocation mechanisms, congestion management procedures and 
transparency requirements” (Regulation 1775/2005, Recital 1). The European Parliament added 
some amendments which had been the result of earlier negotiations with the Council before 
approving it on 8 March 2005. These amendments did not trigger any substantial changes, but 
stated more precisely the measures emphasising the need to be cost-reflective.  
 
While new legislation was already on its way, the EC had to take action against member states 
who failed to transpose the second Gas Directive on 16 March 2005, when the EC entered the 
second phase of infringement procedure. At that point, reasoned opinions were sent to Belgium, 
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, and Sweden. (See Directorate-General for Energy and 
Transport, 2005). 
 
Looking back at the last two legislative initiatives (Security of Supply Directive in 2004 and the 
Regulation 1775 in 2005), it is striking that the crucial topics concerning storage could not be 
solved in either. So far, neither a crisis mechanism for European gas supply nor a minimum 
storage obligation in the case of supply disruption could be established. Instead, storage was left 
to the Madrid Forum mechanism. There, the Joint Working Group of the Madrid Forum decided 
in March 2005 to adopt ERGEG’s voluntary Guidelines for Good Practice for Gas Storage 
System Operators (GGPSSO). Aware of a growing import dependency of natural gas, this 
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circumstance left some energy experts and politicians concerned. On the one hand, the 
experience with the first set of Guidelines relating to third party access did not turn out to be a 
success story of industry self-regulation – the industry’s compliance had been too low. On the 
other hand, a comprehensive gas storage policy has not been introduced so far, and is still in its 
infancy. As the next section shows, the effects of this hesitancy to tackle natural gas storage 
became apparent relatively quickly.  
4.7  Exploring the potential: evaluation and reinforcement phase 
The European Council adopted the revised Lisbon Strategy in March 2005 to foster European 
competitiveness in reaction to globalisation and its growing competition between geographic 
locations. The revision mainly tried to revitalise the common European broader economic goals 
by formulating European-wide targets and implementation procedures. Energy prices were rising 
high at that time and brought the gas reform back on the agenda. Carried by the Lisbon spirit, the 
Directorate-General for Competition announced that the EC was initiating sector investigations 
in the field of financial services and energy. The launch of the energy sector inquiry marked the 
start of a new phase of evaluation and enforcement. (See EC Inform-Energy, 2005, March-a: 2). 
  
The official opening of the energy sector inquiry took place on 13 June 2005. Under the new 
regulation DG COMP was able to conduct an inquiry “where the trend of trade between member 
states, the rigidity of prices or other circumstances suggest that competition may be restricted or 
distorted within the common market.” (European Commission, 2005e: 1). In the Commission’s 
Decision, the enforcement policy was justified by the malfunctioning of the European gas market 
indicated by slow integration, rising prices, and market concentration. Especially the 
development of gas and electricity prices were Commissions concerns. According to DG COMP, 
there was distrust in the existing mechanism of price formulation. Although the accusation of 
price agreements was not stated explicitly, the Commission suggested that the lack of liquidity in 
the market “leads to price volatility and may give scope for manipulation” (European 
Commission, 2005e: 1). To strengthen their argument, the EC referred to energy intensive user’s 
experience from different member states having difficulties obtaining competitive offers. In this 
regard, the Commission repeatedly received tailwind from energy intensive user associations 
such as the Federation of Industrial Energy Consumers (IFIEC-Europe) (see EC Inform-Energy, 
November 2005: 3). It was not only the energy intensive users who pressed for action on the EU 
level. Later in 2005 the British gas regulator Ofgem also requested DG COMP to step in. In 
November 2005, Ofgem asked DG COMP in an official letter to enquire into the market 
malfunctioning between continental Europe on the one side and Britain and Ireland on the other 
side. Ofgem then complained, “much higher prices in the UK compared with continental Europe 
in October 2005 did not result in a comparable inward flow of gas, which the economics of a 
competitive market expect” (EC Inform-Energy, 2005, December: 7). For an economist the 
situation was puzzling: Demand and supply was not matching, wholesale prices went up but no 
gas could be directed to the UK from continental Europe. Looking back, one can say that the UK 
was suffering from transitional problems as a result of a self-sufficient gas exporter developing 
towards a net importer. On the one hand, natural gas production (capacities) decreased more than 
expected and limited to UK offshore fields to serve as swing producers. On the other hand, the 
UK did not provide over sufficient gas storage to balance out the demand cap. Being a producing 
country the UK did not have same degree of storage as other Continental European member 
states (see Ofgem, 2004, October). To prevent such malfunctioning in the years to come and to 
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foster the gas inflows from Continental Europe, Ofgem lobbied for competition in the market. 
Armed with EC Regulation No. 1/2003, DG COMP was determined to spearhead the promotion 
of a competitive European gas market by carrying out cross-EU sectoral investigations (see EC 
Inform-Energy, 2005, March-b: 2). What could have started as a concerted action between DG 
COMP and DG TREN, turned out to be an uneasy alliance in the first place. Instead of involving 
DG TREN in the announcement procedure, DG COMP voted for a solo under the new lead of 
competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes. The debut of the competition Commissioner and the 
new challenge of an energy sector inquiry seemed to induce the need to clarify the role the 
Directorate-Generals were supposed to play within the enforcement phase. During the next half 
year coordination between the two Directorate-Generals improved and the competencies were 
redefined. Thereafter, DG TREN was supposed to develop regulation and proposals on the basis 
of its initiative right regulatory action to the European Parliament and the Council, whereas DG 
COMP ensured the competition oversight. The benefits of this coordination became evident 
when DG TREN and DG COMP jointly presented their findings on 15 November 2005. DG 
TREN published its report on the regulatory performance of the member states and DG COMP 
presented its initial findings of the energy sector inquiry.   
 
The sector inquiries’ initial findings outlined the major malfunctions. In an initial step, the 
Commission targeted five malfunctions: market concentration, lack of liquidity on the gas 
market, insufficient market integration indicated by numerous barriers towards cross-border 
trade, lack of transparency hampering competition, and high prices in conjunction with a lack of 
trust in price formation on wholesale level (see European Commission, 2005f). In a second step, 
the EC published the preliminary report four month later which specified some criticism and 
sketched a way forward in terms of competition law and regulatory enforcement. In the 
preliminary report, DG COMP elaborates much more on the argument of vertical foreclosure. 
Accordingly, the prevalence of long term supply contracts in combination with an insufficient 
degree of unbundling between transport and trade transactions result in vertical foreclosure that 
hinders the creation of a competitive market. As long term supply contracts and their derogations 
from third party access are a given, the unbundling came into force under the European 
Commission (see European Commission, 2006d, 16 February: 3). The preliminary report hardly 
exposed any new facts, but provided evidence of what was known to the industry and energy 
experts. Nevertheless, this sector inquiry and its precision was a necessary step to prepare for the 
regulatory enforcement the Commission was heading for. By stressing the need for a stricter 
unbundling of the gas industry, DG COMP kept its promise to feed some arguments to the 
regulatory activities DG TREN was preparing. 
 
On 14 March 2006, the Energy Council was held and discussed the Green paper ‘A European 
Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy’. The Green paper did not contain any 
groundbreaking changes but posed  
 
the […] fundamental question [of] whether there is an agreement on the need to develop a new, common 
European strategy for energy, and whether sustainability, competitiveness and security should be the core 
principles that underpin the strategy. (European Commission, 2006: 4) 
 
In other words, the EU proceeded in terms of strategy formulation by identifying six priority 
areas. These ranged from policy areas concerning (i) competitiveness and internal market, (ii) 
diversification of the energy mix, (iii) solidarity mechanism in energy supply crisis, (iv) 
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promotion of sustainable development, to (v) foster innovation and technology and (vi) 
coordination of external energy policy. The EC used the Green paper to flank the strategy 
formulation with several initiatives that then could be discussed at the upcoming Council 
meeting at the end of March. To ensure that the development of a common European energy 
strategy stays alive and progresses, the EC proposes a Strategic European Energy Review 
(SEER) to be presented to the European Parliament and the Council on a regular basis (see 
European Commission, 2006: 5). With regard to the gas reform, the Green paper basically 
brought together the two strands of the current gas market regulation, internal market integration 
and security of supply measures for natural gas. With reference to the first strand, the EC 
proposed the establishment of a European grid code. To facilitate such a common network access 
code, the EC considered among other forms of oversight the creation of a European Energy 
Regulator. The Commission also advertised a ‘priority interconnection plan’ (European 
Commission, 2006: 5) to promote investments in cross-border transport capacity. In addition, the 
Green Paper takes up the view of DG COMP and DG TREN and stresses the significance of an 
effective unbundling to reach a level playing field to allow new entrants to compete under fair 
conditions. Following up the other strand, the Commission recommended for the establishment 
of a European Energy Supply Observatory that would gather information on EU demand and 
supply developments and detect shortfalls of transport infrastructure. Moreover, the Commission 
aspired to re-examine the Directive on gas security of supply. The selective list of proposals 
vividly demonstrates a magnitude of ideas to develop a common energy policy. (See ibid: 8). 
 
Shortly after its publication however, the Green Paper received a sober response from the head of 
governments during the Council on 23-24 March 2006. There, the intergovernmentalists 
emerged victorious. The heads of the European governments and their energy ministers rejected 
the EC’s initiative to create a common energy regulator for electricity and gas. Instead, the 
member states called for more coordination. Some comments reaffirmed the diverging 
interpretations on how a liberalised European market should look like. For instance “The 
German Chancellor, Angela Merkel said that the Single Market could only work ‘when 
electricity flows freely and when we accept European champions and not just think nationally’” 
(EC Inform-Energy, 2006, March: 5). French president Chirac formulated more elegantly “The 
construction of a Europe of Energy cannot be confined to the liberalisation of markets” (ibid). 
These comments suggest that it will take much more effort to overcome the divergent visions of 
a European energy market.  
 
After the harsh disappointment for the European Commission, the European energy regulator 
group followed the model on the Electricity Regional Initiative and launched a Gas Regional 
Initiative (GRI) in April 2006. Based on the initiative, seven Electricity Regional Energy 
Markets were formed as well as three Gas Regional Energy Markets (REM). This divides the 
European gas market into South, South-East, and North-West Regions. These Regional 
Initiatives are supposed to identify and remove barriers to trade at the regional level and thereby 
to overcome stagnation on the EU-level. ERGEG focuses on developing practical solutions for 
inter-trade and transport of natural gas in Europe, pinning its hope on increased cooperation of 
the relevant stakeholders when dealing with concrete tasks and projects. Some therefore see the 
Gas Regional Initiatives as ‘springboards’ (European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas, 
2007: 1) and a useful interim step towards a fully integrated, well functioning market. Others are 
more pessimistic; feeling that a regional approach in the end just delays the supranationalisation 
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of energy policy. Be that as it may, the council meeting in spring 2007 left no doubts regarding 
political will. There is no sufficient political will, therefore a regional diffusion of liberal ideas 
and enhanced cross-border cooperation looks the most promising for now. 
 
 
The year 2007 started with the publication of the energy package, which contained the final 
report of the energy sector inquiry, the Strategic European Energy Review, and the new energy 
policy the Commission formulated. The SEER replaced the benchmarking Report and serves as a 
monitoring tool to examine the performance of natural gas markets with respect to several goals 
ranging from market structure, security of supply situation, and environmental concerns. For our 
purposes, the results of the energy sector inquiry and the new energy policy are important and 
will be addressed in the following paragraphs.   
 
Unsurprisingly, the energy sector inquiry concludes that the overall aim of resolving the barriers 
currently impeding the development of a fully functioning open and competitive EU wide energy 
market by 1 July 2007 could not be fulfilled (see European Commission, 2007b). The final report 
expands the list of malfunctions by addressing phenomena occurring in downstream markets, 
balancing markets, and liquefied natural gas markets (LNG markets). The criticism with regard 
to downstream markets mainly centres on a lack of competition stemming from the contract 
durations for industrial and local distribution companies. After the introduction of liberalisation, 
balancing regimes are often based on short balancing periods, which according to the reasoning 
of the Directorate-General for Competition, does not encourage new entrants in the market, but 
rather reflects the interest of incumbents (see section 5.4). With regard to LNG markets, DG 
COMP does address the necessity of competition on the retail market and diversification of LNG 
supply. Although DG COMP indicates no worrying trend towards concentration within LNG 
markets, the report emphasises the need to monitor its development. (See European Commission, 
2007a, January 10: 9-11). 
 
In the context of the energy package, the European Commission made the step from energy 
strategy formulation to setting out a new energy policy. In the Green Paper the European 
Commission made the conceptual step to integrate internal market liberalisation, security of 
supply, and sustainable development. In January 2007, the European Commission translated the 
integrative concept into a new energy policy.  Ultimately, the combination of internal market 
integration and sustainability will formulate a more coherent European energy policy by bridging 
both the energy sectors and different policy aims, for instance fighting against climate change. 
Two subjects were important regarding gas market regulation: the distribution of regulatory 
power and the unbundling provisions. Whereas the proposition of establishing a common energy 
regulator had been rejected at the last Council meeting, the EC’s way forward in terms of 
unbundling awoke the interest of the energy community.  
 
After the defeat regarding the creation of a common energy regulator, the European Commission 
applied a more moderate strategy by outlining three possibilities for enhancing effective 
regulation of the European gas markets. The first option looks to preserve the institutional status-
quo with the only difference that the national regulators are supposed to take a more active role. 
In the Commissions interpretation, this option implies that national regulators increase the inter-
regulator coordination and prioritise community objectives instead of their national objectives. 
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The second option is described as a European network of independent regulators labelled 
“ERGEG+”. “Under this mechanism the role of ERGEG will be formalised and it would be 
given the task to structure binding decisions” (European Commission, 2007, January 10: 8). The 
third option would be a common energy regulator whose tasks are supposed to mainly centre on 
cross-border regulatory decisions. Although exposing three options, the Commission rejects the 
first option in the same document by arguing that effective decision-making will not be provided 
when 27 regulators with different interests are supposed to agree on cross-border issues on a 
voluntary basis, be it technical or regulatory standards. Accordingly, the Commission prefers the 
last option and considers the ERGEG+ variant as a minimal approach (see ibid: 9). 
 
In this context, it is noteworthy that the EC propositions did not question the regulatory oversight 
of the national regulators as such. Instead, the EU tries to follow the US example by suggesting a 
labour division between state and federal levels. Accordingly, internal market affairs such as 
tariff setting would remain with the national regulator, whereas derogations for investment in 
cross-border network linkages would be approved by a European authority, the so-called 
ERGEG+ (see ibid: 8-9; (Piebalgs, 2007, 7 February). One underlying idea of centralising 
regulatory oversight of cross-border issues to the supranational level is to make regulation more 
effective. Currently, anyone planning to invest in a project such as an LNG terminal and aims to 
receive a derogation of third party access needs the approval of at least two regulatory 
authorities, the European Commission as supervisor- and the national regulators involved.  
 
Before the publication of the third Energy Package in September 2007, the big question was 
whether the Commission would call for ownership unbundling to be mandatory, as the earlier 
announcement of DG COMP and DG TREN might have suggested. In anticipation of the lack of 
political will from the member states, the Commission did not hold a strong stance. Instead, the 
EC considered two possibilities. The first option is ownership unbundling, the Commission’s 
preference. The second option is the designation of Independent System Operators “where the 
vertically integrated company remains owner of the network assets and receives a regulated 
return on them, but is not responsible for their operation, maintenance or development” 
(European Commission, 2007, January 10: 7).  
 
Neither the Energy Council meeting on 15-16 February 2007 nor the following general Council 
meeting in spring 2007 brought about any progress in terms of unbundling or regulatory 
oversight. On the contrary, the Council voted for the minimum solution in both instances. 
Accordingly, the member states opted for Independent System Operators leaving open the degree 
of regulation imposed on network companies. The initial suggestion from the Commission 
foresaw a rate of return regulation, whereas the Council spoke of “adequately regulated network 
system operators” (Council of the European Union, 2007, May: 16). The action plan formulated 
by the Council did not propose any concrete action which would significantly support the 
European Commissions attempts.  
 
The third Energy Package contains a bundle of proposals which could have a considerable effect 
on the governance of the European gas sector once adopted. First and foremost, the Commission 
continued to strive for ownership unbundling while keeping the option of derogating through 
designating an Independent System Operator (ISO) by the national government. After the 
publication of the third Energy Package proposal, the member states and the Parliament divided 
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up in three groups: the proponents of ownership unbundling represented by the majority of 
Members of European Parliament, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, 
Spain, Finland, Romania and Sweden; the group of undecided consisted of Estonia, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Czech Republic and Slowenia; the group of 
opponents of ownership unbundling was lead by France and Germany and supported by Austria, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Slovakia (EurActiv.com, 2007). At the 
following Energy Council meeting in December 2007, Germany and France announced to 
propose a third option aiming below the level of ownership unbundling and the ISO option. This 
strategy has been employed to bottom out the regulatory standard with regard to unbundling and 
to win time for negotiations with the member states in the group of undecided.  
 
Secondly, the proposed Directive attempts to strengthen regulatory authorities on both levels by 
extending regulatory powers. For the ISO option accounts that regulators might obtain the right 
to review and approve 10-year investment plans formulated by the independent system operators 
and to carry out investigations at the transmission system owner and independent system 
operators premises (Article 24c), point 2.e). Moreover, regulators shall impose sanctions on 
companies “not complying with their obligations under this Directive or any decisions of the 
regulatory authority or of the Agency” (Art. 24c, point 3.b)). These references to the proposal, 
illustrate the immanent attempt to move from enacting to enforcing regulation. Into the same 
direction points the addition of Article 24 f) which requires supply undertakings to keep record 
of their transaction data. The underlying idea of the Directive is to decrease the information 
asymmetry by expanding the scope of controlling rights and report duties. To support the 
national regulators and to extend the room for negotiation, the proposal calls for only one single 
authority to be responsible for the sector oversight (Article 24a, point 1). At the Energy Council 
meeting in December 2007, Commissioner Piebalgs indicated the EC would not insist on a 
single-authority-structure, but certainly is more determined to establish the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). The ACER proposition draws on the earlier 
mentioned “ERGEG+” option. The aim of this Agency is to enhance the coordination of national 
regulators and ensure the cooperation between transmission system operators (European 
Commission, 2007d: 10-11). The proposal of the Agency runs the danger to be sandwiched 
between its proponents and opponents. Objectors simply reject any kind of increase in regulatory 
power, whereas the advocates of strong regulation criticise the proposal for not equipping the 
Agency with sufficient competencies to ensure effective regulation that justifies huge 
administrative costs of establishing a new Agency. It would be mistaken to interpret proposal 
and limited powers of a new Agency as a lack of ambition; instead it reflects the anticipation of 
realistic options. The EC employs a piecemeal technique which aims first to ensure the 
establishment of the Agency and the position of the Commission, then to expand regulatory 
powers of the Agency in the long run (see European Commission, 2007d: 11-13).  
 
Third, the Commission established the practice of releasing guidelines to steer the further 
liberalisation of the sector reform and plans to expand this practice in future. On several 
occasions, the Commission proposes the formulation of guidelines and determines the 
compliance mechanism of those guidelines (Article 24 e). Last but not least, the possibility to 
receive derogations for new investment projects or considerable upgrading of infrastructure like 
for instance interconnector between Member States, LNG or storage facilities is still guaranteed 
by Article 22. 
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4.8 Concluding considerations 
The nine years of gas market reform were characterised by constant power struggles on the one 
hand and learning and adaptation processes on the other. Altogether, we identified five phases 
ranging from one to four years. In our interpretation, the fifth phase is currently ongoing because, 
so far, no new legislative or regulatory act has found sufficient political support and approval 
among the member states.   
4.8.1 Conclusion and expectation 
This conclusion evaluates observations concerning the first layer of Williamson’s model by 
initially asking whether major changes of general or energy policy objectives occurred.   This 
makes it possible to formulate in a second step an expectation regarding the effects of this layer 
on the convergence of regulation.    
 
Within the Lisbon strategy in 2000 and its revision in 2005, the European Commission 
formulated its current wider economic policy goals. The inherent claim for competitive and 
affordable energy prices remained unchanged and induced impulses to continue the liberalisation 
track by emphasising the need of competitive prices. Economic performance indicated by natural 
gas prices functioned as a justification to start regulatory action in the form of the energy sector 
inquiry in 2005. After seven years of reform, it became not only apparent that existing measures 
would not sufficiently tackle the level of concentration in the market, but also the Directorate-
General for Competition was by then equipped with the necessary competencies to launch an 
energy sector enquiry. The results of the inquiry strengthened the argument for ownership 
unbundling and support its brother in arms DG TREN. In the short-term, the combined efforts of 
the Commission did not bring about much progress with regard to the core issues at stake. With 
reference to Williamson’s four-layer model, we can interpret that general economic objectives in 
conjunction with negative economic performance create regulatory activity striving to improve 
regulation by prescribing ownership unbundling. Nevertheless, a negative economic performance 
proved to be a necessary but insufficient condition to change member states’ attitudes towards 
ownership unbundling.    
 
In general, energy policy underwent a significant transformation, moving from a paradigm 
perceiving liberalisation, privatisation, and competition in the gas sector as paramount, to a new 
energy paradigm that addresses security of supply concerns and climate change. According to 
Helm, the latter is a result of structural changes in the energy markets such as a structural upward 
shift of oil prices, the ageing of assets, network failures, and greater import dependency that 
became apparent for politicians and policy planers  (see Helm, 2005). As a consequence, security 
of energy supply moved up on the political agenda. Within the gas market reform, this paradigm 
shift manifested most obviously in the Green paper “Towards a European Strategy for the 
Security of Energy Supply” (European Commission, 2000) and the formulation and adoption of 
the Security of Supply Directive. We later saw the European energy strategy, which the 
European Commission formulated in the Green paper of 2006, based on the core principles of 
sustainability, competitiveness, and security. With regard to gas market reform, the Green paper 
(2006) basically brought together the main elements of these two paradigms, internal market 
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integration and liberalisation and security of energy supply measures for natural gas. In other 
words, liberalisation, privatisation, and competition as objectives of the reform were not 
abandoned as policy objectives, but have been diluted by the objective of security of supply 
throughout the period under study.  
 
Regulators, policy planners, and politicians on European and national levels face the question of 
how to guarantee and carry out the public service obligation of security of supply in liberalised 
gas markets. In this context, long term security of supply is perceived as sufficient investment in 
import and network capacity, to meet future demand. Due to imperfect markets and certain 
characteristics of the natural gas market, there is a consensus among regulators and policy 
planners that security of energy supply will not be carried out by the invisible hand of the market 
alone, but must be ensured by hands-on regulation.  
 
Helm elaborates on five ways in which governments or regulatory authorities may try to ensure 
security of supply in liberal electricity markets. The first two fall under the category of 
competitive market approaches. Both put forward price regulation as key element of industry 
regulation. The second variant combines price regulation with capacity elements. Price 
regulation and its mixed variant are based on the neoclassical idea to influence performance by 
influencing price and/or quantity. The third possibility looks to directly impose more complex 
obligations on network operators. The fourth possibility represents various forms of state 
subsidy. Subsidies might be granted by direct money flows into investments projects or for 
instance by taking over planning risks. The fifth possibility is to rely on market power to impose 
costs. Helm describes this as a kind of virtual barter trade between government and the dominant 
company, in which the government is not intervening if the company guarantees a sufficient 
level of investment. Helm (2005) elaborates:  
 
The price of market power is investment. And with the ability that market power renders to pass through 
costs to final customers, the advantage of the market power model is that it reduces the cost of capital. In 
principle, provided the threat of regulation stops the undue exploitation of that market power, investment 
should be higher in proportion to the reduction in the cost of capital. In effect, it is quasi-rate-of-return 
regulation by default. (Helm, 2005: 11)  
 
This brief listing of the possibilities demonstrates that out of five regulatory possibilities only 
two competitive market models are in line with a purist application of the liberalisation, 
privatisation, and competition paradigm. A growing importance of security of supply on the 
political agenda combined with its regulatory authorities’ guarantee ultimately alters the 
likelihood of employing approaches other than competitive market models.  
 
Regarding European energy policy, the member states’ statements and behaviour in the course of 
the formulation of gas market policy and its related legislation on the European level indicated 
that the attitude of the majority towards gas market liberalisation remained reluctant during the 
entire period of examination. Some showed a pro-active attitude; for instance the United 
Kingdom, Spain, the Netherlands, and the European Parliament in 2001 called for earlier 
implementation deadlines of the second Directive than the Commission proposed itself. 
Nevertheless, numerous Council meetings confirmed the general reluctance of the majority of 
member states to vote for a fully fledged liberalisation policy. A vivid example is the negotiation 
of the implementation date for the legal market opening during 2000 and 2002. Another 
39 
 
illustration offers the evolution of Regulation 1775, characterised by lengthy discussions 
questioning the need for regulatory action to deepen the liberalisation of the market – just to 
name a few.  
 
On the basis of our explorative analysis we can formulate an expectation related to general and 
energy policy objectives:  
 
Expectation 1: We argue that the coexistence of objectives, market liberalisation, privatisation, 
and competition on the one hand and security of supply on the other, does not necessarily 
promote the convergence of regulations towards competition (delta convergence), as those 
objectives tend to favour different instruments. Whereas the former objective prefers market 
competition approaches, the latter is likely to alter the attractiveness of less competition 
supporting instruments.  
 
4.8.2 Outlook 
Since 2005, stagnation and regulatory inertia is apparent. Unlike the first stalemate, which 
evolved with regard to the legal market opening provisions, the obstacles might not be overcome 
by waiting until an election of one opposing member state has passed. During the European 
Council meetings the ownership unbundling of trade and transport branches was rejected 
repeatedly and by unanimous agreement of the member states. On the contrary, instead of voting 
for a fragmentation of the industry structure along trade and transport, the consensus among the 
member states appeared to be the support of the evolution of European champions in the gas 
sector. Most European gas markets have been characterised by vertical foreclosure and 
concentration processes (re-bundling). As a consequence, regulatory instruments besides 
unbundling itself could not enfold their full effect. Moreover, both attempts of the European 
Commission to shift regulatory competencies to the supranational level failed. Neither a common 
EU mechanism for releasing stored gas in the situation of supply disruption nor a common 
European energy regulator could be established. The idea of Regional Gas Initiatives (RGI) 
emerged in light of a lacklustre political will in the majority of member states to deepen the 
liberalisation provisions and supranationalise gas market regulation. The RGI appear to function 
as an interim step and current playing field, where substantial progress in terms of market 
integration and harmonisation is facilitated.  
 
The negotiations on the third Energy Package will continue in 2008. The Director General for 
Competition Philip Lowe estimated at the Flame conference in 2007: “It will probably take until 
2009 to pass into law and in the meantime, member states must anticipate the change and plan 
for it” (Gas Matters Today, 2007, March 14). Considering the preferences member states voiced 
with regard to unbundling during the Energy Council meeting in December 2007, it seems to be 
very unlikely that ownership unbundling will become the dominant mode of unbundling. This 
would imply a serious setback for the liberalisation of the sector. Thus, the reform would run the 
danger to be “stuck in the middle”, while at the same time raising the immediate transaction 
costs on both sides (regulators and regulatees) without changing the industry structure and its 
underlying incentives. 
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5. REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN GAS MARKET   
REFORM: HOW MUCH LEEWAY DO MEMBER STATES HAVE? 
The European Union began with a classical soft-power approach by choosing a framework 
regulation. Instead of prescribing a rigid market design for national gas markets, member states 
could gradually develop the appropriate regulatory regimes, “[…] to allow the industry to adjust 
in a flexible and ordered manner to its new environment and in order to take account of the 
different market structures in the Member States” (Directive 1998/30/EC, Recital 7). In other 
words, the member states had the freedom to choose the instruments to meet the provisions given 
by the EU legislation. Often the margins for regulatory regimes were set by compliance with the 
objectives and principles formulated in the legal provisions. By examining the legal texts 
constituting the Gas Reform in more detail, we first demonstrate that only a few instruments 
were compulsory. Second, this proceeding allows identifying which effect the introduction of the 
new legislation had on the convergence of particular instruments and the regulatory regimes of 
European gas markets in general. Last but not least, this examination later serves as a reference 
to facilitate the formulation of an index to describe a ‘best-practice’ model in the methodology 
chapter.  
Either in anticipation of the EU legislation or as a reaction to the EU Reform, member states 
brought additional and complementary energy legislation into place. Our reference point is 
supranational law however, and this analysis concentrates on the member states’ choice of 
instruments. Consequently, we do not expect to learn about how member states precisely 
transposed the EU legislation into national law, or find an exhaustive and in-depth discussion of 
the two Directives and related documents. Instead, we aim to show how much room for 
manoeuvre the member states were given by the framework regulation regarding their choice of 
instruments. To facilitate this, we first state the major legal acts that form the bases of the EU 
Gas market reform. We continue with a description of the general objectives and principles as 
laid out in the legal texts. Finally, we show which regulatory instruments became mandatory for 
the member states to integrate into the national regulatory regime and formulate expectations 
with regard to the convergence of the applied instruments.  
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5.1 Legal framework of the European gas market reform 
European gas market reform is mainly based on three legislative acts introduced by the European 
Union as secondary legislation between 1998 and 2005. The first (Directive 98/30/EC) and 
second Gas Directives (Directive 2003/55/EC), are both framework regulations. By definition, 
“Directives bind the Member States as to the results to be achieved; they have to be transposed 
into the national legal framework and thus leave margin for manoeuvre as to the form and means 
of implementation” (See European Commission, 2006c). The measures were supposed to be 
implemented by 10.8.2000 for Directive 1998 (equivalent with t0=2000) and by 1 July 2004 for 
Directive 2003 (equivalent with t4=2004).  
The EU did not formulate a third Directive in the later reform process, but first chose the legal 
instrument of Regulation. Regulations do not give the same flexibility to the member states 
compared with Directives, but are directly applicable and binding for all member states. In 
addition, Regulations do not necessitate national implementation of legislation as it follows the 
principle of subsidiarity, where national laws are not allowed to be in conflict with European 
secondary laws (such as Regulations). With the release of Regulation 1775/2005 in 2005 
however, the EU overruled national laws with the justification that, “It is now necessary to 
provide for structural changes in the regulatory framework to tackle remaining barriers to the 
completion of the internal market in particular regarding the gas trade” (Regulation 1775/2005, 
Recital 1). They also added that,  
 
[…] since the objective of this Regulation, namely the setting of fair rules for access conditions to natural 
gas transmission systems, cannot sufficiently achieved by member states and can therefore, by reason of the 
scale and effects of action, be better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures 
[…] (Regulation 1775/2005, Recital 23) 
 
 The Regulation had to be implemented by 1 July 2006 (beyond t6) . 
5.2 Objectives and principles of the reform 
The first Recital of the first Directive not only states the overall objectives of the gas reform, but 
also reflects the tension between Europe’s old and aspiring market design. According to the first 
and third Recitals, the completion of the internal market and a competitive natural gas market are 
the major objectives of the reform. Ironically, these two embrace the second Recital, that allows 
member states to take into account differences in their economies and to derogate from the 
Directives provisions (see Directive 1998/30/EC, Recitals 1-3). One could argue whether the root 
for divergent gas market regulation is already disposed. Further constraints might stem from 
Recital 12 which foresees the fulfilment of public service obligations as objectives, and might 
interfere with competition goals. Thereafter, “[…] for some Member States the imposition of 
public service obligations may be necessary to ensure security of supply and consumer and 
environmental protection, which, in their view, free competition left to itself, cannot necessarily 
guarantee” (Directive 1998/30/EC, Recital 12). Despite the given ambivalence of objectives, the 
European Union considers the completion of market liberalisation to be pivotal in order to meet 
these public service obligations. In other words, the EU continuously expressed the aim to create 
one common European gas market. Attesting to this declaration, the EU identified the 
completion of internal market as the first of six priority areas in its recent strategy paper: 
“Sustainable, competitive and secure energy will not be achieved without open and competitive 
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energy markets, based on competition between companies looking to become European-wide 
competitors rather than dominant national players.” (European Commission, 2006: 5). 
 
The second Gas Directive complements the first by stating objectives the EU wishes to achieve 
through gas market reform. Thereafter, the EU aims to increase efficiency, reduce prices, raise 
standards of service, and increase competition (see Directive 2003/55/EC, Recital 2). 
 5.2.1 General principles 
In a framework regulation, principles are of considerable importance due to the lack of tailor-
made rules. Hence, we start off  by exploring the role of principles in the gas reform. In this 
regard, the ninth Recital of the first Directive appears to be insightful, as it prescribes not only 
the Gas Directive as framework regulation, but also defines the role of principles to constitute the 
Gas Reform:  
Whereas a certain number of common rules should be established for the organisation and operation of 
the natural gas sector; whereas, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, these rules are no more 
than general principles providing for a framework, the detailed implementation of which should be left to 
Member States, thus allowing each Member State to maintain or choose the regime which corresponds 
best to a particular situation, in particular with regard to authorizations and the supervision of supply 
contracts. (Directive 98/30/EC, Recital 9) 
This clearly indicates that the European Union was not aiming to determine measures or 
instruments, but instead formulate general principles. Moreover, the EU further specifies in 
Article 3 section 1 the context in which the general principles are set and thereby leaves no doubt 
about the binding character of the principles:  
Member States shall ensure [….] natural gas undertakings are operated in accordance with the principles 
of this Directive with a view to achieving a competitive market in natural gas, and shall not discriminate 
between such undertakings as regards either rights or obligations. (Directive 1998/30/EC) 
Given the relative importance of principles in this legal document, one is driven to search for 
articles in the Directives which summarise the reforms principles. Surprisingly however, there 
are none. Instead, the principles are defined in relation to the objects of regulatory functions and 
grouped under the pillars ‘Transmission, storage, LNG’, ‘Distribution and supply’, 
‘Unbundling’, ‘Network access’, and ‘Organisation of access to the system’. This still leaves us 
with the question: what are the constituting principles of the gas reform? A further question is 
whether these principles changed in light of altering legislation or whether additional principles 
evolved.  
 
The first Directive names six principles: objectivity, non-discrimination, (information) 
transparency, efficiency, economics, and security. Within the second Directive, the EU expanded 
the list by another four principles: fair prices, cost-reflectiveness, environmental friendliness, and 
consumer protection, meaning that the choice of measures should be in line with the 
environmental policy of the EU.  
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Table 1: Principles of the European Gas Directives 
 
Introduced in Directive 
1998/30/EC 
Added in Directive 
2003/55/EC 
• Objectivity 
• Non-discrimination 
• Transparency  
• Efficiency  
• Economics 
• Security 
 
• Consumer protection 
• Fair prices 
• Cost-reflectiveness 
• Environmental 
friendliness 
Source: Directive 1998/30/EC, Directive 2003/55/EC 
 
 
Regulation 1775/2005 aims to specify regulatory functions rather than revise principles. Thus, it 
does not add new principles but instead contributes to the principle formulation by specifying the 
transparency requirements (Regulation 1775/2005, Article 6) and the principles which have to be 
applied for the regulatory function of capacity allocation mechanism and congestion 
management procedures.  
In summary, the European Union postulates nine core principles member states have to comply 
with. There is no indication that one can deduce the relative importance of one principle to 
another by referring to the order in which they are stated in the Directives. The Directives’ 
inherent logic suggests they are of equal importance and complementary in nature. 
5.2.2 Issue related principles  
Having stated the general core principles, we now look closer at which principles are formulated 
with regard to different regulatory functions and how they changed over time. In doing so, we 
adopt the structure of pillars suggested by the Directives.  
 
Unbundling does not specifically rely on principles as the formal requirements are given in the 
legal text. It is therefore dealt with in more detail in the next section that explores the Directives 
requirements. 
 
Article 7 is quite central concerning the formulation of principles, as it introduces principles in 
application to the transmission, storage, and Liquefied natural gas (LNG) business. Section 1 
states “each transmission, storage and/or LNG undertaking shall operate, maintain and develop 
under economic conditions secure, reliable and efficient transmission, with due regard to the 
environment”. (Directive 1998/30/EC, Art. 7 (1)). The next two sections expand the set of 
principles by non-discriminatory behaviour and information transparency (Directive 
1998/30/EC, Art. 7 (2-3)). The principles for the distribution and supply follows the same 
scheme as those for the former pillar and literally the same principles are outlined for the 
distribution and supply sector (Directive 1998/30/EC, Art. 10 (1-3)). Directive 2003/55/EC takes 
over the first Directive’s principles and adds environmental friendliness to the catalogue. 
Complementary to Articles 8 and 12 of the second Directive, Recital 31 requires that “measures 
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should be taken to ensure homogenous and non-discriminatory access regimes for transmission, 
including cross-border flows of gas between Member States”. (Directive 2003/55/EC, Recital 
31). This legal provision clearly shows the European Union’s intention to harmonise network 
access conditions.  
 
Due to the discussions of the relative importance of balancing rules to guarantee equal and non-
discriminatory transport services, balancing conditions receive much more attention in the 
second Directive and the proceeding Regulation. Accordingly, balancing rules should be 
objective, transparent, non-discriminatory, and cost-reflective (See Directive 2003/55/EC, 
Recital 15, Article 8 (2), Article 12 (5). 
 
Independent from the member states’ preference with regard to negotiated or regulated third 
party access, the organisation of the network access shall be “in accordance with objective, 
transparent and non-discriminatory criteria” (Directive 1998/30/EC, Article 14.). These 
principles were accompanied by Article 21 (1), where “Member States shall ensure that the 
parties negotiate access to the system in good faith and that none of them abuses its negotiation 
position to prevent the successful outcome of such negotiations”. (Directive 1998/30/EC, Article 
21 (1). The EU addresses here the comparative advantages of incumbent companies and the 
somewhat moral appeal not to use their grandfathering rights.  
 
The EU repeatedly emphasised the necessity of network access and therefore declared in the 
second Directive, “[…] non-discriminatory access to the network of the transmission and 
distribution system operator is of paramount importance” (Directive 2003/55/EC, Recital 8). In 
terms of principle formulation, Directive 2003/55/EC does add the principle of fairly priced 
network access, which might be interpreted as a growing awareness of highly heterogeneous and 
intransparent network tariffs (See Directive 2003/55/EC, Recital 7, Article 18 (1). New elements 
of the second Directive are certainly the introduction of third party access for storage and the 
requirement to establish regulatory authorities. Like the third party access for the network, TPA 
for storages must be in line with the principles of objectivity, transparency, and non-
discrimination.   
5.3 Mandatory instruments  
After elaborating on the gas market reform objectives and principles, our attention is now 
directed towards the instruments the legal provisions require. These are discussed along with the 
regulatory functions concerning legal market opening, third party access, unbundling, balancing, 
and regulatory authorities.  
5.3.1 Legal market opening  
To achieve a gradual and incremental market opening, the EU chose the definition of eligible 
customer as the key variable to facilitate legal market opening. The Directive distinguishes 
between those countries that started to open their markets (e.g., Germany) and those that entered 
the reform process with a considerable degree of market opening (> 30%) such as the United 
Kingdom. The first category of new market openers “shall ensure that the definition of eligible 
customers referred to in paragraph 1 will result in an opening of the market equal to at least 20% 
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of the total annual gas consumption of the natural gas market” (see Directive 1998, Article 18 
(3)). Article 18 continues prescribing the market opening in later states. Accordingly, a legal 
market opening of 28% by 2003 and 33% by 2008 is compulsory. Countries in the category of 
advanced market openers shall ensure a market opening of 38% by 2003 and of 43% by 2008 
(see Directive 1998/30/EC, Art. 18 (6).   
 
The Directive requires that Member States specify ‘eligible customers’, defined as those customers inside their 
territory that have the legal capacity to contract for or to be sold natural gas according to the procedures set out 
in Articles 15 and 16. It requires that initially two categories of customers – at least- be included as eligible 
customers. These are: 
(1) all final consumers consuming more than 25 million cubic meters of gas per year on a consumption 
site basis; and  
(2) gas-fired power generations, irrespectively of their annual consumption level. (Cameron, 2002: 178) 
In short, member states are obliged to use the definition of eligible customer as an instrument to 
facilitate the required market opening. In the end, it was the member state’s responsibility to 
define the eligible customer in terms of consumer classes, assuming the achievement of the 
above mentioned targets. For monitoring purposes, the European Commission asks for the 
annual publication of the countries definition accompanied by all other appropriate information 
to justify the fulfilment of market opening (See Directive 1998/30/EC, Art. 18 (9)).  
 
In 2003, the second Directive set more ambitious targets. Amending the first Directive, the 
acceleration Directive foresees the freedom of choice of supplier for all European non-
households from 1 July 2004, and for all costumers from 1 July 2007 (See Directive 2003/55/EC, 
Art. 23 (1)).     
5.3.2 Third party access 
Third party access is a crucial instrument in introducing competition in the downstream part of 
the natural gas sector and has therefore already been a major topic within the pre- liberalisation 
debate. The first Directive foresees both negotiated third party access (nTPA) and regulated third 
party access (rTPA). The circumstance that only Germany did not have an independent regulator 
at that time shows the incumbents inclination to employ delaying strategies. Moreover, it reflects 
the strong resistance of former integrated companies who function as transport operators to open 
their grids and allow other firms to gain market shares. In general, one could say that the TPA 
provisions given in the first Directive introduce the objective and idea of third party access rather 
than ensuring a rigid European-wide implementation. By choosing negotiated third party access, 
member states can still vote for transaction based transmission and distribution services. 
Although Article 15 Section 2 requires the publication of the undertakings main commercial 
conditions for the use of the network, it leaves the information power and thereby negotiation 
power in the hands of the incumbent firms (see Directive 1998/30/EC). In contrast, regulated 
third-party access is based on published and common tariffs that offer more transparency and 
non-discriminatory network access to new entrants. Moreover, the first Directive foresees for 
both nTPA and rTPA, the possibility of temporary derogations, “if a natural gas undertaking 
encounters, or considers it would encounter, serious economic and financial difficulties because 
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of its Take-or-pay commitments accepted in one or more gas purchase contracts” (Directive 
1998/30/EC, Article 25, section 1). In addition, Article 17 explicitly allows the refusal of 
network access in the case of capacity congestion caused by pre-liberalisation Take-or-pay 
contract obligations. There is no doubt that in this context the possibility of derogations functions 
as a clear lock-in mechanism that turned out to have massive effects on the amount of available 
capacity. DG Competition revealed in their energy sector inquiry that “on the Benelux-Italy axis 
[…] primary capacity on these pipelines is booked until 2022” (European Commission, 2006d, 
16 February: 61). 
 
  One of the major revisions of the second Directive was the abolition of the negotiated third 
party access. Directive 2003/55/EC and Regulation 1775 confirm and emphasise the regulated 
third-party access and determine more detailed terms and conditions for this instrument. 
Accordingly, tariffs and their methodology shall be approved and published before their entry 
into force (See Directive 2003/55/EC Article 18, (1). Regulation 1775 specifies  
 
[…] where a transmission system operator offers the same service to different customers, it shall do so 
under equivalent contractual terms and conditions, either using harmonised transportation contracts or a 
common network code approved by the competent authority. (Art. 4 (1a)) 
 
 The mentioning of a common network code reflects the continuing evolution of network access 
regimes in the reform process: beginning with nTPA under which the main terms and conditions 
were required to be published and moving on to rTPA with published tariffs and methodologies 
and envisaging a common network code in Regulation 1775.  
 
The latter regulation focuses on adding technical rules “in particular regarding third party access 
services, principles of capacity allocation mechanisms, congestion management procedures and 
requirements” (Regulation 1775, Recital 1). One might expect that after seven years of gas 
market reform, the EU would alter the level of coercion by naming concrete instruments. One 
could argue that Regulation 1775 fills existing regulatory gaps; nonetheless the scope of 
regulation is complementary rather than deepening or widening. This argument will be 
exemplified with reference to the provisions concerning capacity congestion and tariffs.  
 
As we saw earlier, the Regulation aims to specify capacity allocation mechanisms and capacity 
congestion mechanisms. To prevent capacity hoarding of incumbent firms under new or 
renegotiated transport contracts, the following provision entered the legal text:  
When transmission system operators conclude new transport contracts or renegotiate existing transportation 
contracts, these contracts shall take into account the following principles: in the event of contractual 
congestion, the transmission system operator shall offer unused capacity on the primary market at least on a 
day-ahead and interruptible basis. (Regulation 1775, Article 5, section 3 (a)) 
 The Regulation clearly states that unused capacity must be offered to other parties. It is worth 
noting that those derogations due to Take-or-pay commitments are not tackled per se by this 
provision, since it refers not to transportation contracts but to trading contracts.   
Tariffs are a crucial but very complex area in gas market regulation. In general, tariff systems are 
based on diverse instruments that reflect different dimensions such as the type of capacity 
booking, allocation method, and tariff structure. In this context, the absence of explicitly 
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determined instrument is striking. The furthest community law goes is mentioning auctions as a 
possible instrument: “Member States may decide that tariffs may also be determined through 
market based-arrangements, such as auctions, provided that such arrangements and the revenue 
arising there from are approved by the regulatory authority” (Regulation 1775, Article 3 (1). The 
tariff system and its instruments are not determined by the EU provisions. Accordingly, one 
should not expect a convergent impulse in terms of instrument choice. 
Third party access to storage is introduced in the second Directive. The EU applied the same 
approach for the general TPA provisions, by offering the member states the choice 
between regulated and negotiated TPA for storage. If national regulatory authorities vote for 
nTPA,  
Member States shall require storage system operators and natural gas undertakings to publish their main 
commercial conditions for the use of storage, linepack and other ancillary services within the first six 
months following implementation of this Directive and on an annual basis every year thereafter (Directive 
2003/55/EC, Art. 19 (3).  
In contrast, regulated third party access is based on published tariffs and other terms and 
obligations for the use of storage and linepack (See Directive 2003/55/EC, Art. 19 (4).  
5.3.3 Unbundling 
The first Directive requires the publication of accounts of integrated gas undertakings (See 
Directive 1998/30/EC, Art. 13 (3)), but does not prescribe any further measure to ensure the 
separation of trade and transport in the natural gas markets. In contrast to the Electricity 
Directive, the first Gas Directive does not impose legal or management unbundling (see below). 
Instead, “integrated natural gas undertakings shall, in their internal accounting, keep separate 
accounts for their natural gas transmission, distribution and storage activities” (Directive 
1998/30/EC Article 13 (3)). The publication and separation of accounts apply equally to 
transmission and distribution operators. “The aim of this requirement is to ensure non-
discrimination and fair tariffs to avoid cross-subsidisation and the distortion of competition” 
(Cameron 2002: 181). 
Legal unbundling was subject of the second Directive. Thereafter, vertically integrated 
distribution system operators and transmission system operators are required to be independent 
in legal form and in terms of organisation and decision-making from other activities not related 
to distribution or transmission (see Directive 2003 Art. 9 (1) and Art. 13 (1)). The provision of 
legal unbundling as a minimum standard remains; instead of heading for ownership unbundling, 
an intermediate step has been taken by introducing the concept of “functional unbundling”. The 
characteristics of functional unbundling are usually subsumed and referred to as management 
unbundling.  
The unbundling idea is based on the Transmission System Operator or Distribution System 
Operator having efficient decision making rights to allow them to make decisions in their own 
right and interests, independent from the interests of the trading branch of the integrated 
company. To ensure the independence of the transmission and distribution operators the 
European Union formulated a number of criteria which have to be fulfilled. Thereafter,  
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[…] the provisions of the Directive on management separation require firstly that the management staff of 
the network business do not work at the same time for the supply/production company of the vertically 
integrated company. This applies to both the top executive management and the operational (middle) 
management. (European Commission 2004: 8) 
Furthermore, the operators are obliged to establish a compliance programme and report annually 
how the criteria are met; thereby discriminatory conduct shall be excluded.  
The legal provisions of the second Directive allow two exemptions to the unbundling provisions, 
the so-called 100,000 customer exemption and the postponement option. According to the 
former, member states have discretion to exempt distribution service operators from the legal and 
functional unbundling requirements in circumstances where they serve less than 100,000 
customers (Directive 2003/55/EC, Article 13). The postponement option allows member states to 
delay the implementation of the legal unbundling of the DSO beyond 1 July 2007 (Directive 
2003/55/EC, Article 33 [2]). 
 
The chart below summarises the legal and functional unbundling requirements of the Gas 
Directive. Regulation 1775 does not cover unbundling and as a result does not formulate 
additional provisions.  
 
Figure 3: Unbundling requirements of the 2nd Gas Directive 
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5.3.4 Balancing 
As a result of the separation of gas trade and gas transportation due to the unbundling 
requirements, the formerly centralised model of gas flow management moved to a decentralised 
model. This necessitates the rearrangement of responsibilities between the 
transmission/distribution system operators and the shippers. In the course of the reform, each 
member state tried to develop a balancing regime that equally guaranteed the fair distribution of 
responsibilities and business opportunities among the new entrants and the incumbent formerly 
integrated companies. According to the legal provisions, the European Union is generally in 
favour of a market based mechanism. Acknowledging the fact that liquid markets (the 
precondition for those instruments) have not been realised, the European Union calls for 
regulatory authorities to step in and set up the necessary balancing rules. These balancing rules 
are not further specified and left to be determined by the member states. (See Directive 
2003/55/EC, Recital 15) In Regulation 1775, the conditions balancing regimes have to fulfil are 
described in Article 7. Thereafter, balancing conditions should be non-discriminatory, 
transparent, and cost-reflective. Additionally, the compatibility of balancing regimes across 
Europe shall be ensured (See Regulation 1775, Article 7). 
5.3.5 Regulator  
The first Directive does not foresee a common EU energy regulator or national regulatory 
authorities as separate and independent institutions. Reference is only made to the delegation of 
dispute settlement. In this context, member states are asked to designate a competent authority to 
settle disputes that may arise from negotiations or refusals of access to the national network. The 
criteria this competent authority has to fulfil are not further specified. In the case of cross-border 
disputes, the competent authorities of each member states shall consult each other and settle the 
dispute in accordance with the Directives provisions. (See Directive 1998/30/EC, Article 21) 
The introduction of national regulatory authorities in the context of the acceleration Directive 
had a significant impact on the governance of the European gas markets. Though most of the 
NRAs were already established before the entry into force of the Directive, the anticipation of its 
coming legal requirement together with the necessity of dealing with other regulatory 
requirements in light of the EU gas reform clearly pushed member states to establish independent 
regulators.  
According to the Directive 2003/55/EC,  
The Member States shall designate one or more competent bodies with the function of regulatory 
authorities. These authorities shall be wholly independent of the interests of the gas industry. They shall, 
through the application of this Article, at least be responsible for ensuring non-discrimination, effective 
competition, and efficient functioning of the market […] (Article 25 (1)) 
DG TREN explicitly states that the legal provisions do not require a regulator to be separated 
from other governmental bodies, “[…] even though a separate regulator is the most common and 
desirable model” (European Commission, 2004b: 1). The Directive also foresees the possibility 
of ministry involvement in the regulatory processes. More precisely, the ministry may either 
accept or reject a Regulator’s decision, but does not have the right to make amendments (See 
Art. 25 (3). The member states have considerable leeway and can either vote for the 
centralisation of regulatory functions or a distribution of regulatory functions among several 
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authorities. It is noteworthy that the traditional labour division between competition functions 
and regulatory functions is kept. As a consequence, competition authorities and regulators or 
regulatory bodies within ministries share the overall governance of the gas sector.  
In general, the core responsibility of the regulatory authority should be the approval of network 
access tariffs, and conditions, including transmission, distribution, and LNG facilities. 
Methodologies for tariffs and balancing services have to be set up ex ante (See Art. 8 together 
with Art. 25 (2)). The change with regard to the timing of decision making by shifting from ex 
post control to ex ante control is substantial and should be highlighted (See Directive 
2003/55/EC, Article 25 (1, 2 & 4)).  
In particular, the Regulator is responsible for monitoring and intervening if necessary in the 
following areas:  
1 management and allocation of interconnection capacity; 
2 mechanisms to deal with congested capacity within the national system; 
3 the time taken by transmission and distribution undertakings to make connections and repairs; 
4 publication of appropriate information; 
5 the effective unbundling of accounts to avoid cross subsidies and the unbundling compliance programme; 
6 connecting new producers; 
7 the access conditions to storage, line pack and to other ancillary services; 
8 overall compliance of transmission and distribution system operators with the Directive 
9 the level of transparency and competition. (European Commission, 2004b: 2) 
  
With the requirement to determine regulatory authorities and transfer dispute settlement 
functions and ex ante control over network access and balancing rules to these authorities, a 
significant change in the governance of the gas sector has been undertaken. The sector was 
formerly based on self-regulation, whereas the aim of the legal provisions was to introduce and 
define public regulation. 
5.4 Conclusion and expectations  
The conclusion summarises the general aims and principles of the reform. Next, the further 
development of the legal provisions is portrayed along indicators describing provisions regarding 
legal market opening, third party access, balancing, unbundling, and regulatory oversight. Our 
analysis assumes that legal provisions influence the choices of member states designing their 
regulatory regime. The success of harmonisation depends on the degree of legal specification. 
The more concrete European law is in setting targets or prescribing regulatory instruments the 
more likely will be the convergence of national regimes. Examining these provisions, we identify 
several instruments for which an effect towards convergence can be expected.  
The European Union’s main reform goals are the completion of an internal market and the 
creation of a competitive natural gas market. They have been expanded in the second gas 
Directive by postulating efficiency gains, price reductions, and higher standards of service and 
increased competition as objectives that are supposed to be achieved through the implementation 
of the legal provisions.  
 
The legal framework of the gas reform is mainly based on ten principles. In the first Directive: 
objectivity, non-discrimination, (information) transparency, efficiency, economics, and security 
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are introduced. In the second Directive by: fair prices, cost-reflectiveness, environmental 
friendliness, and consumer protection, meaning that choice of measures should be in line with 
the environmental policy of the EU (see Directive 2003/55/2003, Recital 5, 7 and 27). The 
Directives inherent logic suggests that they are of equal importance and rather complementary in 
nature. The principles also have been portrayed with regard to their application of regulatory 
functions.  
 
With regard to the member states’ choice of instrument, the legal provisions proved to be either 
surprisingly ill-defined or rather complex, leaving the information power with the incumbent 
companies to a large extent. Such was the case for the advent or increase of legal market opening 
facilitated by the definition of eligible customer. Depending on their initial degree of 
liberalisation, the legal norm requested for those countries, which may be called liberalisation 
beginners, is a market opening of 20% of the total annual gas consumption of the natural gas 
market, increasing by 2003 to 28% and by 2008 to 33%. For the category of advanced markets, 
the margins were set higher, a market opening of 38% by 2003 and of 43% by 2008. Later, the 
second Directive prescribed a full legal market opening for non-household consumers by 1 July 
2004 and for all costumers by 1 July 2007. Accordingly, one can expect that the converging 
effect on legal market opening towards full market opening is most likely to be limited between 
2000 and 2004, and not very strong (expectation 2). Due to the legal market opening of non-
household consumers, the level of legal market opening should increase after 1 July 2004. 
 
In the course of the reform, the provisions concerning TPA underwent profound improvements: 
beginning with nTPA as a minimum requirement, under which it was mandatory to publish the 
main terms of conditions (see Directive 1998/30/EC), moving on to rTPA with published tariffs 
and methodologies (see Directive 2003/55/EC) and envisaging a common network code in 
Regulation 1775. In this light, the shift from ex post to ex ante control of third party access can 
be considered one of the major achievements of accelerating the regulatory process. In the 
second Directive, the EU followed the same path for the introduction of third party access rules 
for storage, allowing the member states to apply negotiated or regulated TPA for storage. It is 
noteworthy however, that no instruments concerning allocation method, tariff structure, type of 
capacity booking, minimum booking periods of transport capacity, level of tariffs, incentive 
regulation, and the ‘use it or lose it’ principle have been explicitly commented on. The same 
holds for balancing requirements. Although the EU expresses a general favour for market based 
mechanism, no balancing rules are prescribed. The legal provisions do not prescribe balancing 
instruments, gas release programmes or certain trading facilities. We therefore do expect a low 
converging effect (delta convergence) stemming from the European legislation (expectation 3). 
On the contrary, regulated third party access had to be implemented by 1 July 2004 and we 
should observe a high degree of delta convergence in the last two measurements of the analysis 
in 2005 (expectation 4). The same applies to negotiated third party access to storage (expectation 
5). 
 
The first Directive introduced legal unbundling, but did not prescribe it as a minimum 
requirement in Directive 1998/30/EC. Thereafter, the unbundling requirements have been 
gradually enhanced by demanding first of all legal unbundling and the introduction of so called 
management unbundling (functional unbundling), instead of voting for a rigid unbundling regime 
such as ownership unbundling. Concerning the unbundling provisions, we formulate three 
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expectations with regard to the convergence of regulatory instrument choices. According to the 
first Gas Directive (GD), separate accounts should be published by 10 August 2000. Therefore, 
we should detect a full convergence throughout the entire observation period (expectation 6). 
Legal unbundling of transmission system operators should be the norm by 1 July 2004 
(expectation 7). With regard to the legal unbundling of distribution system operators, the second 
GD allows two exemption options reaching beyond 1 July 2007. Consequently, we expect a low 
degree of convergence in terms of legal unbundling and no convergence towards ownership 
unbundling on the DSO level (expectation 8). As a result, the degree of convergence of 
unbundling measures on the DSO level should be lower than the TSO level (expectation 9). 
 
The acceleration Directive introduces, apart from rTPA, TPA for storage, balancing rules, and 
management unbundling, and the quest for defining national regulatory authorities. Again, the 
legal text offers the member states considerable leeway and they can either vote for a 
centralisation of regulatory functions under the roof of one regulator or a distribution of 
regulatory functions among several authorities. Nevertheless, DG TREN’s interpretive note 
leaves no doubt that the EU prefers the creation of independent national regulators and along 
with it the centralisation of regulatory oversight. So far, the legal provisions do not allow the 
expectation that the member states transfer competencies to the national regulator. In other 
words, it is unlikely that the legal provisions induce a high degree of delta convergence for the 
indicators belonging to the polity dimension during our time of examination (expectation 10).   
 
Community legislation started as a rather principle-based regulation and gradually developed. In 
other words, the nature of the reform (framework regulation) has been preserved and no 
qualitative shift from a bottom-up approach towards a top-down approach, which determines the 
member state’s instrument choices, has been detected.  
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6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY   
A quantitative, cross-national comparative analysis of the natural gas sector in the European 
Union, as proposed here, has its strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, the general strength 
of a quantitative analysis is a higher number of cases, providing more evidence in generalising 
findings and allowing the comparison of regulatory performance. On the other, a quantitative 
analysis is often restricted to rather aggregate formal data. That applies to this analysis which 
draws on the formal aspects of regulatory regimes in European gas market regulation. The study 
includes data on formal regulatory regimes but does not detect how these measures are precisely 
implemented and interact in each member state’s gas market. Hence, the analysis reflects only 
partially the regulatory performance or reality of natural gas markets due to a lack of accessible 
information. Nevertheless, it provides an aggregated analysis of the convergence of regulatory 
regimes in the old member states since the introduction of the gas reform.  
 
The following chapter exposes the constituent parts of the research methodology. First the case 
selection is given reason, and second, we specify the data sources. Finally, we elaborate the 
operation of the research design.  
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6.1 Geographical scope  
The European Union’s (EU) political landscape changed profoundly during the period of 
examination (1998-2006), due mainly to the enlargement of the supranational power in May 
2004. For the new member states this implied the implementation of a huge number of measures, 
including the Gas Directives. Unlike the old member states, where the regulation was introduced 
in 1998, the gas market regulation has just recently been put in place in the accession countries. 
For this reason, the trend study incorporates only cases from the group of EU-15.  
 
Yet, the group of EU-15 is relevant in terms of market coverage. In 2000, the enlarged European 
Union with 25 member states (later called EU-25) consumed 376 million tonnes of oil equivalent 
(Mtoe) of natural gas. Then, the share of the 15 old member states alone was 339 Mtoe which 
then corresponded to 90% of the total enlarged European gas market as we know it now. (See 
European Commission & Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, 2003b: 150-176). 
 
When the first Gas Directive was put in place, it foresaw the possibility for derogations which 
allowed member states not to implement a new regulatory regime (see Directive 1998/30/EC, 
Directive 2003/55/EC, benchmarking report 1: 4). These derogations were applied for Finland, 
Greece, and Portugal who were considered emerging gas markets with a marginal market size or 
limited network connectivity. To illustrate, the natural gas consumption of the three countries 
(Finland 3.42 Mtoe; Greece 1.7 Mtoe; Portugal 2.03 Mtoe) amounted in total 7.17 Mtoe in 2000. 
This is equivalent to 2% of EU-15 total consumption. Consequently, by excluding Finland, 
Greece, and Portugal and selecting 12 member states for the analysis, the quantitative analysis 
still covers 88% of the EU-25 natural gas market (based on the data from 2000) and 98% of the 
EU-15 natural market. For these reasons the analysis of the 12 member states is representative 
for the EU 15. (See European Commission & Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, 
2003b: 150-176). 
 
The cross-national analysis of EU-15 includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The 
selected cases represent small and big countries (gas markets), producing and consuming 
countries, countries with high and low network connectivity, as well as countries with a small 
and large number of companies.  
6.2 Time-frame and data 
The period of examination begins with the introduction of the first Gas Directive in 1998 (which 
had to be implemented by 2000) and ends with the last available assessment at the end of 2005. 
The observations cover six years of European gas reform and identify six possible points of 
measurements.   
 
The relatively short time-frame poses some challenges for the appropriate interpretation of the 
results, as the concept of policy convergence is based on long term changes. Classical policy 
convergence studies start off with 10 years, so-called medium time frames cover 15 to 30 years 
and a considerable number of studies go beyond. Some authors even argue that a time frame of 
10 years leads to questionable results (see Howlett cited after Heichel et. al., 2005: 830). 
Therefore, it is important to be cautious. A short time-frame may lead to the misinterpretation of 
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a temporal convergence phenomenon which is in effect a cyclical development that does not 
indicate a one directional, permanent policy convergence. Given the possible time-frame, we 
conclude that the analysis has rather the character of a trend study which assesses policy 
convergence with regard to regulatory regimes in the European gas markets. Hence its 
noteworthy, solid or ultimate conclusions on the convergence of regulatory gas market regimes 
can only be confirmed after a longer time of observation.  
 
Since 2001, the European Commission has annually published benchmarking reports (BR) to 
assess the regulatory performance of member states. This set of data, describing the 
implementation of the Gas Directives and related Regulations, offers the opportunity to create a 
time series and apply a longitudinal design. The publication of a BR is treated as a measurement 
point, although changes of regulatory instruments took place within a certain period of time, 
usually one year.  
 
At the time of this study, five benchmarking reports on the implementation of the internal 
electricity and gas market have been published: the first benchmarking report (3.12.2001 = t1), 
the second benchmarking report (2.10.2002 = t2), the second benchmarking report including 
accession member states (2nd plus benchmarking report) (7.4.2003 = t3), the third benchmarking 
report (1.03.2004 = t4), the fourth benchmarking report (5.1.2005 = t5), and the so-called 
‘Report on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market’ (15.11.2005 = t6) which 
we treat as the fifth benchmarking report. Formally the latter two reports were published in the 
same year, but being nearly one year apart, they are treated as separate measurement points: one 
describing the reality in 2004 and the other in 2005. We then have a total of six measurement 
points. Complementary data has also been collected from the national regulatory authorities 
through a standardised questionnaire and the CEER Regulatory Benchmarking Report (see 
Council of European Energy Regulator (CEER), 2005). Sometimes this generated differing data. 
We then considered the benchmarking reports published by the EC as the primary source, 
because this data has been handed in by the regulators within their legal binding monitoring 
requirements.    
 
The European Commission compiled the benchmarking reports by incorporating information 
from various sources: Accordingly,  
the reports have been compiled using information collected from market players and government agencies 
following a detailed survey. A number of individual studies have also been completed by DG Energy and 
Transport using both its own resources and external consultants. (European Commission, 2001: 1) 
Special attention has to be paid to the data describing the tariffs in European gas markets, 
because the assessment of tariffs in a single country results in approximated rather than precise 
figures. During the reform period, methodologies for accessing and regulating tariffs were 
developed and implemented in an evolutionary process. Therefore, data on tariffs is often not 
completely available and moreover is not based on the same standardised definition. This is also 
the case for the data used to access the tariffs in EU-12 between 2000 and 2005. The second and 
third benchmarking reports are based on the European Commission’s own calculations, assessing 
tariffs for transmission services of large users with an annual consumption of 25mm3 with a 
daily peak of 100,000 m3 and an hourly peak of 4100 m3. This differs from the fourth and fifth 
benchmarking reports, in which the national regulators contributed to the data based on 
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comparatively broad definitions. To describe the tariffs in the latter reports, we applied the 
Eurostat categories for large users. Large users of category I4 are defined as consumers with an 
annual consumption of 4,186,000 GJ, and load factor of 250 days (4000 hours) (see European 
Commission, 2001: 54; Eurostat, 2006). However, 4,186,000 GJ is treated by the Commission as 
equivalent to the category of 10 mm3. The difficulties in assessing comparable tariffs exposed 
above thus lead to the conclusion that the primary data on tariffs is rather tentative and 
trendsetting. 
 
Yet, high tariffs form a significant barrier to new gas market entrants and are therefore an 
integral part of market regulation. To include the tariff level, we must make two adjustments. 
First, there is no valid observation of the component tariff contributing to the first indicator “Gas 
network access conditions and tariffication” in the First benchmarking report (t1). Treating it as a 
missing value would automatically translate it into high tariffs. Thus, stability is assumed for 
missing tariffs in 2001. Tariffs from 2002 are chosen to facilitate this (see European 
Commission, 2002: 38). Second, in the second and third benchmarking reports two levels of 
tariffs for large users are measured in minimum and maximum tariffs (see European 
Commission, 2002: 38; , 2003a: 43; European Commission, 2004d: 35), indicating the range and 
variety of tariffs in each country. To put it into operation, we create a mean of the two indicator 
components. The degree of convergence is not fully mapped, but the overall trend can be 
demonstrated. Estimations of tariff levels on the transmission level are tentative and express a 
certain trend, but do not reflect precise tariff developments in the European gas markets.  
6.3 Operationalisation 
In the following sections, the concept of regulatory regimes is operationalised. In a first step, 
Indicators are selected along the two dimensions, regulatory function and competencies. Then, in 
a second step, the values of these Indicators are scored.    
6.4 Assessing the comprehensiveness of a regulatory regime 
In previous chapters we pointed out that there is no such thing as an ideal-type competitive 
market, nor has the EU Commission explicitly defined and officially announced a best-practice 
model for a competitive European market that would allow us to assess the comprehensiveness 
of regulatory regimes in the gas market. 
  
Reviewing the literature on gas market regulation, the interested reader is instead confronted 
with a complex litany of measures and specific terminology. This complexity is reflected by a 
high number of indicators describing the characteristics of gas market regulation. Due to the lack 
of a best-practice model, the choice of indicators and their scaling for our analysis is inspired by 
the literature and publications that served as a preparation for the regulatory reform of the gas 
market and were generated during the Madrid Forum process. There, national Regulators, the 
European Commission, and industry and consumer associations incrementally discussed and 
developed indicators to monitor the regulatory performance. In particular, the Council of 
European Energy Regulator (CEER) and the Brattle group (see Council of European Energy 
Regulators (CEER), 2002; Lapuerta & Moselle, 2002) worked extensively on tariff 
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methodologies for intrastate, cross-border, and transit flows in European gas markets to facilitate 
the gas market liberalisation. These indicators and definitions were supposed to - if not enter at 
least influence - the choice of required instruments and wording of the text of the second Gas 
Directive which came into force in 2004. However, the appropriateness of indicators is by nature 
controversial, as each indicator and the interpretation of its values added to the interpretation of 
measures and therefore might potentially imply far reaching influence on the organisation of the 
gas markets (see Lapuerta & Moselle, 2002). Nevertheless, I claim the indicators proposed in the 
framework of the Madrid Forum are sufficiently consensual to assess comprehensiveness of 
regulatory regimes in the gas sector.  
 
As a matter of fact, the lack of a best-practice model of a competitive gas market posed some 
challenge to put into operation the comprehensiveness of regulatory regime. We suggest a 
bottom-up approach, starting with indicators applied by the European Union and then weighting 
and scoring the indicators to create an index. In this context, three critical questions had to be 
solved: First, which indicators sufficiently describe a regulatory regime in the gas sector and 
second, how should these indicators be weighted in an index? And even more important, how 
shall the instruments be scored? The following section is organised according to these questions.  
6.5 Choice of Indicators 
The following section explains the choice of indicators for the first dimension of the variable 
“comprehensiveness of regulatory regime”, the regulatory function. Then, in a second step, I 
define the indicators for the second dimension, the regulatory competencies. The choice of 
indicators is based on the assumption that the regulatory measures of the whole downstream part 
(wholesale, network activities, and downstream) of the gas value chain matter.  
6.6 Indicators for the dimension of regulatory function  
I refer to the concept of regulation the Madrid Forum applied to describe the choice of indicators 
for the variable regulatory comprehensiveness in its dimension regulatory function. In the 
beginning of the Madrid Process, the participants basically distinguished between two groups of 
aspects: first, the  
 
technical and commercial conditions applying to the access to the system, with particular attention to the 
aspect of tariffication (“conduct regulation”). The second (“structural regulation”) concerns the decision 
regarding the structure of the gas industry, in particular the obligations imposed to gas companies with 
regard to the limits to vertical integration (unbundling). (Madrid Forum, 1999: 1-2) 
 
 This very general grouping serves as a starting point to present the chosen indicators which are 
based on the suggestions made in the benchmarking reports and the documents accompanying 
the Madrid Forum. In the following paragraphs define the indicators and give further 
explanations where necessary. The indicators are often based on several components which are 
exposed in detail in the tables (4 & 7).   
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Table 2:  Grouped indicators for operationalisation of the variable “comprehensiveness of 
the regulatory regime” for dimension regulatory function 
 
Indicator 1 Market opening 
Indicator 2 Gas network access conditions and tariffication 
Indicator 3 Balancing rules 
Indicator 4 TPA storage 
Indicator 5 Gas release programme 
Indicator 6 Trading facilities 
Indicator 7 Network unbundling  
Transmission System Operator (TSO) 
Indicator 8 Network unbundling  
Distribution System Operator (DSO) 
 
 
The legal provisions of the Gas Reform required a gradual market opening (Indicator 1) that has 
been introduced in the course of the reform. The facilitation of the market opening and its precise 
requirements is addressed in section 5.3.1. Indicator 2, ‘Gas network access conditions and 
tariffication’, incorporates such information as type of capacity booking as well as minimum 
booking period and tariff structure to describe the flexibility and transparency of the access 
regime. Indicator 3 includes ‘balancing rules’, accounting for the fact that certain balancing 
measures can be a powerful tool to increase the entrant barriers for flexible trade. The latter 
focuses on the required balancing period, because it is regarded as a key measure to ensure 
network access, flexible trade, and a balanced network system alike (see Ofgem, 2002). Other 
balancing rules, such as the arrangement of tolerance bands or the allowance for pooling and 
trading in the balancing regime, are not included, weighting the gain of adding secondary 
measures and loss through over complexity of the measurement.  
 
Discussions centred on storage issues during the second half of the Madrid Forum process. These 
discussions clarified the significance of ‘Third party access (TPA) of storage’ (Indicator 4), in 
order to guarantee a balanced gas transport system and equal trading opportunities for 
transmission operators and gas traders alike (see European Commission, 2003; International 
Energy Agency, 2000: 100; Madrid Forum, 2004b). The last but not least indicator is the ‘Gas 
release programme’ (Indicator 5). In markets which are dominantly supplied by long-term import 
gas contracts, market liquidity can either be achieved by gas release programmes for “over-the-
counter” (OTC) or by gas trade in the on-the-day commodity (OCM) market stemming from 
balancing arrangements. Therefore, the existence of a gas release programme is an essential tool 
to accelerate the intensity of competition in the market by requiring dominant market players to 
release certain amounts of their long-term contract gas import to other market players such as 
new entrants.  
 
This leads to indicator 6 which assesses whether there are significant trading facilities in place. 
The EU provisions do not prescribe the establishment of trading facilities such as gas hubs or gas 
exchanges. Instead, it is left to the incumbent, the market, and member states to establish trading 
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facilities. In general, liberalised markets are characterised by a growing complexity of 
transactions (see Ingwersen, 2004, 14 April). Whereas monopolistic markets are dominated by 
confidentially contractualised bilateral trade, so called OTC trade, standardisation, and 
transparent pricing is significant for transactions in liberalised markets (see Wright, 2005: 21). 
 
Figure 4: Growing complexity of trade in a liberalised gas market  
 
 
 
More advanced liberal markets such as the UK are characterised by a very differentiated market 
landscape. Wright identifies four different gas markets in the UK, a retail and three different 
wholesale markets. On the wholesale level, in addition to the classical long-term bilateral 
contract market there is the OTC market and the on-the-day commodity market (see Wright, 
2005: 52). The latter initially evolved from system operator’s need to balance the pipelines 
system and later served as a vehicle to promote the development of trade. Since liberalisation, 
more trading opportunities evolved within other European gas markets as well. Mainly, due to 
the creation of gas hubs and or virtual trading points, new traders could enter the markets. 
Therefore, the existence of complex trading facilities offering clearing prices can be interpreted 
as an indicator for market openness, a necessary precondition for achieving competition. More 
precisely, the volume of traded gas at the OTC and OCM markets in relation to gas trade 
conducted within bilateral long term contracts could serve as an indicator for the degree of 
competition. As we see later, the assessment of the indicator is not based on this ratio. Instead, a 
more technical approach is followed by asking whether there are significant trading facilities 
such as gas hubs or gas exchanges. The European Commission did not monitor this indicator in 
most of its benchmarking reports. Instead, the data is collected from primary and secondary 
literature.  
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To describe the process of vertical ‘dis-integration’, the so called unbundling of trade and 
distribution or transmission services within a formerly integrated utility (structural regulation), 
has been incorporated. In this respect, we chose a group of indicators to describe the network 
unbundling of Transmission System Operator (TSO) (Indicator 7) and network unbundling 
Distribution System Operator (DSO) (Indicator 8). Through distinguishing between TSO and 
DSO a more precise picture of the different levels of services can be achieved. In doing so, we 
expect to show different rates of implementation with regard to unbundling of gas industry.  
6.7 Indicator for the dimension of regulatory competencies 
According to Arentsen, the dimension of ‘regulatory competencies’ refers to competencies, 
capacities, and instruments of the regulator. Elaborating on the latter dimension, he distinguishes 
two aspects: competencies and capacities on the one hand and the degree of autonomy of the 
regulator on the other. (See Maarten Arentsen, 2004: 88) 
 
Table 3: Grouped indicators for operationalisation of the variable “comprehensiveness of 
regulatory regime” for the dimension regulatory competencies 
 
Indicator 9 Type of decision-making by regulatory authority (Ex 
ante/ex post) 
Indicator 10 Capacity allocation rule decided by 
Indicator 11 Balancing conditions approved by 
Indicator 12 Dispute settlement 
Indicator 13 Type of Regulator  
Indicator 14 Ratio of consumption of national gas market and staff 
number of national regulator 
Indicator 15 Ratio of consumption of national gas market and 
budget of national regulator 
 
 
Regulatory competencies – in terms of competencies, capacities, and degree of autonomy – 
basically deal with different aspects of decision-making regarding network access conditions. 
Hence, Indicator 9 ‘Type of decision-making by regulatory authority’ refers to the timing of the 
network access regulation and the existence of a regulatory authority to regulate third party 
access. In this context,   
 
 
two approaches can be distinguished: one applied by a majority of Member States consists of ‘ex ante’ 
regulation, i.e. it provides for a requirement for operators to submit a schedule for network access tariffs to 
the regulator for approval prior to its application. The second approach is ‘ex post’ regulation. Under this 
approach grid operators would, for instance, publish or notify network tariffs applied by them to the 
regulator, who then has the possibility to intervene or not. (European Commission, 2001: 66) 
 
 
The next set of indicators describes the degree of autonomy the national regulator has towards 
the governmental institutions (such as ministries of economic affairs). These indicators inform 
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which authority or authorities jointly decide on ‘capacity allocation rules’ (Indicator 10), 
‘balancing rules’ (Indicator 11), or are in charge of ‘dispute settlement’ (Indicator 12). In other 
words, the governance dimension is addressed.   
The remaining three indicators map the formal competencies and capacities of the national 
regulator. First and foremost, we assess whether a ‘regulator’ has been set up and distinguish 
between pure sector regulation and multi-utility regulators (Indicator 13). This is complemented 
by the next two indicators, which qualify the institutional endowment the regulator received from 
the member states. By assessing the staff number (Indicator 14) and the budget of the national 
regulators (Indicator 15) and setting these numbers in relation to the size of the natural gas 
market (market size/staff or budget) it allows us a tentative judgment about the strength or 
formal competencies of the member states regulator. Gas consumption (in million tonnes oil 
equivalent) in the year 2000 serves as a reference point for describing the market size. The staff 
number and budget numbers comprise the energy regulator as such and don’t distinguish 
between sectors such as gas and electricity. Often they even refer to a multi-utility regulator, 
including telecommunication.  
6.8 Index: Aggregation and weighting of Indicators 
Due to the lack of a best-practice model of a competitive gas market which precisely outlines the 
characteristics of an ideal regulatory regime, there was no applicable concept available for the 
formulation of an index. The aim and conceptual contribution of this study is therefore to 
formulate an index that indicates the relative distance of the member state’s regulatory regimes 
to an anticipated best-practice model. In doing so, we apply a bottom-up approach to weight 
indicators. Based on the choice of 15 indicators and its 23 components to describe a regulatory 
regime, we determine that all 23 components together correspond to 100%.  
 
The alternative would have been to determine criteria according to which the weighting of 
indicators is carried out. We briefly illustrate why a weighting of indicators is important and at 
the same time ambivalent if its criteria driven. This involves discussing the comparative impact 
of two indicators, third party access, and balancing rules. In this context a reasonable question 
might be: do balancing rules have the same impact as network access rules on the market reality? 
The answer must certainly be no. Third party access is a crucial instrument that enables new 
market entrants to trade their gas through a network; balancing rules are rather complementary. 
Nevertheless, balancing can be used as a tool to influence the amount of available capacity and 
the market liquidity. At the same time, balancing rules allow sharing responsibility for the 
optimisation of gas flows in the grid between the network operator and trading companies. The 
discussion accompanying the European gas reform clearly demonstrated that all the downstream 
activities of the gas chain have to be taken into account (transmission, storage, distribution) and 
this necessitates including instruments regulating the entire downstream sector (see European 
Commission, 2003). In other words, it can be considered moderately consensual to include the 
proposed instruments, whereas the question of how to deal with different impacts of instruments 
is analytically pretty nebulous. Indeed, it becomes more complicated and controversial if one 
tries to express the comparative importance of for instance, TPA and balancing rules in exact 
figures. Experts may find common ground in the fact that both instruments are relevant and even 
consider the overall impact of the chosen network access rules to be more decisive than the 
balancing rules. However, it is unlikely that they would reach an agreement on the impact of one 
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instrument on the whole comprehensiveness of a regulatory regime expressed in percentage. Due 
to the lack of a clearly defined best-practic model and the ambivalence of expressing the 
comparative importance of indicators in exact figures, there is no optimal solution for creating an 
index.  
 
We identified two criteria the index is based on: one, it should allow the same hierarchical 
scaling for the values of each indicator, and two, it is supposed to reflect differing significance of 
indicators regarding their impact on promoting competitive market conditions. These two criteria 
are carried out by the proposed bottom-up approach. According to this logic, the index is created 
first by choosing indicators and then calculating the indicators share or impact on the regulatory 
regime. The indicator’s share can be grouped according to the indicator’s dimension (e.g., 
regulatory function) or single indicators (e.g., balancing rules).  
 
Accordance to the calculations, the comprehensiveness of regulatory regime is 70% determined 
by indicators related to the regulatory function dimension and 30% by indicators describing the 
second dimension, the regulatory competencies (see figure 6). The result is in line with the 
assumption that the two dimensions - regulatory function and regulatory competencies - do not 
have the same impact on the regulatory comprehensiveness.  
 
 
Figure 5: Indicators’ share of a comprehensive regulatory regime 
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Figure 5 illustrates each indicator’s share describing the regulatory regime. The previous section 
identified 15 Indicators to describe the regulatory regime. The regulatory function is expressed 
by 8 Indicators, comprising 16 components, while the regulatory competencies are assessed with 
7 Indicators. Cumulating the indicators components and calculating their shares, the following 
composition evolves: ‘Gas network access conditions and tariffication’ (Indicator 2) hold a share 
of 31% and ‘network unbundling at TSO and DSO’ each represents 8% (Indicators 7 and 8). The 
other indicators are all incorporated with a share of 5%. These are: ‘Gas release programme’ 
(Indicator 5), ‘Trading facilities’ (Indicator 6) ‘type of decision making by regulatory authority’ 
(Indicator 9), ‘capacity allocation rules decided by’ (Indicator 10), ‘balancing conditions 
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approved by’ (Indicator 11), ‘dispute settlement conducted by’ (Indicator 12), ‘type of regulator’ 
(Indicator 13), ‘ratio of staff number of national regulator and consumption of national gas 
market’ (Indicator 14), and ‘ratio of budget of national regulator and consumption of national gas 
market’ (Indicator 15). Due to mathematical reasons Indicator 3, ‘balancing rules’ and Indicator 
4, ‘TPA storage’, deviate from this scheme and receive only 4%.  
 
 
Figure 6: Dimensions’ share within a comprehensive regulatory regime 
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The bottom-up approach suggests that the indicators describing the regulatory competencies 
make up approximately 1/3 and regulatory function 2/3 of the regulatory regime. The latter 
mainly stems from the comparative importance inherent in the indicators gas network access 
conditions and tariffication (31%) and network unbundling at TSO and DSO levels (8%). One 
can argue that the comparative importance is achieved by several components forming the 
indicators, whereas the other indicators are only based on one component. This is certainly a 
correct observation, but a different grouping of indicators (e.g., through a split of indicators, all 
indicators equally based on one component) is still not favourable for analytical reasons.  
6.9 Index: Components and scaling of Indicators 
The scaling of the variables values is arranged along the logical distance to the necessary 
condition for the promotion of a competitive market model. Each indicator is ranged from 0 to 
10, assuming equal distance between the values. In terms of scaling, there is no distinction made 
between the nominal and interval measurement of the indicator values. Nominal measures like 
time, percentage, and other numbers are also grouped and expressed with the 0-10 scaling; 
otherwise the nominal indicators would gain more weight in the index than transformed interval 
indicators. The main reference point serves as the distance or closeness to the best practice 
model. The index applies a scoring rule to each indicator ranging from 0 to 10, where 10 is the 
most competitive.  
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Not every indicator has an equal number of values or categories, although the total number of 
categories does influence the score. One might criticize the scoring method to be value sensitive 
or even biased. To minimise this effect, the values have been grouped into categories.   
6.10 Scoring of Indicators describing the dimension of regulatory function 
The scoring is based on the reform’s inherent theoretical assumptions as well as the concrete 
provisions and principles of the reform (see chapter 2 and 5). Thereafter, the chosen regulatory 
instruments should meet the principles of objectivity, non-discrimination, (information) 
transparency, efficiency, being economical, and safeguarding security of supply. Moreover, 
prices should be fair and instruments should be cost-reflective, environmentally friendly, and 
consumer protective. Both principles and instrument-related European legal provisions were 
elaborated earlier and serve as a reference for the scoring.  
6.10.1 Legal market opening 
The scoring of ‘legal market opening’ takes the legal provisions of the Gas Directives as 
reference points (see section 2.4). Accordingly, a low market opening is defined as 20-28%, a 
middle market opening 29-42%, and a high market opening is reached if more than 43% of the 
market has been formally opened. The Directives distinguish between new and advanced market 
openers. In terms of scoring, this differentiation is reflected in the percentages of market opening 
and is later stated by the empirical data.  
 
Table 4: Legal market opening (Indicator 1) 
 
Indicator data type values and scores
Legal market opening numeric
high (10) = >43% 
middle (5) = 29-43% 
low (0) = 20-28%
 
6.10.2 Network access conditions and tariffication 
In the first years of the gas reform, the EU was especially concerned with measures that 
promised to open the market for competition and serve market integration by lowering the 
barriers for cross border transport. In this regard, network access conditions and tariffication 
were seen as the spearhead. Often cross-border or even inter-European transport has not been 
economical because the nationally applied tariff system often resulted in so-called “double-
counting” or “pan-caking” (European Commission, 2000a: 7). The second indicator is therefore 
assessing gas network access conditions and tariffication. The indicator is based on seven 
components, and thereby reflects different aspects of a tariff system and network access 
conditions (see Lapuerta & Moselle, 2002: 35). Although the indicator third party access is a 
genuine part of the network access, this is subsumed under regulatory competencies and treated 
in the next section (see Indicator 9) due to the fact that the question of whether third party access 
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is regulated or unregulated reflects the decision mechanism the network access conditions are 
based on. 
Tariff system 
The distinction between tariff structures, type of capacity booking, and allocation method is 
often not clear, or sometimes the terminology is simply mixed up. This is often due to the fact 
that the tariff structure corresponds with the type of capacity booking. Germany for instance, 
used to have a distance-based tariff type and applied for the capacity booking a point-to-point 
method. In contrast, the Brattle Group pointed out several examples where capacity is defined 
one way and tariffs are set in another way. The different aspects of a tariff system can be 
described as follows: whereas the type of capacity booking defines the access, the tariff structure 
determines the pricing rules. In distinction, the allocation method determines the mechanism the 
network capacity is allocated by. No tariff instruments are prescribed by the European gas 
market regulation, but left to the member states to decide. 
Tariff structure 
The Madrid Forum repeatedly stressed the need for convergence in terms of tariff structure (see 
European Commission, 2002: 16; Madrid Forum, 2001, 2002, 2004a), but the legal norms do not 
prescribe the tariff structure itself. In this context, the Council of European Energy Regulators 
stresses the “diversity of tariff structure in Europe in itself could impose transaction costs 
(associated with gathering the information and understanding it) on new entrants to the point 
where new entry is deterred” (Council of European Energy Regulator (CEER), 2000: 9). The 
discussion paper of the Madrid Forum indicates that entry-exit tariff structures are considered to 
be much more effective in promoting gas trade and market liquidity. Furthermore,  
the Regulators, the Commission and most member states expressed serious doubts that distance-related 
point-to-point tariffs would effectively achieve this and therefore invited Regulators, Member States, GTE, 
and individual TSO´s to consider more cost-reflective and trade-promoting tariff systems such as entry-exit 
systems. (Madrid Forum, 2001: 3) 
 
The general acceptance of entry-exit tariffs later resulted in the presentation of a report that 
documents on the implementation of the “a road-map to entry-exit systems” (Madrid Forum, 
2004a: 3). To sum up, entry-exit tariffs systems are considered to be cost-reflective, flexible, 
transparent and non-discriminatory. 
 
Reading these statements still leaves us with the question of why entry-exit tariffs are favoured 
by the European Commission and the majority of participants of the Madrid Forum. The Brattle 
Group offers this explanation:  
Under an entry-exit system, the total transportation charge is the sum of separate charges for entry and exit 
capacity. The charges vary by entry and exit point, and should be set to make the total charge for any 
transportation route as close as possible to the associated cost. (Lapuerta & Moselle, 2002: 42) 
 
Following this line of interpretation, the tariff allows to transparently reflect costs for the 
transport itself and the costs stemming from keeping up the flexibility of the network, and 
thereby reduces the risk of monopolistic rents. The claim entry-exit based tariffs are cost-
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reflective is contested. In either case, entry-exit tariffs have two characteristics that meet the aims 
of the liberalisation process. First, entry-exit significantly promotes the transparency of tariffs. 
As a result, new entrants are able to calculate transportation costs without facing high transaction 
costs that would otherwise discourage participation in the market. Secondly, it is argued that 
entry-exit systems give locationally and temporal signals that allow identifying and reducing 
congestion in the grid. Manifested through high prices at certain entry-exit points, this tariff type 
is supposed to additionally indicate where investment might be necessary (See Council of 
European Energy Regulators (CEER), 2002: 4). 
 
In contrast to entry-exit tariffs, distance related tariff structures have to fulfil certain conditions 
to be cost-reflective and non-discriminatory. According to Lapuerta and Moselle (2002), these 
conditions are not given in reality. As they point out “in more complicated networks with 
multiple entry and exit points physical flows will deviate significantly from contractual flows. In 
these instances, distance-based systems no longer provide cost-reflective charges and therefore 
are potentially discriminatory” (Lapuerta & Moselle, 2002: 38). It is argued that this deviation 
allows operators to ask for higher transportation costs, which discriminate against new entrants. 
In other words, distance related tariff structures permits incumbents (supplying and transporting) 
to determine the increase of marginal costs for transporting additional gas.  
 
Postal tariffs, so called postage stamp tariffs, can be thought of as a special case of entry-exit 
tariffs - with the same entry tariff at every entry point and vice versa (see Lapuerta & Moselle, 
2002: 35). The CEER working Group elaborates,  
 
if postage stamp (average cost) tariff is applied where the network modelling implies locationally 
differentiated tariffs, there will be a cross-subsidisation from ‘low cost’ entry points to ‘high cost’ entry 
points. The tariff will not be cost-reflective. Post-stamp tariffs allow incumbents and new entrants to 
compete on an equal cost basis. Cost reflectivity is, however, very important because tariffs distort the 
market. In view of the Working Group (CEER), therefore, the best approach is to set cost reflective tariffs 
for all and simultaneously ensure capacity arrangements provide for non-discriminatory access. (Council of 
European Energy Regulators (CEER), 2002: 5) 
 
The benchmarking reports also designate the category “mixed” for countries in which different 
tariff zones still exist. Some zones may have already introduced entry-exit, whereas others still 
use distance related or postalised tariffs. In other words, a national market can contain a 
favourable and an unfavourable tariff system at the same time.  Nevertheless, the least optimal 
solution is no publication of tariffs as such, which is covered by the values ‘not applicable’ or 
‘not published’. Thus, we argue mixed systems are less favourable as well, because they offer a 
lower degree of tariff harmonisation and transparency which in return results in higher 
transaction costs for the companies. Distance related and post stamp tariffs receive the same 
score as we could not identify a qualitative difference between their disadvantages (one cross-
subsidising different transport cost areas and the other offering the ability to increase the TSO 
profit due to the deviation of contractual and physical flows). Entry-exit tariffs receive the 
highest score, mainly because the EC considers it to be the best practice tariff that promotes 
transparency and non-discrimination. 
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Type of capacity booking 
In practice. tariff structure and type of capacity booking often correspond. However it is also 
possible to deviate, as they express different functions of network access. The benchmarking 
reports distinguish eight values that describe capacity booking and group them into four 
categories. The first category form entry based, entry-exit based, and so-called cost-reflective 
types of capacity booking, and the second group consists of distance related types postalised and 
point-to-point based capacity booking. The third category incorporates mixed types of capacity 
booking and the fourth is reserved for countries that do not provide any information about the 
way capacity booking services are organised. The most favourable are the most flexible and cost-
reflective in the first category. Due to the similarity between the values of tariff structure and 
type of capacity booking, we apply the same reasoning then for the tariff structure (see above). In 
this context it is noteworthy that the type of capacity booking described here does not indicate 
duration. In other words, the different type of capacity booking does not reflect the phenomenon 
of capacity congestion in some of the European gas markets. 
Allocation method 
The next indicator describes the allocation method used to distribute transport capacity. Three 
different types of allocation methods are applied in the EU gas markets that are considered to 
have different degrees of efficiency and impact on discrimination. The auction mechanism is the 
first. In the European context, this method was introduced in the UK in 1999 to replace the 
negotiation based allocation of capacity rights. Under an auction mechanism, available capacity 
is published and thereafter auctioned. This mechanism allows a transparent and non-
discriminatory proceeding to allocate capacity. Moreover, it is claimed that an auction 
mechanism provides market signals for investment in transport capacity. Since high auction 
prices are a sign of scarce capacity, it can set incentives to upgrade transport capacity. (See 
McDaniel & Neuhoff, 2002) 
The second category ‘Capacity goes where costumers are’ describes the mechanism used in 
Sweden. Unlike the other European gas markets, the Swedish gas market enjoys an oversupply 
of capacity and therefore capacity goes where the costumers are. Although the Swedish situation 
is comfortable from a regulatory point of view, it is not applicable to other European countries 
that lack transport capacity. Nevertheless, capacity-goes-where-consumers-are is a very 
favourable allocation method and therefore receives a high score. The same holds for the value 
“not applicable”, which is used to express that there is no congestion, but sufficient capacity for 
all market players.  
 
‘First come first served’ (fcfs) forms the third category. Under this mechanism capacity goes to 
the shipper that first requests transport services (see American Gas Association, 2006). Here, the 
pipeline operator is only obligated to provide service to a particular customer to the extent that 
capacity is available. Although the fcfs can be considered an improvement over the old 
negotiation practice, it is not the most favourable as it might result in the phenomenon of 
grandfathering. Under an fcfs arrangement, the system operator publishes available capacity. For 
potential shippers this means they have to constantly update their information on available 
capacity while relying on the TSO to publish the necessary information in the right manner. 
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Incumbents could generate a comparative advantage due to their information power, which 
might enable their transport arm to react much faster than new entrants. In other words, if the 
‘Chinese walls’ are not very high, the trading part of the incumbent will receive the information 
much faster and perhaps of better quality than other market players gaining a comparative 
advantage.    
 
The benchmarking report uses the value ‘others‘ without specifying or giving any further 
explanation. Following the Latin principle in dubio pro res, we subsume the value ‘others’ not 
under the least favourable measures. The least favourable situations for supporting competitive 
market conditions occur if the value information is ‘not available’ or the implementation of a 
general allocation method of the capacity is ‘planned’.   
Tariff 
The Brattle Group sheds some light into the tariff formulation principles by offering us a straight 
forward formula: “an aggregate tariff can (therefore) be conceived as the sum of two 
components: tariff = “scarcity charge” + “charge to recover balance of fixed costs” (Lapuerta & 
Moselle, 2002: 38). Accordingly, we can deduce that there is an individual fixed cost component 
and a relative profit margin component. Though there is a certain degree of discretion stemming 
from differences in individual network costs, in general higher tariffs are an indicator that 
network operators are charging above the marginal (long run) costs. As a consequence of high 
transportation costs in the form of tariffs, the profit margins of all players are reduced. In 
general, the causality holds true that the higher the tariff, the higher the entrance barrier for new 
entrants.  The tariffs in the European Union show a huge disparity. Between 2002 and 2005, 
tariffs on the transmission level ranged from 0.75-5.5 Euro/Mega Watt hour (MWh). To score 
the level of tariffs, we group the values in low (0-2 Euro/MWh), middle (2,1-3 Euro/MWh) and 
high (3,1-5.5 Euro/MWh), and then score accordingly.   
 
Incentive regulation 
The literature distinguishes between four methods of incentive regulation: price-cap regulation, 
rate-of-return regulation, revenue-cap regulation, and the so called discretionary regulatory 
regime of tariff determination. (Alexander & Irwin, 1996, September: 3). 
 
The price-cap mechanism imposes a ceiling on prices the network company is allowed to charge 
as tariffs. The regulatory authority reviews and determines a price-cap regulation for a period of 
three-to-five years based on a complicated formula. Components of this formula determine the 
degree to which inflation, operating costs, return of investment (cost recovery), return on 
investment (profit), and efficiency gains are taken into consideration. The formula and scope of 
its variables vary for each country. In other words, the method itself does not inform about the 
strictness of the regulation per se but enables the generation of an efficiency factor, also known 
as x-factor. In this context, x represents the expected annual gain in the utility’s efficiency that 
the regulator imposes on the gas network operators. Price-caps often distinguish between generic 
and individual efficiency factors. For instance, the Dutch regulator Dte formulated not only a 
generic x-factor of 1% per year, but also individual x-factors for the operating companies. 
During the Dutch price review period between 2005 and 2007 the companies specific x-factors 
ranged from -0,4% (NRE Energie) to 6,5% (Essent). The Dutch example demonstrates how 
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considerably the company specific x-factors vary. (See Directie Toezicht Energie (DTe), 2007) 
Under a rate-of-return regulation utilities are permitted a set rate of return on capital. In contrast, 
revenue-cap regulation takes the total revenues as the variable on which the ceiling is imposed. 
For the process of rate-of-return regulation and revenue-cap regulation the estimation of 
regulatory asset base values is crucial. Regulatory asset base value refers to  
 
the capital value of the assets used by regulators in setting prices or price limits for utility companies. A 
basic formula in utility rate-setting is: Required Revenue = Operating Costs + Depreciation + Return on 
Capital. That is to say, utility charges should be designed to recover no more than reasonable operating 
costs (including taxes), plus capital charges that provide investors with a competitive return equal to what 
they would have earned on other investments of equivalent risk. Capital charges include both a return of 
investment (also known as depreciation) and a return on investment (known as profit). Both depreciation 
and return on capital require an approach to asset valuation, i.e., the determination of the Regulatory Asset 
Base. (Woodman, 2004) 
 
The last method ‘discretionary regulatory regime’ is not defined and serves as an umbrella for 
methods other than the two mentioned. Often a mixture of several elements of price-cap 
regulation and rate-of-return regulation, it is sometimes labelled as a hybrid form.  
 
The European Union did not prescribe any kind of incentive regulation and the European 
Commission did not declare or promote any preference in this regard. The legal provisions refer 
only indirectly to incentive regulation through the principles of economic and cost-reflectiveness. 
For our assessment it is therefore crucial whether any kind of incentive regulation is in place. A 
more differentiating ranking of the four forms of incentive regulation is not suitable. Moreover, 
the effect of these forms of incentive regulation vary in their country specific application, which 
makes an instrument based rating less meaningful. 
 
Minimum booking service firm service 
The indicator minimum booking service of firm services describes the flexibility of transport 
arrangements. The minimum booking period of firm services varies yearly, monthly, weekly, 
daily, and can also have no minimum. The values are ranked by their degree of flexibility and 
grouped into scoring categories accordingly (see below).   
 
Use it or lose it (UIOLI) 
‘Use it or lose it’ is a voluntary mechanism that can be applied to enhance the market liquidity 
and foster non-discrimination with regard to transport capacity access. It is supposed to force 
shippers to release initially booked but ultimately unused capacity. The use it or lose it 
mechanism is a powerful tool to prevent capacity hoarding for strategic or speculative reasons 
(see Cavaliere, 2007: 16). The benchmarking reports introduce four values to describe the 
application of the use it or lose it mechanism. The scoring is self-explanatory except for the 
value ‘not applicable’. In this context the value ‘not applicable’ is used to describe countries 
without capacity congestion and is therefore given a high score. Moreover, if information is 
unavailable to the European Commission it is assumed not to support the transparency principle 
and is therefore considered unfavourable. 
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Table 5: Gas network access conditions and tariffication (Indicator 2) 
 
Component data type  values and scores 
Component 2.1:  
Tariff structure nominal 
entry-exit (10) 
distance, postalised (6.7) 
mixed (3.3) 
not published (0) 
Component 2.2:  
Type of capacity booking nominal 
entry, entry-exit, cost-reflective (10) 
point-point, postalised (6.7) 
mixed (3.3) 
not applicable, not available (0) 
Component 2.3:  
Allocation method nominal 
auction, cgwc, not applicable (10) 
fcfs (6.7) 
others (3.3) 
planned/not available (0) 
 
Component 2.4:  
Tariffs numeric  
high (3.1-5.5 Euro/MWh) (10) 
middle (2.1-3 Euro/MWh) (5) 
low (0-2 Euro/MWh) (0) 
Component 2.5:  
Incentive regulation nominal 
yes (10) 
no (0) 
Component 2.6:  
Minimum booking period firm 
service 
nominal 
no minimum, 3.3=1-3 days (10) 
day/month, week (6.7) 
month (3.3) 
year, no congestion/not applicable/no 
information (0) 
Component 2.7:  
Use it or lose it (UIOLI) nominal 
yes, not applicable (10) 
short-term/Partial (6,7) 
planned (3.3) 
no, not available (0) 
Gas network access conditions 
and tariffication  
sum of the indicators scores (listed above, 
max. 70 scores) 
 
6.10.3 Gas balancing rules 
Regulation 1775 determines principles for the balancing provisions in Article 7. Thereafter 
balancing rules should be fair, transparent, and non-discriminatory, reflecting costs; the rules 
should not hamper cross-country trade and transport within Europe (see section 5.3.4). Balancing 
regimes were a subject of the Madrid Forum earlier within the context of the formulation of the 
Guidelines for Third Party Access Services (see Madrid Forum, 2000; Madrid Forum, 2002). In 
contrast to the tariff structure, the Madrid Forum did not reach a consensus about whether hourly 
or daily balancing is more favourable. Moreover, the European Commission did not formulate 
any preference with regard to the duration of balancing periods. So far, it is contested whether 
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hourly or daily balancing is more favourable. The benchmarking reports distinguish between 
monthly, daily, hourly, and mixed balancing arrangements. These are scored according to their 
degree of flexibility.   
6.10.4 Third party access to storage  
The introduction of competition in all parts of the gas chain including gas storage aims to offer 
equal business opportunities to new entrants and to optimise system flow at the same time.  
Access to gas storage has not only proven to be relevant for optimising the transport system, but 
can serve as a powerful tool to meet the balancing requirements and also offers trade 
opportunities. For instance, gas bought and stored during summer time could be profitably sold 
at a higher price in winter time. Consequently, third party access to gas storage has been 
introduced within the acceleration Directive, leaving it open whether to apply negotiated or 
regulated TPA for storage. A minimised variant of TPA presents the offer of “modulation 
services only”.  
 
6.10.5 Gas release programme 
The introduction of a gas release programme frees up gas to the market, which is originally 
imported through existing long-term contracts. In the European context, the UK first introduced 
a gas release scheme in 1991 to open the market to competitors of British Gas (see Helm, 2004-
253). Although many countries implemented a gas release programme, it is not mandatory 
according to EU legislation. Yet, competition in the market is stimulated by forcing dominant 
vertical integrated gas companies to auction certain amounts of gas from their gas import ‘bags’ 
to other market players. For this reason, we consider the introduction of a gas programme as 
favourable and a forceful measure to weaken dominant market positions and foster gas-to-gas-
competition (see Madrid Forum, 2002: 6). There are some countries in which a gas release 
programme is not applicable, due to a lack of capacity congestion or a competitive market 
structure. In the latter case, the countries therefore receive a high score.   
 
 
6.10.6 Trading facilities 
To assess the physically available trading facilities, we distinguish between three categories. 
First, fully-fledged mature trading facilities are characterised by a gas hub or/and virtual trading 
point in conjunction with a functioning spot market and future market, resulting in a relatively 
high total traded volume. Second, evolving trading facilities also provide a gas hub and/or a 
virtual trading point, but do not offer the whole variety of contracts that full-fledged spot and 
future markets ensure, and are signified by a limited volume of trade. In the third category fall 
those markets which have not established a gas hub or virtual trading point, or if so, only offer a 
limited variety of contracts and trade. 
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Table 6: Indicators gas balancing rules (3), third part access to storage (4), gas release 
programme (5), and trading facilities (6) 
  
Indicator/component data type  values and scores 
Indicator 3: Gas balancing rules   
balancing period  nominal 
hourly, hourly/daily, daily (10) 
daily/monthly (5) 
monthly (0) 
Indicator 4: Third party access to 
storage 
  
third party access to storage  nominal 
yes (10) 
modulation only (5) 
non available (0) 
Indicator 5: Gas release programme 
  
gas release programme nominal 
completed, yes, not applicable 
(10) 
planned (5) 
no (0) 
Indicator 6: Trading facilities  
  
trading facilities nominal 
Mature (10) 
Developing (5) 
Infancy (0) 
 
 
6.10.7 Unbundling 
Although we suggest separate indicators for unbundling, the values to describe unbundling at the 
transmission and distribution level are identical. Both indicators’ scoring are based on the degree 
of unbundling. Ownership unbundling is the most far reaching variant and implies splitting the 
companies vertically into a trade company and a distribution or transmission company. Legal 
unbundling has been mandatory since the second Directive. It preserves the ownership structure, 
but creates independent organisations under one roof, predominantly in the form of a company 
holding. For legal unbundling the expression ‘Chinese walls’ is often used to expose the 
closeness of the separated organisation in real life. Introduced by the second Directive, 
management unbundling is an advanced form of legal unbundling because it explicitly requires 
separating the staff working for the trade and transporting parts of the gas undertaking. The 
minimal form of unbundling is so-called unbundling of accounts. There an existing and 
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integrated company separates only the accounting for trade and transport services (see 
Brunekreeft & Keller, 2001: 7-9). In the progress report from 2005, the Commission only 
distinguishes between those countries which have implemented ownership unbundling or legal 
unbundling. ‘Unbundling of accounts’ is subsumed under the label ‘no’ legal unbundling. 
Management unbundling which implies legal unbundling is not taken into consideration. If 
countries do not offer legal unbundling by 2005, we assume the country fulfils the initial 
minimum of separated accounts and score them accordingly. (See European Commission, 2005a: 
81-82). 
 
Published accounts 
With the introduction of legal unbundling in the first Directive (see section 5.3.3), the European 
Union requires the separation and publication of the accounts. Consequently, the question is 
whether the transmission system operator and distribution system operator of a formerly 
integrated gas company in one country meet the implementation requirements as outlined in the 
legal provisions.   
 
Table 7: Network unbundling TSO and DSO (Indicator 7 & 8)     
 
Indicator/component data type values and scores 
Network unbundling TSO  Sum of the indicators scores 
(listed above, max 20 scores) 
Component 7.1: Basic 
unbundling model TSO 
nominal ownership (10) 
management, 
legal/management (7,5) 
legal (5) 
account (2,5) 
non (0) 
Component 7.2: Published 
accounts TSO 
nominal yes (10) 
no (0) 
Network unbundling DSO  Sum of the indicators scores 
(listed above, max 20 scores) 
Component 8.1: Basic 
unbundling model DSO 
nominal ownership (10) 
management, 
legal/management (7.5) 
legal (5) 
account (2.5) 
non (0) 
Component 8.2: Published 
accounts DSO 
 
nominal yes (10) 
no (0) 
 
 
6.11 Scoring of indicators describing the dimension regulatory competencies  
All indicators subsumed under regulatory competencies inform us about how economic 
governance in the European gas sector is organised and to whom decision power is transferred to 
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(see Maarten Arentsen, 2004; Maarten Arentsen & Künneke, 1996). In our discussion of formal 
rules (section 5.3.5), we showed that a regulator is neither mandatory nor are the member states 
obliged to transfer all decision making power to one of the member states’ regulatory authorities. 
We also showed that the European Commission prefers the establishment of an independent 
regulator in charge of regulating the gas sector with regard to network activities and trade related 
transactions. This preference is in line with the dominant view the current regulation theory 
holds on the organisation of regulation in the utility sectors (see chapter 2).  
 
The scoring of the indicators describing regulatory competencies distinguishes different degrees 
of state intervention. Hence, if an independent national regulator obtains the regulatory 
competence it is perceived as most favourable, whereas the distribution of competencies among 
multiple authorities is less desirable. In contrast, the absence of regulatory authorities or market 
based coordination mechanism is considered the least favourable.  
6.11.1 Third party access  
The first Gas Directive introduced third party access but left the decision to the member states 
whether to vote for regulated or unregulated TPA. With the second Directive, regulated TPA 
became mandatory (see section 5.3.2). The legal provisions thus make a clear statement that 
regulated third party access is considered less discriminatory than negotiated TPA. We would 
still like to elaborate briefly on this appraisal and thereby discuss why ex ante regulation is more 
favourable than ex post regulation.  
 
The day-to-day gas business has shown that it makes a huge difference whether the operator’s 
access conditions are regulated ex ante or ex post. Within an ex ante system, the operator has not 
only to publish the network access conditions prior to its operation, but they also have to be 
approved before its operation. Consequently, the information and decision power is widely 
transferred to the regulatory authority. In contrast, ex post systems enable opportunistic 
behaviour by incumbents. For instance, a network operator can set high tariffs and generate a 
monopoly rent in the first place. Although regulatory authority may intervene ex post and revise 
the tariff methodology, it would be the market reality for a certain amount of time. And more 
importantly, it would necessitate that the regulator has to prove the tariffs to be inappropriate. By 
applying an ex ante system, transparency and reliability or rules can be enhanced and 
discrimination and the number of court cases reduced. In other words, ex ante regulation lowers 
transaction costs. A considerable delay of fair and transparent market conditions could also be 
prevented. In some countries the decision-making by the regulatory authority received ex ante 
and ex post competencies, depending on the regulatory function. For that type of decision-
making the value ‘hybrid’ is introduced.  
 
Before transferring regulatory power to regulators or any other regulating authority, the member 
states had the option to vote for negotiated TPA (see European Commission, 1998). This option 
is certainly less favourable than any ex ante or ex post regulation by a regulatory authority. In the 
course of the reform the majority of member states established sector regulators. A special 
latecomer with regard to TPA is Germany who kept negotiated third party access without 
simultaneously establishing a regulator. To capture this phenomenon, we introduce the value 
‘negotiated third party access without a Regulator’. Both nTPA and nTPA without a regulator 
therefore receive the lowest score.  
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6.11.2 Decision of capacity allocation rules 
The benchmarking reports distinguish between capacity rules made by a single regulator or made 
together by the regulator and a transmission system operator. The third option foresees that one 
or more transmission system operator(s) receive(s) the decision-making power. The scoring of 
the indicators values follows the reasoning given above. 
6.11.3 Approval of balancing conditions 
In European gas markets, balancing conditions are usually approved by the regulator or ministry 
alone, or the competence is shared by the transmission system operator and one of the former 
two authorities. In some countries decision-making capacity is transferred to the market 
respectively to one transmission system operator. If the market holds the power of approving the 
balancing conditions it is crucial to have a mature market in conjunction with a comprehensive 
regulatory regime. If the latter is not ensured, we argue that the balancing conditions may turn 
out to be less favourable for other market participants than for the transmission system operator 
in charge of their approval.   
6.11.4 Dispute settlement 
Dispute settlement is one of the crucial instruments for the functioning of gas markets and a 
constituent part of faith in regulatory competencies. In some member states this competency is 
transferred to the regulator, in other gas markets governmental authorities such as the ministry, 
minister (e.g., economic affairs), competition authority, or regional government settle disputes. 
To facilitate the scoring of the indicator’s value we distinguish three categories: the regulator, 
single-authority arrangements, and multi-authority variants of decision making. The fourth 
category foresees the option that no authority has been appointed to settle. This is not perceived 
as good for building trust or enhancing the credibility in the national regulatory frameworks and 
therefore receives the lowest score.  
6.11.5 Type of regulator 
As elaborated earlier, the competencies, capacities, and degree of autonomy of the regulator play 
an important role in determining regulatory competencies. The next three indicators describe the 
competencies of the national regulator. 
 
When analysing the effect of regulation on economic performance, the existence of an 
independent regulator serves as a proxy to describe the variable regulation (see Wallsten, 2001; 
Zhang, Parker, & Kirkpatrick, 2002). In our operationalisation, we not only distinguish between 
countries with a regulator and those without, but also differentiate between types of regulators. 
We distinguish between a multi-utility regulator and an energy specific regulator, incorporating 
gas, electricity, or other energy sectors such as nuclear or renewable energies. We argue that a 
regulator whose focus and expertise is related to energy issues only is more likely to build up 
more expertise and ambition to perform with regard to energy regulation. The internal 
organisational agenda of an energy specific regulator is likely to be solely determined by the 
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energy sector regulation, whereas in a multi-utility regulator other regulatory actions might be 
considered more important than for instance, the launch of an energy sector inquiry or 
comparable sector investigations. In addition, the staff and budget numbers should be interpreted 
in conjunction with the type of regulator. A high ratio describing the market size in relation to 
the budget or staff indicates more capacities when describing an energy specific regulator. 
Otherwise the ratio expresses the capacity of a multi-utility regulator with several sectors to 
oversee. For this reason, energy specific regulators receive the highest score, followed by multi-
utility regulators with the middle score; countries with no regulator get the lowest score.  
6.11.6 Ratio market size/staff number of the regulator 
The scoring of Indicator 14 ‘ratio market size/staff number of the regulatory authority’ 
necessitated a quite similar treatment as the grouping and scoring of the tariff data. The ratio is 
based on the market size, respective to the consumption of each country in 2000 and divided by 
the staff number of the regulatory authority in that particular year. The ratio ranges from 0.1 to 
1.05. Accordingly, it has been subdivided into the following three groups: high (0.1-0.19), 
middle (0.20-0.49) and low (0.50-1.05).  
6.11.7 Ratio market size/budget of the regulator 
The formulation of Indicator 15, describing the “ratio market size/budget of the regulatory 
authority”, followed the same scheme. It is equally based on the consumption of the respective 
country, but then divided by the budget of the same country. Here, the ratio ranges between 0 
and 11.86. However, the statistical spread is rather concentrated in the first half. Taking this into 
account, a high ratio is considered less than 1, middle ratio between 1 and 2, and a low ratio 
corresponds with any value above 2.  
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Table 8: Indicators (9-15) describing regulatory competencies 
 
Indicator 9:  Type of decision-
making by regulatory authority 
(Ex ante/ex post) 
  
Indicator/component data type values and scores 
 nominal 
ex ante (10) 
ex post (5) 
nTPAwR (0) 
Indicator 10: Capacity allocation 
rule decided by 
  
 nominal 
Regulator (10) 
Regulator/TSO (5) 
TSO (0) 
Indicator 11: Balancing 
conditions approved by 
  
  nominal 
regulator (10) 
ministry (7.5) 
TSO/ministry-TSO/regulator 
(5) 
TSO (2.5) 
Market, not known (0) 
Indicator 12: Dispute settlement 
  
  nominal 
regulator responsible (10) 
Minister; competition authority 
(6.6) 
ministry + regulator 
responsible;  
regulator/regional government; 
hybrid (3.3) 
not regulated; no regulator (0) 
Indicator 13: Type of regulator 
  
 nominal 
Energy specific regulator (10) 
Multi-utility regulator (5) 
No regulator (0) 
Indicator 14: Ration market 
size/staff number 
  
  numeric 
high (10) 
middle (5) 
low (0) 
Indicator 15: Ratio market 
size/budget 
  
  Numeric  
high (10) 
middle (5) 
low (0) 
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6.12 Summary  
The literature review and related political discussions show that the term regulatory regime 
enjoys pluralistic interpretations and is usually not explicitly defined. As a consequence there is 
no common understanding about what a regulatory regime consists of or which indicators are 
constituent. In a wide interpretation of the term, contractual arrangements such as for instance 
long term Take-or-pay contracts or indicators for cross-border interoperability might be included. 
We suggest that the definition of regulatory regime and its operationalisation focuses on the 
formal institutional factors of the regulatory performance. The proposed operationalisation of 
regulatory regimes in European gas markets may be insufficient for a competitive European gas 
market in future, but we argue that our anticipated best-practice model is reasonably influential 
in shaping current market reality to legitimate our proceeding. With the limited scope of the 
concept of regulatory regime in mind, the conceptual work exposed here will certainly inspire 
controversial discussions and hopefully enjoy further improvements. 
 
For the assessment or regulatory regimes in European gas markets we applied the concept of 
convergence. Thereafter, we distinguish between sigma-, gamma- and delta-convergence. This 
allows us to assess the degree, speed, and direction of convergence. All three approaches are 
based on the 15 Indicators that describe the regulatory regime of a national gas market. These are 
grouped into two dimensions, regulatory capacity and regulatory competencies, thereby 
differentiating between policy and polity. Accordingly, a decrease of variance indicates sigma-
convergence. Gamma-convergence occurs if some countries move faster than others towards a 
best-practice model. The overall decrease towards a best-practice model can be detected by 
assessing delta-convergence. For this reason we developed a methodology that allows us to 
deduce what the European Union represented by the European Commission considers to be best 
practice. To facilitate this, we created an index based on 15 indicators consisting of 20 
components. The sum of these 23 components, each allowing a ceiling of 10, amounts to 230 
maximum scoring points. The table displays how the values of the indicators are attributed to the 
three models referred to in section 3.3.  
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Table 9:  Regulatory regime models in European gas markets 
 
 Model type Best practice Emerging  Minimal 
In
di
ca
to
rs
 d
es
cr
ib
in
g 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 fu
nc
tio
ns
 
Legal market opening > 43% legal market 
opening 
< 43% legal market 
opening 
< 28% legal market 
opening 
Tariff structure Entry-exit Point-to-point, postage 
stamp tariffs   
Mixed, not published 
Allocation method Auction First come, first 
served 
Planned, not available 
Minimum booking 
(firm services) 
No minimum, day Month Year 
Use-it-or-lose-it Yes Short-term, partial or 
planned 
No  
Balancing period Hourly, daily Daily/monthly Monthly 
Third Party Access to 
storage 
Yes Planned, modulation 
services only 
No  
Gas release 
programme 
Yes, not applicable Planned No 
Unbundling 
(TSO/DSO)* 
Ownership 
unbundling 
Management or legal 
unbundling 
Separation of 
accounts 
In
di
ca
to
rs
 d
es
cr
ib
in
g 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 c
om
pe
te
nc
ie
s 
Type of decision-
making by regulatory 
authority  
Ex ante Ex post  Negotiated TPA 
without a regulatory 
authority (regulator) 
Capacity allocation 
rules decided by  
Regulator Regulator/TSO TSO 
Balancing conditions 
approved by 
Regulator Shared responsibilities TSO/market 
Dispute settlement  Regulator Shared responsibilities not regulated 
Type of regulator Energy regulator Multi-sector regulator No regulator 
Staff of the regulator 
in relation to the 
market size 
Well equipped Sufficiently equipped Low number of 
staff/market ratio 
Budget of the 
regulator in relation to 
the market size 
Well equipped Sufficiently equipped Low number of 
budget/market ratio 
* Within the unbundling indicator, we distinguish between the unbundling modes of the transmission system operator (TSO) and 
the distribution system operator (DSO). Further, we separately assess whether accounts are separated. 
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7. EUROPEAN GAS MARKET REGULATION: DO REGULATORY REGIMES 
CONVERGE TOWARDS BEST PRACTICE?  
7.1 Introduction  
This empirical chapter analyses converging and diverging trends within regulatory regimes in 
European natural gas markets. The first section outlines the main results of our empirical 
analysis. We then leave the regime level and show how these results were generated from an 
indicator level. In the sequence and grouping suggested in the methodology section, we examine 
three different modes of convergence (sigma, delta, and gamma) for each indicator. Accordingly, 
the indicators subsumed under the dimension regulatory function are tackled first, followed by 
the analysis of those indicators belonging to the dimension regulatory competencies. In our 
definition, sigma convergence indicates harmonisation, whereas delta convergence expresses the 
direction and degree of harmonisation. Both forms of policy convergence are complementary. 
Moreover, gamma convergence mainly informs us about countries whose performance is 
somehow outstanding, be it because some countries move faster towards best-practice or former 
best-practice countries revise their policy in a less favourable way. Additionally, the index 
developed earlier allows measuring the degree of delta convergence and thereby seeing how far 
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the old member states are from best practice in terms of gas market regulation (see chapter 6). 
Last but not least, we confront our expectations concerning the correlation between the success 
of delta convergence and the degree of legal specification with our empirical observations.  
7.2 Regulatory comprehensiveness at a glance 
On the basis of our analysis we conclude that the regulatory comprehensiveness in the EU-12 
natural gas markets reached only a moderate degree by the end of 2005. A correlation between 
the legal specification of the European legal provisions and the degree of delta convergence 
appears to be positive but not very strong. Accordingly, European law that prescribes regulatory 
instruments can be interpreted as a necessary but insufficient condition to achieve best practice. 
These two main results will be specified in three steps. First, we summarise the occurrence of the 
three types of convergence approaches. An indicator-specific analysis is provided in the next 
sections and the results are discussed in more detail in the related overviews of the dimensions. 
Second, we analyse the impact of the two dimensions, regulatory function and competencies. 
Third, we assess the increase of delta-convergence towards best practice and identify 
implementation patterns by taking a country perspective.  
 
The analysis of sigma, gamma, and delta convergence is based on 15 indicators consisting of 23 
components. A decrease of variance in the form of sigma convergence could be found for 15 of 
23 components. Whereas gamma and delta convergence are adequately described from an 
indicator or country perspective, expressing sigma convergence is better facilitated by comparing 
changes regarding mean, range, and variance of indicator values. The overall mean of the 
regulatory comprehensiveness across the old member states decreased by 35 points between 
2000 and 2005. At the first measurement point in 2001, the mean was 123 points with a 
minimum score of 63 in France and a maximum score of 205 in UK. This range of 135 points 
shows a high degree of variation. The mean gradually increased from 138 points in 2002, to 143 
points in 2003, 152 points in 2004, 157 points in the beginning of 2005, and topped by 159 
points at the end of 2005. The overall range decreases from 142 points to 88 points, suggesting a 
moderate sigma convergence.  
  
The majority of gamma convergence was positive, meaning that countries caught up towards 
best-practice application. Up to 22 components showed positive gamma convergence. The 
degree of positive gamma convergence reached a high degree for seven components, a moderate 
degree for 10 components, and a low degree for the remaining five components. The only 
component that was lacking any movement towards best-practice was ‘allocation method’, 
because member states considered first-come-first-serve arrangements sufficient and preferred 
those to the auction mechanism. With 12 of 23 components, the degree of negative gamma 
convergence is comparably lower. Ten of these indicators showed only a low degree of negative 
gamma convergence, indicating that a considerably small number of member states were falling 
behind by applying less favourable instruments. By 2005, only 54% reached best practice, 
suggesting a moderate delta convergence. From an indicator perspective, the components are 
relatively evenly distributed, reaching from high to low degree of delta convergence.  
With the two dimensions of regulatory comprehensiveness in mind, one might ask which 
dimension had more impact on minimising the distance to the best-practice model. To answer 
this, we compare the overall mean change of both dimensions, one expressing the policy and the 
other the polity dimension in this period. Accordingly, the mean of regulatory functions 
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increased by 28 points, whereas the mean of the regulatory competencies only increased by 
seven points. Therefore, we conclude that the overall mean change for the regulatory 
comprehensiveness stems mainly from the increasing mean of the regulatory function. This 
result suggests that countries are more reluctant to change their institutional arrangements by 
transferring decision power to the regulator than by revising a regulatory instrument. At the end 
of the period, there is a plus mean change of 36 points. Although the number suggests progress, 
the overall mean in 2005 is still 71 points under the maximum score.  
 
Another way to approach the impact of the two dimensions on the overall comprehensiveness of 
gas market regulation in EU is to analyse whether countries deviate much in the two dimensions. 
The underlying question can be stated ‘are policy and polity pointing in the same direction?’ To 
examine this question, we created a scatter plot in which the scores of both dimensions are set in 
relation to each other and their position is measured in 2001 and 2005. If countries deviate 
considerably, we would expect countries’ positions to be in the upper left corner or lower right 
corner of the figure. Countries predominantly were positioned in the lower left corner however, 
and moved upwards towards the higher right corner. Accordingly, the upward trend can be 
described as a diagonal upward trend from bottom left to top right. The United Kingdom and 
Spain are the only exemptions, first located in the higher right corner before moving slightly to 
the left.  
 
Figure 7: Relation of the dimension regulatory function and regulatory competencies in 
2000 and 2005b 
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Four patterns can be identified when comparing the degree of delta convergence of the 
regulatory regimes in European gas markets (EU-12) between 2000 and the end of 2005. First, 
there are countries whose scores form a steadily increasing slope. Second, some countries’ 
indicators score can be best described as a plateau, suggesting a high degree of stability. Third, 
we observe scoring patterns shaped like a roof characterised by an increase of scores in the 
beginning and decrease towards the end of the examination period. The latter phenomenon is 
partly related to negative gamma convergence or a gradually backward trend. Fourth, there is the 
group of countries whose scores do not form a pattern or are a mixture of those described.  
 
The overall scoring results of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden in general steadily 
increase over time. The Netherlands is a less obvious case of increasing scores due to a small dip 
in the beginning of 2005. Then, changes in the governance of dispute settlement and capacity 
allocation abrogated the formation of a stringent slope pattern. The same holds true for Sweden, 
with a little dip in the beginning of 2005. The downward trend of 117 points in 2004 to 110 
points at the beginning of 2005 is based on changes of the minimum booking period from one-
three days to one year and a shift of capacity booking from entry to point to point system. The 
upward trend, reaching 127 points, stems from the introduction of ownership unbundling and 
changes of competencies regarding the decision of balancing conditions and capacity allocation.   
In contrast, the regulatory regime in the UK stayed relatively stable, ranging between 200 and 
205 points; its regulatory performance is therefore best described as a plateau pattern. Countries 
following the roof pattern and eventually becoming more hesitant to implement best-practice 
measures are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, and Luxembourg. A closer look at these 
countries reveals that no common behaviour other than applying less favourable measures can be 
found. These countries do not revise the same indicators, nor do they do it to the same extent 
(downgrading ranges between 7-20 scoring points). It is also not related to the policy or polity 
dimension. We can observe only a shared hesitation to move further towards best-practice 
amongst these countries.   
 
The regulatory regime in Spain achieved quite high and relatively stable scores during the entire 
period. Still its changes are too severe to speak of a plateau pattern. Especially the dip during 
2005 from 193 points to 183 points suggests a mixed pattern. According to our indicator 
analysis, the lack of published accounts induced some negative regulatory performance. Other 
than that, no real outstanding cases could be detected.  
 
 
The countries are grouped into high, low, and middle degree of delta convergence. Into the 
lowest category fall those countries whose score is below 150 in 2005b. The group applying a 
minimal model consists of Germany, Luxembourg, and Sweden. Although these countries might 
have been progressive in applying one or two best-practice measures, the overall regulatory 
comprehensiveness of the regulatory regime is considered less favourable. The middle degree of 
delta convergence is reached by a score ranging between 150-189 points. An emerging model 
could be identified in France, Ireland, Austria, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Denmark. 
The latter three countries significantly and steadily increased their regulatory 
comprehensiveness. Therefore, they may be considered forerunners within the group of the 
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emerging model. The most comprehensive regulatory regimes are expected to reach a score 
above 189. In 2005, only the United Kingdom could reach this level of best practice. The table 
below exposes the scoring results of each country in more detail between 2000-2005. The United 
Kingdom held the first rank for most of the time period with either 200 or 205 points. By 2005, 
Denmark reached the second and Spain the third rank.  
 
Table 10: Countries scores for regulatory comprehensiveness 
 
 RC 2001 RC 2002 RC 2003 RC 2004 RC 2005a 
RC 
2005b 
Austria 118.4 150 171.5 181.5 175.1 155.1 
Belgium 122.6 140.9 135.9 165.1 160.1 160.1 
Denmark 133.4 140.1 153.4 170 193.4 183.4 
France 62.6 67.6 77.6 112.5 147.5 152.5 
Germany 69.2 92.6 92.6 92.6 97.5 126.7 
Ireland 130.9 155 158.4 143.4 138.4 153.4 
Italy 150 171.6 171.6 176.7 169.2 161.7 
Luxemburg 92.6 119.2 119.2 120.9 135.9 117.5 
Netherlands 130.1 145.1 151.7 159.2 157.5 176.7 
Spain 183.4 183.4 188.4 185.1 193.4 183 
Sweden 81.7 91.7 91.7 116.7 110.1 127.5 
United Kingdom 205 200 200 200 200 205 
 
 
7.3 Convergence of regulatory functions  
The following section analyses the eight indicators comprising 15 components in order of their 
description in the methodology section (see chapter 6). 
   
7.3.1 Legal market opening 
Since the first Directive left considerable leeway to the member states decision, especially in 
early reform years, the indicator legal market opening is well suited to identify whether member 
states followed the liberalisation by letter or in spirit. It was only the second Directive 
accelerating the process of legal market opening by bringing forward the date of full market 
opening to 1 July 2007. In foresight of the approaching implementation deadline, the 
Commission did not pay much attention to the indicator after the fourth benchmarking report was 
published in 2005. 
 
Originally, the legal provision differentiated between new market openers and advanced market 
openers. This suggests not only different entry positions, but also creates opportunities for the 
occurrence of so-called gamma convergence, characterised by different speeds of legal market 
opening. During the first year of the reform, UK and Germany were the only countries who 
offered a declared legal market opening of 100%. Both countries, one an advanced market 
opener and the other a new market opener, suggest a very proactive attitude towards competition 
supporting market designs. In reality, it may serve as an illustrative example why one single 
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instrument left alone does not translate in a proactive regulation for competition. Whereas, inter 
alia effective third party access in UK assured the practical application of legal market opening, 
Germany only offered negotiated TPA when legally opening its market. As a result, customers 
had the legal possibility to switch and change their natural gas provider, but the third party 
access regime did not support this competition-induced behaviour. In other words, on a formal 
level Germany appears to be a fast mover, indicating gamma convergence. Nevertheless, this 
result has to be set in the context and treated with caution.  
 
In terms of legal market opening, the Gas Directives clearly induced converging effects. In 2002, 
Austria opened its market. Spain and Italy followed the year after. Next, Denmark implemented 
100% legal market opening in 2004 and the Netherlands in 2005. By opening their market by 
2005, a total of seven countries met the obligations earlier than required. Countries such as 
Belgium, France, Ireland, and Luxembourg gradually increased the legal market opening up to a 
high level without reaching 100% in 2005. The exception was Sweden, who only opened half of 
its market until 2005. Starting as new market openers, France and Denmark demonstrated good 
process over time. France started off with a legal market opening of a concise 20% and by 2005 
offered 70% market opening. Denmark’s case is not only remarkable, but at the same time 
indicates gamma convergence: With a ceiling of 35% market opening in 2003, Denmark then 
jumps up to 100% in the following year.   
 
As explained earlier, sigma convergence occurs if there is a decrease in variation of policies 
among the countries under consideration. The decrease of variation is indicated by a decreasing 
range and standard deviation. Taking into account the 12 cases and observing the legal market 
opening between 2000-2005, sigma convergence evidently occurs. In 2001, the mean of legal 
market opening accounted for 62% and gradually accrued to 89% by 2005. In that period, the 
range was reduced from 80% to 50%, accompanied by a decrease of standard deviation from 
initially 27 points down to 17 points. By 2005, 7 of 12 countries had fully opened their gas 
markets legally. To sum up, 11 of 12 countries legally opened their market more than 70%. The 
overall mean accounted for nearly 90% legal market opening even before the Directives required 
full market opening. As a matter of fact, there is evidence for sigma convergence: most of the 
countries gradually increased the legal market opening between 2000 and 2004, showing through 
moderate positive gamma convergence 50%. By 2005 a moderate level of delta convergence 
(58%) was reached, confirming our expectation (2) that legal provisions concerning legal market 
opening are not ambitious enough to induce a high degree of delta convergence.   
7.3.2 Network access conditions and tariffication 
The indicator gas network access conditions and tariffication consists of six components and 
reflects different aspects of the tariff regime and network access conditions. The following 
portrays each component individually.  
Tariff structure  
At the beginning of the Reform, the old member states applied a considerable variety of tariff 
structures. For three (Ireland, Luxembourg, and Sweden) the tariff structure was either not 
published or its publication was due to limited network capacity considered insufficient to offer 
market possibilities that would warrant the set up of a tariff structure for third party access. In 
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2001, only the United Kingdom and Italy offered entry-exit arrangements. In Austria, Belgium, 
France, and Netherlands network tariffs were distance based; Denmark and Spain started with 
postalised tariffs. Germany’s tariff landscape was too fragmented and based on a variety of tariff 
structures to find a single label other than “mixed”. The different categories Germany received to 
describe its tariff structure does not indicate several nationwide tariff reforms but shows the 
difficulties Germany had integrating and harmonising its tariff structures (see Lohmann 2006). In 
contrast, Ireland and the Netherlands belong to the group of early movers, introducing entry-exit 
based tariffs in 2002-2003. Belgium and France followed in 2004. The late movers appeared to 
be Austria, Denmark, and Germany, implementing entry-exit tariffs in 2005. Spain partly revised 
its postalised system in 2006 by introducing entry-exit tariffs for transport devoted to natural gas 
re-exported to third countries. At the end of 2005, nine of 12 countries followed the road to 
entry-exit based tariffs, as promoted by the Madrid Forum and European Commission. Sweden 
and Luxembourg had earlier applied postalised tariffs, but in 2005 the regulator preferred to 
choose the category ‘not applicable/information not available’. To conclude, sigma and delta 
convergence occur simultaneously. Moreover, the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
France, Austria, and Denmark suggest positive gamma convergence. By 2005, delta convergence 
reached a high level (75%). Accordingly, a low degree of precision of European legislation did 
not translate into a lack or low degree of delta convergence and as a result expectation three 
cannot be confirmed.   
Type of capacity booking 
In 2001, capacity across Europe was booked based on postalised, point-to-point or entry-exit 
arrangements and showed a significant degree of variance. Denmark, Spain, and Sweden applied 
postalised capacity booking, whereas Austria, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and Netherlands 
voted for the distance related point-to-point variant. Ireland, Italy, and the United Kingdom 
started off either entry or entry-exit types of capacity booking. These were followed by Sweden 
and Luxembourg in 2002 indicating positive gamma convergence. At the same time, Ireland 
switched back from entry-exit based capacity booking and introduced point-to-point capacity 
booking (negative gamma convergence). Interestingly, Denmark took a three step approach by 
first applying postalised capacity booking then point-to-point in 2002, before finally 
implementing an entry-exit based method. The same can be observed in Austria, starting with a 
point-to-point capacity booking, moving to cost-reflective variant, and then finalising with entry-
exit based capacity booking. Both show how the parties involved, be it regulator, ministry, or 
transmission system operator, try to find the most appropriate regulatory instrument or label for 
their practice. A wave of entry-exit application occurred in 2004, when Austria, Denmark, 
France, and the Netherlands changed their type of capacity booking. By the end of 2005, 10 of 
12 member states had implemented entry-exit based capacity booking. The only two exceptions 
were Ireland and Belgium: Ireland stayed with its point-to-point system and Belgium offered 
mixed types of capacity booking.  
 
All three types of convergence could be found for the component ‘type of capacity booking’. By 
moving towards an entry-exit system there is proof for sigma and delta convergence. In addition, 
positive and negative gamma convergence occurred. The former applies to the UK, Ireland, Italy, 
Sweden, Luxembourg, Denmark, Austria, France, and the Netherlands. Ireland showed the latter 
with some time delay as well. Expectation 3 does imply a low degree of delta convergence when 
European provisions do not prescribe the type of capacity booking. Contrary to our expectation, 
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we observe a high degree of delta convergence (83%). One may conclude that the member states 
dominantly followed the road map to entry-exit system promoted in the context of the Madrid 
Forum between 2001 and 2004 (see section 6.10.2).  
 
Overall, we observe a decrease of variation with regard to tariff structure and types of capacity 
booking across the old member states towards entry-exit tariffs. The Commission emphasised 
that disparity between tariff structure and capacity booking might cause disadvantages for the 
network access. The table below demonstrates that seven countries adapted an entry-exit system 
for both tariff structure and capacity booking. Not covered by this study is the number of entry-
exit zones and their effect on harmonisation. Nevertheless, some countries like France and 
Germany have either reduced the number of entry-exit zones or will in the near future. (See 
European Commission, 2005a: 68-69) 
 
Table 11: Tariff system in 2005b 
Type of 
capacity booking 
Tariff structure 
entry-exit postalised not published/not applicable 
entry-exit 
 
Austria, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, UK 
Spain Luxembourg, Sweden 
point-to-point Ireland   
mixed (entry-
exit/point-to-point) 
Belgium   
 
 
Allocation method 
In contrast to other components of the tariff system, the allocation method showed almost no 
variance during the six years of implementing the European gas reform. From the beginning, 
first-come-first-serve was unchangeably the dominant allocation method in the 12 member 
states. Accordingly, no sigma convergence occurred. In the UK market auctions are allocating 
network capacity. Reflecting the demand side orientation of the small Swedish market, the 
Swedish regulator introduced the allocation principle ‘capacity goes with customer’ in 2005. As 
the Swedish authority did not change their practice but instead found a more adequate label, we 
find no evidence for gamma convergence. Delta convergence occurred only to a low degree 
(17%). The allocation method chosen by the member states was not determined by the legal 
provisions. Accordingly, the result confirms our expectation that only a low degree of delta 
convergence is supposed to be induced by legal institutions.     
Tariffs 
The previous chapter alluded to the relatively low quality of the data on tariffs. The available 
data does however, give us some indication of entry barriers new market participants are facing. 
To compare the tariffs between 2001 and 2005, three tariff groups were created. High tariffs 
(3.1-5 Euros/MWh) receive low scores, middle tariffs (2.1-3 Euros/MWh) receive middle scores 
and low tariffs (0-2 Euros/MWh) receive high scores. According to our classification, the transit 
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countries in the Northwest, Belgium, and Netherlands offered low average tariffs in 2001 and 
2005, and therefore receive high scores. Tariffs in Austria and Spain appeared equally stable, 
representing the middle category. In contrast, France, Luxembourg, and Sweden continuously 
gained low scores due to their high average tariffs in 2001 and 2005. In the first year, the United 
Kingdom and Italy offered comparably low tariffs, but an increase of the average tariffs by 2005 
resulted in middle scores at the end of the examination. Ireland developed exactly the other way 
around. High scores in 2001 shifted to the low score category in 2005. Germany and Denmark 
also downgraded. In 2001, Germany and Denmark were in the middle score category, but 
changed over time to the low score group.  
 
Figure 8: Tariffs in EU-12 between 2001-2005b 
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The lowest tariffs could be found in the two transit countries in Northwest Europe, the 
Netherlands and Belgium. During the entire period, average tariffs in the Netherlands were the 
lowest across the EU-12. The Netherlands offered an average tariff of 0.75 Euros per MWh 
during 2000 and 2001. These stunningly low tariffs were only increased up to one Euro per 
MWh in the subsequent three years. Only Luxembourg was able to compete with the low Dutch 
tariffs by constantly providing an average tariff of one Euro per MWh as well. Belgium followed 
closely with a tariff level between 1.25 and 2 Euros per MWh during the same period, starting 
with 1.5 Euros per MWh in 2001 and levelling at 2 Euros per MWh. We also find relatively low 
tariffs throughout the examination period in UK, ranging between 2 and 2.5 Euros per MWh.  
 
In contrast, Italy’s average tariffs decreased from initially 3 Euros per MWh between 2000-2001 
to 2.5 between 2002 and 2003 and shrunk again to a favourable 2 Euros per MWh. Average 
tariffs in Austria remained pretty stable at 2.75 Euros per MWh. One exceptional year was 2003, 
when Austrian tariffs averaged 2.5 Euros per MWh. In Spain average tariffs started at 
moderately low level of 2.25 Euros per MWh in 2000, but more or less steadily increased to 3 
Euros per MWh by 2004. Only during 2002, Spanish average tariffs went down from 2.25 
E/MWh to 2.00 E/MWh, to jump up to 2.5 Euros the following year.  
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Positive gamma convergence was found in the case of Germany. Average German tariffs started 
with 4.75 Euros per MWh and halved by 2002. During 2004, the German average tariffs 
constituted 2.5 Euros per MWh. Nonetheless, the reverse trend occurs as well. In Denmark for 
instance the average tariffs double between 2004 and 2005 from 2 to 4 Euros per MWh. The 
same can be observed in Ireland between 2001 and 2002. Tariffs in France even first decrease 
from 3.5 Euros per MWh in 2000 to 1 Euro per MWh in 2003, before jumping up to 5 Euros per 
MWh in 2004.  
 
There are at least three cases of negative gamma convergence. Moreover, in Spain and Sweden 
tariffs are gradually increasing. Whereas Spain started with a moderate 2.25 Euros per MWh in 
2000 this rose to 3 Euros per MWh in 2004. Sweden even started with high average tariffs of 3.5 
Euros per MWh, and rose to 5.5 Euros per MWh in 2003, declining only to 5 Euros per MWh in 
2004.  
 
The overall range of network charges did not decrease between 2001 and 2005, levelling at 4 
Euros per MWh. Instead, it even goes up to 4.5 Euros per MWh during 2002. Looking at the 
minimum and maximum of the tariffs over time, no decrease of tariffs could be measured. In 
2000 and 2001 the minimum tariff accounted 0.75 Euros/MWh and the maximum tariff was 4.75 
Euros/MWh. During 2004, the tariff minimum accounted 1.0 Euros/MWh and reached a 
maximum of 5 Euros/MWh. The reform goal, harmonisation and increasing efficiency in the 
form of lowered tariffs could not be reached; at least our data suggests little progress in this 
regard. This observation is confirmed when analysing the overall mean changes. The overall 
tariff mean for EU-12 increased from initially 2.5 Euros/MWh in 2000 (equivalent to t1) to 2.9 
Euros/MWh during 2004 (equivalent with t4=2005). To conclude, sigma convergence did not 
occur and only a low degree of delta convergence (25%) was evident. Gamma convergence 
could be found in several cases. France and Germany even showed both forms.  
 
Incentive regulation 
In the beginning of the reform, incentive regulation was not in place in 10 of the 12 countries. 
This situation changed considerably by the end of 2005, when five member states had introduced 
incentive regulation. Throughout time, sigma convergence decreased and a movement towards 
delta convergence is apparent.  
 
As usual, the regulatory practice in UK served as prototype for incentive regulation in Europe. 
There, price-cap regulation was introduced in 1991 (see Waddams Price, 1997) followed by 
cycles of methodological reformulations and improvements. Taking on the British example, Italy 
adopted revenue-cap regulation for transmission tariffs with the implementaion of the first 
Directive (see Autorità per l'Energia Elettrica e il Gas, 2005, July 31). Since then, transmission 
tariffs are regulated via a revenue cap, “…with the exclusion of the commodity charge subject to 
a pure price cap” (Cavaliere, 2007: 15). Ireland was another early mover introducing revenue-
cap regulation in 2002 (see Commission for Energy Regulation, 2002). One year later, Denmark 
started to regulate annually the revenues of gas distribution companies (see Energitilsynet, 2002). 
In 2003, the Spanish ministry of industry, tourism, and commerce released a decree which 
introduced revenue-cap regulation. The general rate of return is set for old investments, whereas 
the rates of return for investments are regulated on a case by case basis. The Netherlands 
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imposed a mixture of revenue-cap and price-cap regulation in 2005 (see Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken (EZ), 2005). After strong opposition from industry the revenue cap was 
lifted in 2007 (see van der Hoeven, 2007, March 29). Italy, the UK, and Ireland suggest positive 
gamma convergence, a trend supplemented by Denmark Spain, and Netherlands. The latter fell 
back in the end of 2005b, indicating negative gamma convergence. In contrast, Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Sweden had no incentive regulation in place throughout the 
entire period of examination. France is in the process of examining advantages and 
disadvantages of incentive regulation for the French gas market (see Commission de Régulation 
de l'Energie, 2005: 55). Germany just recently voted for a revenue cap system (see Gas Matters 
Today, 2007, September 21). Austria and Belgium have plans to introduce incentive regulation 
in 2008. It is noteworthy that the labels describing the incentive regulation employed mostly 
refer to the dominant mode of incentive regulation. The applied incentive regulation often 
differentiates between different levels or parts of the gas value chain such as transmission tariffs, 
distribution tariff, or for instance an interconnector. Moreover, the regulators across Europe 
distinguish between old and new investments when applying a regulatory instrument. The most 
detailed overview concerning the scope and type of incentive regulation member states applied is 
provided by the 2005 GTE report (see Gas Transmission Europe (GTE), 2005, June). To 
conclude, incentive regulation is not prescribed by the European provisions, as an effect we see 
expectation 3 to be partially proven by observing a moderate degree of delta convergence.  
Minimum booking service 
In the first place, incumbents were reluctant to make the transport market more flexible. Initially 
the common minimum booking period for firm services was one year, not leaving much room for 
flexible transport services and trade opportunities. The UK was the exception to the rule, offering 
a minimum booking period of one-to-three days. Apart from Italy (for which no information on 
minimum booking periods was available) all other 10 member states applied the one-year rule. 
Within the member states one can observe a clear hesitation to lower the minimum booking 
period to one-to-three days. Belgium and Italy employed a one-month period in 2002, followed 
by the Netherlands in 2003. In 2004, Austria offered monthly booking periods and Belgium 
decreased its minimum booking period to one week. In contrast, Ireland and Luxembourg 
retained the minimum contract duration of one year. Further developments in the Italian and 
Swedish gas markets are a little puzzling. First, Italy gradually lowered its minimum booking 
period down to one-to-three days in 2004, but then in 2005 fell behind by offering a minimum 
booking period of one year. The same holds true for Sweden, signifying negative sigma 
convergence in both cases. As a consequence, the indicator minimum booking period exhibits a 
relatively wide variance, instead of sigma convergence. Austria, Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom are the most flexible, offering one-to-three days of 
minimum booking service. Belgium allows weekly and France monthly minimum booking 
periods. In contrast, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, and Sweden allow only transport contracts with 
a minimum booking period of a year for firm services.   
 
Comparing the situations in 2001 and 2005, there is no decrease of variance to indicate sigma 
convergence. Although the variance might not decrease, the minimum booking services become 
more flexible over time in old Europe. In other words, the best practice of one-to-three days is 
not reached by the majority of countries, but the distance to this goal is decreasing, pointing to 
moderate delta convergence (50%). Contributing to this development are Austria (2005b), 
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Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, and the UK (positive gamma convergence); Italy and 
Sweden abandoned the one-to-three day contract duration rule (positive and negative gamma 
convergence). Expectation three can only be partially confirmed by the observations of this 
indicator component.  
Use-it-or-lose-it 
Anti-hoarding mechanisms were not popular in European gas markets before the introduction of 
the gas reform. Only three countries (Netherlands, Spain, and the UK) offered a use-it-or-lose-it 
provision in the early days. For Sweden this measure has not been applicable, because the 
Swedish network is under-utilised and therefore there are no incentives for hoarding capacity in 
the first place. Other European markets were characterised by a lack or scarcity of transport 
capacity. To meet contractual congestion in European gas networks the reform targeted those 
countries which did not offer use-it-or-lose-it arrangements in 2001, including Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg. The implementation of UIOLI 
arrangements took place in three waves. First, Denmark, Ireland and Italy went ahead in 2002, 
implying sigma convergence. Second, Austria and Belgium followed in 2004 with the last 
movers in France and Germany in 2005. In 2005, all old member states had formally 
implemented anti-hoarding mechanisms, where it was applicable. Regulators in Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Sweden, and the UK claimed for different reasons that imposing anti-hoarding 
measures was not necessary, due to either a lack of capacity congestion or effective secondary 
trading. A view held by the relevant national regulators was not officially questioned by the EC 
in their reports. Consequently, a high degree of delta convergence is reached for UIOLI 
provisions and our expectation (3) cannot be confirmed. All three types of convergence can be 
ascertained for the UIOLI indicator.    
7.3.3 Balancing period 
In 2001, balancing periods ranged from hourly to non-transparent arrangements. Most of the 
countries were distributed in two groups, each consisting of five member states. In the first 
group, hourly balancing was required (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the 
Netherlands). The second group (France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain and UK) voted for a daily 
balancing period. The Commission did not receive any information concerning the balancing 
period Sweden applied at that time. Italy offered a mixture of daily and monthly balancing 
arrangements in the first year, but then decided to allow only daily balancing periods thereafter 
(positive gamma convergence). Other countries proceeded the other way round. The Netherlands 
moved in 2002 from a single time frame balancing period to a dual arrangement, and since then 
proffers hourly and daily balancing periods. Germany followed the same scheme in the 
beginning of 2005; by the end of 2005 the EC received the notice that only hourly balancing 
periods are required in Germany. Between 2001 and 2005, we observe more countries switching 
from hourly to daily arrangements, namely in 2003/2004 Denmark and in 2004/2005 Belgium 
and Sweden were revising its balancing arrangement. At the end of 2005, nine countries 
preferred daily balancing periods and followed the Anglo-Saxon practice. There is a clear 
decrease of variance, pointing to sigma convergence. In 2005, only three countries deviate. The 
Netherlands also deviate by offering partly hourly and partly daily arrangements. Opposed to the 
Anglo-Saxon daily balancing practice, Austria and Germany required hourly balancing. Keeping 
in mind that the European Union did not specify preference with regard to hourly or daily 
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balancing periods, the delta convergence shows in a less strict interpretation even stronger, 
cumulating to 100% by the end of the examination period. Consequently, expectation three 
cannot be confirmed.       
7.3.4 Third party access to storage 
In the beginning, third party access was formally granted in Austria, Denmark, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, whereas Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, and Sweden did not foresee negotiated or regulated TPA to storage facilities. In 
2002, Germany made the first move and in 2004 Belgium and France caught up by introducing 
TPA for storage. Sweden decided to implement open access to its storage facilities by 2005. 
Exceptions are Ireland and Luxembourg. Ireland provides extra natural gas storage and 
additionally may use the Interconnector to the UK market to balance its moderate seasonal 
fluctuations (see International Energy Agency, 2003a: 69-70). Nonetheless, no formal third party 
access to gas storage was granted. An exceptional case is Luxembourg where no natural gas 
storage is available. Instead, the de facto monopolist Société de Transport de Gaz (SOTEG) is 
able to fulfil the balancing function that gas storage usually offers through the flexibility 
measures arranged in the long-term contract with the neighbouring supplier Distrigaz. This 
arrangement does secure the public need of security of gas supply and allows the transmission 
system operator to fulfil its balancing mandate. It does not however, offer any other market 
participant access to storage or its related balancing opportunities. For this reason, Luxembourg 
receives a low score. (See International Energy Agency, 2004a: 60). 
   
The analysis clearly indicates a decrease of variance with regard to third party access to natural 
gas storage. Thus, 10 countries provided the formal conditions of granting third party access to 
storage by 2005. Consequently, not only sigma convergence occurred, but also a high degree of 
delta convergence (83%) was reached. Moreover, positive gamma convergence can be found due 
to progressive choices made in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. The second Directive prescribed third party access to storage by 
1 July 2004. Accordingly, we expect to see a high degree of delta convergence (expectation 5) 
from 2004 onwards. This expectation was confirmed in the case of Belgium, France, and 
Sweden, which contributed in 2005 to the high delta convergence.       
7.3.5 Gas release programme 
Although the European Continental market lacked liquidity, gas release programmes enjoyed 
only meagre application at first. The UK, and at some distance Spain, were clearly the 
forerunners that showed other countries how gas release programmes in practice induce market 
liquidity and competition. In 2001, the Italian ENI started its so-called “innovative sales” by 
releasing capacity for the Italian market. These “innovative sales” were not conducted under 
regulated terms and were replaced by an official gas release programme by the end of 2004. 
Other countries such as Austria (2003) and Germany (2004) hesitantly implemented gas release 
programmes. By 2005 seven countries including Denmark, France, and Italy were running a gas 
release programme, auctioning imported gas from incumbents. The indicator clearly shows 
different speeds of implementation: Whereas Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
and Sweden are not officially planning to implement a gas release programme, the UK and Spain 
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have already completed the programme. Summing up, 2/3 of the sample countries met best-
practice by implementing a gas release programme. Although the necessary condition to fulfil 
moderate delta convergence is thereby met, an overall decrease of variance cannot be reported. 
Instead, the range of values increased between 2001 and 2005. Last but not least, the UK, Spain, 
Germany, Austria, Italy, Denmark, and France are examples of positive gamma convergence. 
Although the adoption of gas release programmes was not prescribed by the legal provisions a 
moderate degree of delta convergence occurred, partially confirming our expectation (3).  
7.3.6 Trading facilities 
Although the overall measures of the European gas market regulation aim to stimulate trade and 
thereby achieve effective gas-to-gas competition, no common European virtual trading point has 
been created so far. The following discussion reveals how far the EU is still from that aim. On 
the national level, the governments and regulators were at best setting a framework, but did not 
prescribe the creation of trading mechanisms. This was pretty much left up to the companies and 
proves to be an evolutionary process with different speeds and scope.    
 
In its review of European spot gas markets Heren refers to NBP as virtual spot market and names 
Bacton and Fergus in the UK, Zeebrugge in Belgium, and Bunde in Germany where spot prices 
are generated (see Heren Energy, 2005, 27 May ). Additionally, Austria has created a gas hub at 
Baumgarten. In general, natural gas markets show huge differences in terms of traded volumes, 
number of short-term or forward trades, variety of contracts offered and number of players 
involved (see Wright, 2005). Referring to different modes of trading, we can divide the countries 
into three groups: mature natural gas markets, developing natural gas markets, and infant natural 
gas markets (see section 6.10.1) Until now, the UK is the only European country offering a 
mature spot market and full-fledged trading facilities since the introduction of the European Gas 
Reform. In 1996 the National Balancing Point (NBP) was created. Since then, the NBP has 
functioned as a virtual trading point for the UK market. Two years later, the Interconnector 
Bacton-Zeebrugge began operation and thereby marked the beginning of UK-Continental gas 
trading. Wright offers an excellent reconstruction and analysis of the maturing UK gas market by 
tracing the evolution of gas prices and gas trading in the UK (see Wright, 2005).    
  
As indicated earlier, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria belong to the group of 
developing natural gas markets. There, the second rank holds Belgium and the Netherlands. 
From the start, Belgium benefited from the Interconnector, the pioneer gas hub on Continental 
Europe. Within the recent years, Belgium’s hub became an active and liquid trading point in 
North-West Europe. Initially, the Netherlands and Germany shared a hub at the border points 
Bunde/Oude, where several pipelines from Germany, Norway, and Russia link with the Dutch 
pipeline network. Some trading evolved only from 2002 but the hub has been abandoned (see 
Lohmann, 2006). A year later, the Dutch Gasunie set up the Title Transfer Facility (TTF). Since 
then the TTF has functioned as a virtual trading point, allowing natural gas trades within the 
Dutch network  (see Gas Transport Services (GTS), 2007 ). Over the years the idea evolved to 
integrate trading facilities in the British, Belgian, and Dutch gas markets, establishing a common 
north-western market area.  
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In June 2004, APX (Amsterdam Power Exchange – owner of OCM operator EnMO) in partnership with 
Endex (Dutch-based Energy Derivatives Exchange) signed an agreement with Huberator to open a full-
fledged, screen-based Gas Exchange (online market and clearing services) at Zeebrugge in January 2005. 
(Wright, 2005: 65)  
 
Since 3 February 2005, the exchanges APX Gas NL and APX Gas ZEE have been integrated 
with the established UK Gas Exchange, APX Gas UK, which enables online transactions to be 
fully cleared and conducted anonymously. Although there are clear attempts to integrate trading 
facilities, Neumann et al. have demonstrated that trading activities have so far not resulted in 
price convergence between British and Continental markets (see Neumann, Siliverstovs, & von 
Hirschhausen, 2006). Just recently, the APX group announced the full integration of  UK Gas 
and continental gas onto a single trading platform by June 2007. Moreover, APX declared “APX 
Gas UK (NBP), APX Gas NL (TTF), and APX Gas Zee (Zeebrugge) will be consolidated onto 
the trading system EuroLight, which will also include a common clearing.” (Gas Matters Today, 
2007, May 9: 3). The fusion of three trading platforms is a market induced development; it still 
goes with and complements the European regional initiative promoted by CEER/ERGEG. 
 
The Dutch-German gas hub (Oude/Bunde/Emden) was established in 2002 by creating first the 
EuroHub BV in February and later in October the North West European Hub Service Company 
(HubCo). Both hub operators merged in 2003 into EuroHub GmbH (see Lohmann, 2006: 160-
162), but the shareholder of EuroHub GmbH suspended its activities already in 2006. German 
gas trading is developing at a very slow pace. (Before the creation of gas hubs or trading points, 
trading occurred in the regional markets (BEB, EON-Ruhrgas etc). Only by October 2006, the 
new German energy law foresaw the establishment of virtual trading points. The lack of liquidity 
and the fragmented structure of the German gas market with 19 initial market areas were the 
main obstacles for establishment of an active OTC market. The recently established regulator 
announced that they are planning to reduce the number of market areas to 10 to increase the 
attractiveness of trading (see Gas Matters Today, 2007, April 12). The establishment of the 
European Energy Exchange is supposed to accelerate German gas trade. The opening was 
scheduled for 1 July 2007, but was postponed until autumn 2008. In anticipation of the European 
Energy Exchange, BEB, Erdgas Münster Transport, Exxon Mobil Gastransport Germany and 
EWE Netz plan to merge their L-gas market areas in Germany into one joint market area by 
October 2008 (Gas Matters Today, 2007, 11 September). 
 
The group of infant natural gas trading markets consists of the other seven countries: Denmark, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, and Sweden. Although we cannot fully map their 
trading facilities, we would like to give reasons why they were subordinated into this category. 
Some of the countries established virtual title transfer points in the second half of the Gas 
reform. Nevertheless, the absence of gas hubs and/or significant volume of trading does not 
allow to speak of anything other than infant trading facilities. This is the case in Denmark, where 
in 2004 the GTF was introduced and more trading is planned. France did introduce virtual title 
transfer points for five zones of the transmission network, but the European Commission does 
not observe NBP type trading in 2005. In Italy, a virtual balancing point (Punto di Scambio 
Virtuale (PSV) was established; where according to the EC in 2005 limited trading took place 
(see European Commission, 2005a: 33; Harris & Jackson, 2005; Héritier, 2005). Ireland has an 
interconnector pipe starting at the Scottish town of Moffat, ending near Dublin on the east coast 
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of Ireland. Until now, the direction of gas flow is only in one direction from UK to Ireland. At 
this interconnector no significant trade is taking place other than the old-fashioned bilateral long-
term supply contracts. In a comment to the Regulator, the Irish Bord Gais does not see the need 
to put up sophisticated trading facilities (see Commission for Energy Regulation, 2007; 
International Energy Agency, 2003a). In fact, Luxembourg might be too small as it would justify 
the establishment of a trading platform of its own. Nevertheless, Luxembourg has not made any 
effort to enable trading trough cooperation with Belgium or Netherlands for instance, or at least 
such a proactive attitude has not been reported. Spain does not have a gas hub or any other 
significant trading facilities. Instead, the Spanish government is in the stage of taking some legal 
measures such as fixing lower tariffs and introducing transparent conditions for TPA to promote 
trade by making trading activities more profitable. The EC detected limited activities in Spain of 
NBP type trading in 2005. Sweden’s gas market as such is in its infancy, not only trading wise.  
(See International Energy Agency, 2004b, 2004a; International Energy Agency, 2005; Rasines 
García, 2006). 
 
To sum up, in 2001 it was only the UK market which had a mature gas trading market and 
Belgium which started to develop its trading opportunities, whereas all the other 10 European 
markets were in their infancy. Some dynamics evolved in the Netherlands and Germany in 2002. 
In 2003 Austria developed some trading facilities. Comparing the variance with regard to trading 
facilities in 2001 and in 2005, there is a slight positive shift towards increasing trading facilities 
in the European Union. Although delta convergence occurs, no significant decrease of variance 
suggesting sigma convergence could be observed. The UK, the Netherlands, and Belgium show 
evidence for positive gamma convergence, whereas Austria and Germany are less clear cases. 
For trading facilities, our expectation (3) holds: a low degree of delta convergence (8,3%) 
corresponds with objective based legal provisions.  
7.3.7 Unbundling on transmission system level 
Basic unbundling model TSO 
Until July 2004, member states were not obliged to assure legal unbundling, which explains why 
in 2002 four different modes of unbundling were applied across Europe. The first group consists 
of France, Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden, separated only by the accounts of the incumbent 
and its transport arms. The second group is characterised by the application of legal unbundling, 
established in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and Italy. Third, the Netherlands and Ireland even 
voted for management unbundling. Fourthly and most forcefully the UK and Spain went ahead 
by implementing ownership unbundling. Between 2002 and 2005, UK, Austria, and Belgium 
remained unchanged, UK maintaining ownership unbundling and two remaining on the level of 
legal unbundling. Positive moves from legal unbundling to ownership unbundling were taking 
place in Denmark (2002-2004), Italy (2004-2005), the Netherlands (2004-2005), and Sweden 
(2005), indicating positive gamma convergence. Conversely, Spain revised its ownership 
unbundling by falling back to legal unbundling in 2004. Consequently, Spain appears to be a 
case of both positive and negative gamma convergence. A similar case is Ireland. The Irish 
regulator declared that they had applied management unbundling until the beginning of 2005. 
The fifth benchmarking report states quite the opposite when reporting without giving any 
further explanation that Ireland has not ensured legal unbundling in its market. One can only 
101 
 
wonder whether this change of labelling is due to more insights into the unbundling practice of 
gas companies operating in the Irish gas market, changing definitions of management 
unbundling, or in fact reflects a real step backwards (see European Commission, 2005a: 81). The 
same holds true for Luxembourg which started with unbundled accounts, advanced by 
implementing management unbundling in the fourth benchmarking report, but did not offer legal 
unbundling by the end of 2005. In the beginning of 2005, the German gas landscape showed 
initial signs of legal unbundling, but predominantly solely accounts were separated. By the end 
of 2005, German gas trade and transport companies were considered partly legal unbundled in 
2005. 
 
Altogether the variance of the indicator did decrease, which allows us to attest sigma 
convergence. The trend towards delta convergence certainly holds true towards legal unbundling 
and confirms our expectation (7). Delta convergences towards ownership unbundling occurred to 
a much lesser degree, reaching only a moderate level (41.7%). In 2005, five member states met 
the legal unbundling requirements and another five exceeded the Directives yardstick by 
implementing ownership unbundling. The European Commission officially stated its preference 
for ownership unbundling in the new energy package published in January 2007. This preference 
was reinforced in the context of the Third Energy Package in which the Commission proposes 
the introduction of ownership unbundling. Seven countries still have to make the step towards 
ownership unbundling to achieve best-practice across the old member states: Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Spain. Yet, this step is a fundamental one. For this 
reason, most of those countries opposed the Commissions proposal of the third Energy package 
to prescribe ownership unbundling.  
 
Published accounts on TSO level  
The publication of accounts has been mandatory since the first Directive came into force. 
Therefore we expect full convergence throughout the entire observation period (expectation 6). 
By 2002, all old member states except France and Ireland published accounts of natural gas 
companies, distinguishing between trade and transport services in their national markets. 
Stimulated by the legal rule, the member states entered with a high level of harmonisation at the 
beginning of the reform, suggesting an 83.3% positive gamma convergence in the first year of 
monitoring. Surprisingly, the trend did not develop towards full convergence in later years, but 
instead more disparity evolved. In Germany published accounts were the rule until 2004. 
Afterwards the European Commission’s reports declare the absence of published accounts. 2005 
turns out to be an interesting year, when most changes happened. France and Ireland advanced 
and published their accounts, whereas in Austria, Italy, and Luxembourg published accounts 
were not the common practice anymore. As a matter of fact, the two former cases show positive 
gamma convergence and the latter negative gamma convergence. The reasons for not publishing 
the accounts are unclear, because the relevant EU documents make no reference to this 
phenomenon. Supposedly, more comprehensive monitoring revealed the gap between the 
declaration of published accounts and the quality of those publications. Comparing the situation 
in the beginning of the reform and 2005, the variance of this indicator increased and shows a 
reverse trend. Eight countries followed the Directive requirements and four countries deviate 
from the rule. Accordingly, sigma convergence did not occur and a moderate degree of delta 
convergence was reached in 2005. Thereby expectation six is rejected.  
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7.3.8 Unbundling on distribution system level 
Basic unbundling model on DSO level 
The second Gas Directive envisaged legal unbundling of the distribution system operators by 
July 2007. Notably, the distant implementation deadline together with the 100.000 costumer 
exemption did not urge the member states and natural gas undertakings to quickly unbundle the 
natural gas trade and transport on the distribution level (see European Commission, 2005d: 81-
82; Gomez-Acebo, Abogandos, & Russels, 2005). Therefore, we expect a low degree of delta 
convergence towards legal unbundling and no delta convergence towards ownership unbundling 
on the DSO level (expectation eight). In the first assessment in 2002, unbundling on the 
distribution level pretty much resembled the level of unbundling on the transmission level of that 
year. The member states voted dominantly and equally distributed in groups of five either for 
account unbundling or legal unbundling. France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden decided for the minimalist approach of separating accounts for natural gas trade and 
transport. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, and Spain implemented legal unbundling of trade 
and transport services and thereby exceeded the legal obligations of the first Directive. 
According to benchmarking reports, Ireland appeared to be more advanced by implementing 
management unbundling. Only the UK demonstrated best-practice at that time by assuring 
ownership unbundling.   
 
The mode of unbundling in five countries remained unchanged: the United Kingdom preserved 
ownership unbundling and Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and Italy favoured legal unbundling 
throughout the time of examination. The Netherlands legally unbundled its natural gas transport 
on the distribution level in 2004. Furthermore, the Dutch ministry of economic affairs proposed a 
legal act that foresees ownership unbundling being implemented by January 2008 (see Gomez-
Acebo, Abogandos, & Russels, 2005: 5). These countries can be considered progressive; the 
other countries were more reluctant to ensure legal unbundling of the distribution system 
operators.    
 
France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Spain so far show no signs of fulfilling the legal 
requirements before its implementation deadline. France and Germany explicitly intend to not 
implement legal unbundling of the gas distribution system operators before July 2007 (see 
European Commission, 2005d: 82; Gomez-Acebo, Abogandos, & Russels, 2005: 5). Both 
countries and Austria also made use of the 100,000 customer exemption. In the process of 
completing the transposition of the unbundling provisions concerning the DSO, Austrian 
regulation has lowered the threshold of the exemption from 100,000 to 50,000 customers (ibid).   
In earlier years, Ireland and Luxembourg claimed to provide over management unbundling. In 
contrast, the benchmarking reports considered even the conditions for legal unbundling 
unfulfilled (see European Commission, 2005a: 82). So far it is unclear whether these shifts are 
the product of different definitions of management unbundling or the regulator investigated the 
unbundling praxis more precisely than earlier. In the EC progress report, Spain does not receive 
a label, instead referring to the fact that the single DSO is the default supplier (see European 
Commission, 2005d: 82). Gomez-Acebo et. al. show in their unbundling analysis that legal 
unbundling in Spain on DSO level is legally only partially transposed. Due to its market size 
Sweden is an exceptional case in gas market regulation, especially when it comes to unbundling 
of the distribution system operator. With only 55,000 customers in the distribution portfolio, the 
103 
 
unbundling requirements do not apply. At the same time Sweden is not moving forward under its 
own volition for regulation-for-competition by applying legal unbundling regardless of its formal 
exemption. For this reason, the indicators score for Sweden is relatively low. (See Gomez-
Acebo, Abogandos, & Russels, 2005). 
  
Unbundling the distribution system operators shows quite unsatisfactory results in terms of 
harmonisation and the willingness to implement more than the minimal requirements set by the 
unbundling provisions. At the end of 2005, the European Commission considered only four 
countries, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Netherlands as legally unbundled and the 
United Kingdom as the only country practicing ownership unbundling. The other seven countries 
are hesitant to transpose the unbundling obligations earlier than the second gas Directive 
requires. Only the United Kingdom showed a positive gamma convergence (8,3%) when 
applying ownership unbundling for distribution system operators. Consequently our expectation 
is partially right, as the degree of delta convergence is not zero but marginal. Below the level of 
best practice we see some improvements in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, and the 
Netherlands towards legal unbundling. For this reason, low delta convergence can be detected, 
which confirms the initial expectation with regard to legal unbundling at DSO level. Yet, the 
variance of the indicator only marginally declined, suggesting a very weak sigma convergence.  
Published accounts on DSO level 
The publication of accounts for the distribution level has been mandatory since the first Directive 
came into force. Therefore, we should detect full convergence throughout the entire observation 
period (expectation 6). By 2002, eight out of 12 countries claimed to meet this obligation: 
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
French, Belgian, Irish, and Luxembourg natural gas companies did not facing the publication and 
separation of their trading and transport activities. And until 2005, little change took place 
according to the EU documents. In 2004, Germany’s optimistic declaration was worked over, 
saying the publication of accounts is not assured. Italy and Spain revised their proclamation of 
published accounts of distribution system operators one year later. The Luxembourg practice of 
account publication was even changed twice, claiming that publication of accounts took place in 
2004, but was revised by the end of 2005. In other words, there is evidence for four cases of 
negative gamma convergence. Only Ireland adjusted upwards in 2005, indicating positive 
gamma convergence. Consequently, the group of countries publishing accounts on the DSO level 
over the whole period of examination includes Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. In contrast, France only maintained its non publication policy.  
 
By the end of 2005, only six countries fulfilled the obligation to publish accounts of the 
distribution system operators; the other six member states did not fulfil the requirement. 
Consequently, the indicator shows an increase of variance. As a matter of fact, sigma 
convergence did not occur and only a moderate level of delta convergence (50%) could be 
reached. As noted earlier with regard to the similar component of indicator seven (publication of 
accounts on the transmission level), the reasons for countries changing implementation 
declaration are not explained in the benchmarking reports. Consequently, European legal 
provisions did not have a strong effect on the implementation policy in the member states as 
expected.  
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7.4 Overview: convergence of regulatory functions 
 
Table 12: Occurrence and degree of convergence (dimension regulatory function) 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of convergence Sigma Gamma  Delta 
Indicator 1 Legal market opening X (+) 50% 58.3% 
Indicator 2 Gas network access conditions and tariffication 
Component 2.1 Tariff structure X (+) 58.3% 75% 
Component 2.2 Type of capacity booking 
X 
(+) 75%  
(-) 8.3% 
83.3% 
Component 2.3 Allocation method  0% 16.6% 
Component 2.4 Tariff  
 
(+) 33.3%  
(-) 75% 
25% 
Component 2.5 Incentive regulation 
  
(+) 50% 
(-) 8.3% 
41.7% 
Component 2.6 minimum booking period firm service 
 
(+) 58.7% 
(-) 16.6% 
50% 
Component 2.7 Use-it-or-lose-it (UIOLI) X (+) 75.5% 100% 
Indicator 3 Balancing rules X (+) 8.3% 100% 
Indicator 4 TPA storage X (+) 75% 83.3% 
Indicator 5 Gas release programme X (+) 58.3% 58.3% 
Indicator 6 Trading facilities  (+) 41.7% 8.3% 
Indicator 7 Network unbundling Transmission System Operator (TSO) 
Component 7.1 Basic unbundling model TSO 
X 
(+) 50% 
(-) 8.3% 
41.7% 
Component 7.2 Publication of accounts TSO 
 
(+) 83.3% 
(-) 33.3% 
66.7% 
Indicator 8 Network unbundling  
Distribution System Operator (DSO) 
Component 8.1 Basic unbundling model DSO X (+) 8.3% 8.3%  
Component 8.2 Publication of accounts DSO 
 
(+) 66.7% 
(-) 33.3%   
50% 
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The following section begins by summarising converging trends focusing on indicators 
representing the dimension regulatory function. Sigma, gamma, and delta convergence are 
analysed by combining an indicator with a country perspective. Thereby we explore patterns of 
member states implementation and measure the distance of the best practice for each country.  
 
In seven cases we observe no decrease of variance. A lack of harmonisation is evident for the 
indicator and components ‘allocation method’, ‘tariff’, ‘incentive regulation’, ‘minimum booking 
period firm services’, ‘trading facilities’, and ‘publication of accounts on TSO and DSO level’. 
Sigma convergence is predominantly induced by the other nine indicators. The decrease of 
variance can also be measured for the dimension regulatory function.  
 
The member states scores for the dimension of regulatory function increase yearly by 
approximately three-10 points. Beginning in 2001 with 81 points, adding up to 92 points in 2002, 
95 points in 2003, the scores reached 104 points in 2004, and closed with 110 points in 2005. At 
the same time the range decreased from initial 105 points in 2001 to 75 points in 2005.   
 
The shift towards a competition supporting regulatory regime is to a large extent generated by 
positive gamma convergence. Within the dimension regulatory function, positive gamma 
convergence occurs predominantly moderately. Table 12 displays these indicators. With regard 
to ‘tariffs’, ‘balancing period’, and unbundling measures on the distribution level a low degree of 
positive gamma convergence showed. Whereas components such as ‘type of capacity booking’, 
‘UIOLI’, ‘third party access to storage’, and ‘publication of accounts of TSO’ even showed a 
high degree of delta convergence. On the contrary, regulatory inertia became visible in the case 
of five indicators where a low degree of negative gamma convergence was found. Those are 
‘type of capacity booking’, ‘minimum booking period firm services’, ‘unbundling on the 
transmission level’, and the ‘publication of accounts for TSO and DSO’.  
 
Network access conditions and tariffication were prominent features of the gas reform; the EC in 
conjunction with national regulators CEER and ERGEG greatly emphasised harmonisation and 
the promotion of competition-inducing and promoting measures. For this reason, the success of 
these efforts is given more attention and the indicator network access conditions and tariffication 
is therefore considered separately. The indicator is comprised of seven components, five alone 
which confirm a moderate or high degree of delta convergence, meaning a clear trend towards 
best practice over time. This is remarkable and unexpected, when considering that specific 
regulatory instruments were not prescribed by the legal provisions. The introduction of auctions 
as allocation method and the reduction of tariffs across Europe were less successful. For some 
countries the component tariff shows even reverse trends towards higher tariffs. Denmark, 
France, and Ireland’s tariffs formerly were in the upper middle range tariff zone and even 
increased their tariffs over time.  
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Figure 9: Regulatory function (2000-2005b) 
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Figure nine shows the countries scoring results for the indicators describing regulatory functions. 
Accordingly, we observe countries of all four patterns. Four countries develop improvement in a 
single direction and thereby follow a slope pattern (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden). The British regulatory regime remained stable over the entire period and resembled a 
plateau. The scores of most countries form a roof. Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
and Spain manage to increase their scores during the first year scale down in the second half. The 
angular point of this pattern differs from 2004 in Italy and 2005 in Austria, Denmark, France, 
Luxembourg, and Spain. In contrast, no significant pattern could be identified in Ireland. The 
figure does not show any constant development. The exception to the rule is in fact the UK. 
Unsurprisingly, the Anglo-Saxon model which served in many ways as a model for best-practice 
in European gas market regulation did not need to adjust during the gas reform.  
 
In general, the indicators representing the dimension of regulatory function show a moderate 
degree of harmonisation (54%) and trend towards best practice. A high degree of delta 
convergence could be achieved for the component ‘tariff structure’, ‘type of capacity booking’, 
‘UIOLI’, balancing period’ and the indicator ‘third party access to storage’. The majority of 
indicators developed a moderate degree of delta convergence including ‘legal market opening’, 
‘incentive regulation’, ‘minimum booking period firm service’, ‘gas release programme’, basic 
unbundling model for the transmission system operator, and publication of accounts on 
transmission and distribution level. In four cases delta convergence is low: ‘tariffs’, ‘allocation 
method’, ‘trading facilities’, and unbundling on the DSO level.  
 
We get a mixed picture if we set the indicators’ performances in terms of delta convergence in 
relation to the degree of precision of the European legal provisions. For the indicators ‘legal 
market opening’, ‘TPA storage’ and ‘legal unbundling on the TSO level’ we observe a high 
degree of precision concerning the legal provisions corresponding with a high or at least 
moderate delta convergence. The observations regarding ‘trading facilities’ and to a lesser extent 
those of ‘incentive regulation’, ‘minimum booking period firm service’, ‘gas release 
programme’, ownership ‘unbundling for TSO’, legal and ownership ‘unbundling for DSO’ point 
in the same direction. For those indicators a low precision of legal provisions accompanies a low 
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or moderate degree of delta convergence which suggests a positive correlation. The legal 
provisions for the unbundling model on the TSO and DSO levels deviated in terms of their 
ambitions. Therefore, we expected (expectation nine) the degree of convergence to be lower for 
the unbundling of the DSOs than for the TSOs. As a matter of fact, we observe a marginal delta 
convergence of 8% for unbundling of the DSO as opposed to a moderate level of delta 
convergence of 42% for unbundling of the TSO.    
 
The positive correlation is contested by contrary observations. Several indicators reached a high 
degree of delta convergence although the legal provisions were not prescribing the regulatory 
instrument. This is the case for the components ‘tariff structure’, ‘type of capacity booking’, 
‘UIOLI’, and ‘balancing period’. For the publication of accounts of transmission system 
operators and distribution system operators we expected full convergence, because this 
instrument has been mandatory since the introduction of the first Directive. These expectations 
are rejected, indicating little influence of the legal provisions on the member states 
implementation practice.  
 
To sum up, we see indications for a positive correlation between the degree of precision 
regarding the European legal provisions and the degree of convergence. Although the majority of 
indicators support a positive correlation, the number of contradicting observations is too high to 
speak of a strong correlation that allows formulating conditions.  
 
Table 13: Countries score of regulatory function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To differentiate the different degrees of progress member states achieved by the end of 2005, we 
distinguish three groups. The highest degree of delta convergence reached those countries whose 
score for indicators describing regulatory functions was above 120:  Denmark, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom. The middle group scored between 100 to 130 points. Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, and Spain received a middle degree of delta convergence for this set of 
indicators. The lowest scores were seen in France, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Sweden with less 
than 100 points in 2005. The detailed scoring results of each country and the countries ranking 
are summarized in tables 14 and 15 below.  
 
 RF 2001 RF 2002 RF 2003 RF 2004 
RF 
2005a 
RF 
2005b 
Austria 73.4 85 106.7 116.7 123.4 103.4 
Belgium 80.1 93.4 88.4 105.1 115.1 115.1 
Denmark 85.1 91.8 105.1 121.7 141.7 131.7 
France  40.1 40.1 35.1 65 95 97.5 
Germany 61.7 85.1 85.1 85.1 85 104.2 
Ireland 63.4 85 88.4 78.4 78.4 88.4 
Italy  100 121.6 121.6 131.7 121.7 111.7 
Luxemburg 65.1 81.7 81.7 78.4 98.4 75 
Netherlands  95.1 105.1 111.7 124.2 134.2 136.7 
Spain 113.4 113.4 118.4 120.1 128.4 118.4 
Sweden 48.4 58.4 58.4 78.4 75.1 82.5 
United Kingdom 145 145 145 145 145 150 
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Table 14: Countries ranking describing the dimension regulatory function 
 
Rank Countries rank in 2005b 
1 United Kingdom 
2 Netherlands 
3 Denmark 
4 Belgium 
5 Spain 
6 Italy 
7 Germany 
8 Austria 
9 France 
10 Ireland 
11 Sweden 
12 Luxembourg 
 
7.5 Convergence of regulatory competencies 
 
The following section analyses seven indicators in the order of their description in the 
methodology section.    
 
 
7.5.1 Type of decision-making by regulatory authority 
In 2001, the way countries applied third party access showed some variation, although more than 
half of the old member states did grant third party access ex ante. Among these progressive 
countries were Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, and the United Kingdom. At 
that time, Sweden and Denmark offered only ex post arrangements. Quite the opposite group was 
formed by Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands who implemented the minimum requirement 
of the first Gas Directive by applying negotiated third party access. Austria and the Netherlands 
revised their third party regime assuring ex ante decisions from 2002 onwards. Austria 
differentiated between ex ante regulation for inner Austrian transport and distribution and 
negotiated TPA for transit transport. Similar to the Austria, Denmark chose a hybrid mode of 
regulation which contains elements of ex ante and ex post regulation. Surprisingly, the Dutch 
regulator (Directie Toezicht Energie) stated that in 2004 network access was based on negotiated 
third party access, while in 2005 ex ante regulation was back in place. Germany was the most 
reluctant government forcing introduction of ex ante regulation. Until July 2005, neither a 
regulator nor an ex ante regulation was ensured. Instead, an association agreement of the gas 
industry was suppose to guarantee non-discriminatory access to the network. (See Lohmann, 
2006: 25-82). 
 
By the end of 2005, ex ante regulation had become the dominant mode of decision-making to 
ensure third party access. Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK applied ex ante regulation; Austria and Denmark 
partially did. To sum up, there is a high degree of delta convergence (83%) with regard to ex ante 
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regulation. Moreover, the cases of Austria, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands support our 
expectation (4) because we observe a high degree of delta convergence towards ex ante 
regulation in the last two measurement points.  
7.5.2 Decision over capacity allocation rules 
In the first year of the reform, transmission system operators were traditionally in charge of 
allocating the transport capacity within the national natural gas markets. Then, the Transmission 
system operators allocated the capacity in more than half of the member states. Explicitly this 
was the case in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, and Luxembourg. In the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom these responsibilities were shared between the 
transmission system operator and the regulator. Only in Italy, Spain, and Sweden was the 
decision power to allocate capacity entirely transferred to the regulator. As we will show, some 
initial positions of the member states changed over time, but did not result in a decrease of 
variance with regard to the distribution of decision power.  
 
Denmark, Germany, and Luxembourg left control over the capacity allocation entirely with the 
transmission system operators. Equally stable, but at the other end of the continuum were the UK 
and Spain. Positive changes occurred in Austria and Ireland between 2001/2002, followed by 
France the following year and Belgium in 2004, when transferring decision power from the 
transmission system operator partly to the regulator. There were also countries who switched 
back and forth. The Netherlands is such a case. According to Directie Toezicht Energie’s answer 
to the questionnaire, capacity allocation was jointly decided by the regulator and the transmission 
system operator throughout 2001-2003 and 2005. Nevertheless, this information deviates from 
the fourth benchmarking report which states that the TSO was in charge of capacity allocation 
during 2004. Ireland is a comparable case. There, the regulator claimed to share the 
responsibilities of capacity allocation with the TSO in 2004, whereas the year before and after it 
was declared to be the regulators responsibility only. The picture at the end of 2005 can be 
described as follows: In three cases (Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg) the transmission system 
operator allocates capacity. Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the UK preferred to 
share responsibilities between regulator and TSO. Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Sweden entirely 
transferred the allocation of capacity to the regulator. Compared to the initial distribution of 
decision-making power in terms of capacity allocation, there is no decrease of variance. 
Consequently, no sigma convergence occurred. Ireland and the Netherlands are interpreted as 
cases of positive and negative gamma convergence. In general, we observe member states 
transferring the responsibility for capacity allocation away from transmission system operators to 
either shared control between TSO and Regulator or solely to Regulators. Expectation 10 is 
confirmed, detecting a low degree of delta convergence regarding the distribution of decision 
power of capacity allocation.   
7.5.3 Approval of balancing conditions   
When the monitoring of the balancing regime began in 2002, the member states fell mainly into 
two categories. Balancing conditions either were approved by the transmission system operator 
or the regulator. Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg left the approval with the TSO, 
whereas in Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain balancing conditions 
were approved by the regulator. Initially, Sweden’s practice was unknown to the Commission. In 
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contrast, gas market balancing conditions were set by the market in the UK, a practice only 
considered best practice if applied in mature markets with a comprehensive sector regulation in 
place. Therefore, the UK receives a high score.  
 
The year 2004 turned out to be eventful year; seven countries changed the authority in charge. 
Both originally having the TSO responsible for fixing the balancing conditions, Belgium voted 
for shared competencies and France transferred this task to the government (ministry). Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain made the reverse step. Initially, the regulator 
centrally held the responsibility to approve balancing conditions in these countries, but then more 
authorities became involved in the facilitation of balancing conditions. As a result, a moderate 
degree of negative gamma convergence (50%) occurred. The most interesting cases are Italy and 
the Netherlands. In both the distribution of decision power changed three-times from regulator to 
shared competencies to the ministry and back to shared competencies. This is a strong indicator 
for a regulatory game in which the potential authorities are struggling to gain control or at least 
to share it. Less spectacular but still noteworthy is the Austrian case in which the regulator 
received first the regulatory control and then transferred it to the market in 2005. The 
interpretation of this decision and its effect is less obvious, because the Austrian natural gas 
market cannot be compared with the regulatory comprehensiveness that the UK gas market 
regime and its mature liberal gas market offers. On the contrary, we vote for a conservative 
interpretation giving Austria a low score for its instrument choice.  
 
From a regulatory perspective, the distribution of power in 2005 reveals an insightful 
development. At this point, only the regulators in France, Italy, and the Netherlands were still 
determining the balancing conditions. In most of the other countries balancing conditions were 
jointly approved by more than one authority, be it the TSO in cooperation with the ministry or 
the regulator. Only in Belgium did the TSO remain in charge during the entire period.  
 
The state of the play appears to be too ambivalent to suggest more than low delta convergence 
towards the best practice. The approval of balancing conditions holds: objective based European 
legal provisions translated into low convergence (10). The range of the indicator only marginally 
decreased between 2001 and 2005, but still allows identifying a weak form of sigma 
convergence. During the time of examination, we observe seven cases of positive gamma 
convergence, though only in France was the approval of the balancing conditions shifted directly 
from the TSO to the regulator. Furthermore, we observe several cases of negative gamma 
convergence opposed to six cases of positive gamma convergence.   
7.5.4 Dispute settlement   
Originally, disputes were settled by the regulator in six countries: Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. In most of the other countries, the member states preferred a 
clear allocation of rights and duties by either the ministry or the competition authority 
(responsible for dispute settlement). The ministry was considered the most appropriate authority 
to settle disputes in Austria, Ireland, and Luxembourg, while in Germany the competition 
authority settled disputes. Due to the autonomy of the regions in Spain, disputes were partly 
settled by regional government and the regulator in the first year and then in the second year 
conveyed to the regulator. By 2001, only France hadn’t appointed an authority to ensure dispute 
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settlements, but was then catching up by transferring the dispute settlement to the competence 
portfolio of the regulator (positive gamma convergence). In 2002, Austria, Ireland, and 
Luxembourg had already passed on dispute settlement from the ministry to the regulator. For 
2004 and 2005, the Belgium regulator declared that the responsibilities of dispute settlement 
were hybrid, whereas in former years the regulator was suppose to be the only authority settling 
disputes. According to our data, the Netherlands had the most unstable regulatory framework 
with regard to dispute settlement. In the first year the regulator held the responsibility, then 
transferring it for three years to the competition authority, and afterwards shared it with regulator 
and regional government in 2004, before finally staying with the competition authority in 2005. 
For the sake of regulatory stability, one can only hope these shifts in competencies are related to 
the fact that the Dutch regulator, Directie Toezicht Energie (DTe), is situated under the roof of 
the Dutch competition authority (Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit) and that this might have 
caused some labelling irritations on the regulatory side. In contrast, Denmark, Italy, Sweden, and 
the UK provided a stable regulatory framework, by using the regulator as the only mediator of 
disputes during the entire reform period. German authorities performed less progressive but 
equally stable, appointing the competition authority to be solely in charge of dispute settlement. 
By 2005, we observe a converging trend towards the regulator being responsible for dispute 
settlement in nine countries. In other words, there is a decrease of variance towards what we 
assume to be best practice. Here sigma convergence goes along with a high degree of delta 
convergence. The group of best practice is Austria, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. Belgium appears to be off beat, because the 
competencies are shared between the regulator and the competition authority. In Germany and 
Netherlands disputes are still settled by the competition authority instead of the regulator. To 
conclude, our expectation implying a low degree of delta convergence due to objective based 
legal provisions is disapproved for dispute settlement.   
7.5.6 Type of regulator 
Even before the introduction of the first Directive, some initial movers created independent 
regulators to supervise the gas sector. Early birds were the UK (1986/1999), Italy (1995), the 
Netherlands (1998), and Sweden (1998). These countries were followed by Spain (1999), 
Belgium (1999), France (2000), Denmark (2000), and Luxembourg (2001). Slight latecomers 
turned out to be Ireland and Austria. Ireland’s regulator, Commission for Energy Regulation 
(CER), was established in 1999 to regulate the electricity market and in 2002 was extended to 
the gas market. Likewise, the Austrian regulator e-control was established in 2001, but started its 
regulation of the gas sector in 2002. Creating sector regulation only after the second Directive, 
Germany (2005) clearly is at the bottom of the league.  
 
The remit of the regulator was already quite homogenous in 2001 with ten energy specific 
regulators in place. The two exceptions were Luxembourg and Germany. A small country with a 
small gas market, Luxembourg located its regulatory staff (two-three staff) under the roof of a 
multi-utility regulator. On the contrary, Germany is one of the largest European gas markets. 
Lohmann’s analysis of the German gas market shows how well organized gas business interests 
in conjunction with a lack of political will in the government, namely the ministry of economic 
affairs, deferred the establishment of a regulator. This finally occurred only in 2005, when a 
regulatory authority for natural gas was set up within the Federal Network Agency. The Agency 
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started off with telecommunication and incrementally expanded its sectors to become a multi-
utility regulator.  
 
Comparing the regulatory landscape in 2001 with 2005, we balance only a minor decrease of 
variance induced by the Germans setting up a multi-utility regulator at the very end of our period 
of examination. To sum up, there are ten energy-specific and two multi-utility regulators in 2005. 
Consequently, we observe very little sigma convergence, but a high degree of positive gamma 
and delta convergence. The distance to the best-practice remained unchanged at the same high 
degree of delta convergence as in the beginning. At first glance the result is puzzling; hardly any 
effect was observable regarding the type of regulators set up and at the same time we see a high 
degree of delta convergence throughout the examination period. Expectation 10 cannot be 
confirmed because here vague legal provisions correspond with a high degree of delta 
convergence.    
7.5.7 Ratio of consumption of national gas market and staff number of national regulator   
Before turning to the results, the quality of data needs some more explanation to allow an 
appropriate interpretation. While gathering accessible data on staff working on natural gas 
market regulation for the regulator, we learned that staff numbers do not necessarily differentiate 
between professional staff and support staff, or indicate whether this staff is working on gas or 
electricity regulation. Furthermore, regulators may frequently rely on outsourced expertise which 
is not reflected in the staff number. The ratio does not take account for input through consultants 
to the national regulators For this reason, the results of the ratio are somewhat tentative or could 
even be considered to be problematic.  
Our sample countries show a relatively high degree of variation in terms of staff number, annual 
budget, and market size. In 2001, staff numbers ranged from 1 in Luxembourg to 340 in the 
United Kingdom. There is the same disparity with regard to market size. Citizens of Luxembourg 
consumed only 0.6 billion cubic metres (Bcm) of natural gas in 2000, whereas UK consumption 
in the same year was more than 160 times higher, reaching 97 Bcm. Having said this, there is no 
doubt that the ratio setting the market size in relation to staff number of the regulator can at best 
be a proxy to describe the institutional endowment. At first glance the indicator seems abstract. 
Therefore, we illustrate the meaning of the ratio by referring to the UK example. In 2001, the UK 
had a ratio of 0,27. This can be read as one staff member from the Office of Gas and Electricity 
Markets (Ofgem) was responsible for a market share equivalent of 300 million cubic metres. One 
could argue that the higher the ratio, the weaker the institutional endowment of the regulator. In 
line with this reasoning we divide the countries into high, middle, and low scores groups.  
 
The indicator changes over time are displayed in figure 10. Initially, the figure suggests a 
relatively high degree of stability for most of the countries, which needs to be specified by a 
closer look at the individual cases.   
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Figure 10: Ratio natural gas consumption/regulators staff (2000-2005b) 
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Initially, there is a considerable number of countries in the first group with a ratio below 0.2 in 
2001: Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, and Sweden. The second groups’ ratio ranges between 
0.2 and 0.49, and consists of Belgium and the UK. The third group with the highest scores above 
(0.5) incorporates France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.  
 
The ratio of consumption of market and staff of the regulator did not show significant changes in 
three countries. Sweden stayed at a plateau of 0.2 - 0.1. The UK and Spain ratios appear equally 
stable. Both increased slightly between 2001 and 2005, English Ofgem from 0.26 to 0.29 and the 
Spanish Comisión Nacional de Energía from 0.8 to 0.11. The case perspective also reveals a 
gradual downward trend in the market-staff ratio indicating an increase of institutional 
endowment of the regulators. The Netherlands and Luxembourg had the sharpest and most 
abrupt declines between 2001 and 2002, indicating negative gamma convergence. The 
Netherlands is a particularly interesting case. With a ratio of 1.05 in 2001, it cuts back down to 
0.63 the year after and closes with 0.53 in 2005. Although it is still a comparably high ratio, the 
change is significant. Similarly, Luxembourg, employing less staff, lets the ratio drop from 0.54 
down to 0.27 in 2002. Though, as such a tiny natural gas market the drop could be solely 
explained by a single new employee. 
 
Austria, Belgium, and Ireland represent the group of countries whose regulators provide a high 
number of staff in relation to their market size and who increase even more the regulatory 
density in the course of the reform. The Irish Commission for Energy Regulation started with a 
ratio of 0.13 in 2001 and shrank to 0.7 in 2005. Austria followed the example by reducing its 
ratio from 0.18 to 0.10 during the same period. The staff endowment of the Belgian Commission 
de Régulation de l'Electricité et du Gaz developed in the form of a wave, starting with 0.33 in 
2001, decreasing to a low of 0.14 in 2004 and mounting up again to 0.21 in 2005.  
 
Contrary to the group of fast movers, France, Italy, and Germany appeared to be rather reluctant 
to provide a strong institutional endowment. France entered in 2001 with a ratio of 0.54 and 
reduced it gradually to 0.29. Italy started off with a higher ratio of 0.92 in 2001 and reached 0.57 
114 
 
by 2005. Germany brings up the rear, by not institutionalising any regulator until 2005. When 
put in place, the number of staff generate only a conservative ratio of 0.66. As a result, in the 
group of late movers it is only with France could we speak of negative gamma convergence.  
 
Bergmann et al.  (see Bergman et al, 1998) showed that usually the scope and intensity of 
regulation sharply increases in the beginning of a reform. A number of European and national 
laws and regulations had to be implemented and their compliance monitored during the EU gas 
market reform. To meet the growing work load of the regulator, one would therefore expect an 
increase of staff which translates into a lower ratio. In the case of the European gas reform, this 
observation can be confirmed. The range of the indicator ratio market/staff decreased from 1.03 
in 2001 to 0.65 in 2005. Earlier we described a downward trend of the ratio on a case by case 
basis. This trend is also reflected by the overall mean change from 0.38 in 2001 to 0.26 in 2005. 
In general, the decreasing range and mean of the indicator confirm the occurrence of sigma 
convergence. To conclude, a moderate delta convergence does not fully support our expectation 
(10).  
7.5.8 Ratio of consumption of national gas market and budget of national regulator 
Studies on utility reforms observe a rise of regulatory costs due to the increased regulatory 
activities after the legal introduction of the reform (see Bauer, 2006; Bergman et al., 1998). The 
following section covers the other dimension of institutional endowment, indicated by the annual 
budget the national regulators have at their disposal. Just as the staff numbers of the regulators 
show a wide range, so does the height of annual regulators budgets across the old member states. 
For instance, the lowest budget has Luxembourg with 0.22 million Euros; this is contrasted by 
the sum of 103 million Euros Ofgem generated through the licensing system in 2001. 
 
Before describing the indicators performance, we would like to give some illustration of its 
interpretation, using France and the Netherlands as examples. Both countries market size is 
comparable, consuming approximately 39 Bcm in 2000. Setting the consumption level in relation 
to the budget the regulator can use to oversee the market, the two countries differ considerably 
with respect to their ratio. Whereas the French regulator provides over one Euro to regulate a 
market share of 2.5 Bcm, the Dutch regulator only has one Euro to regulate a market share of 5.5 
Bcm. As a result, the regulatory density in France appears to be much higher than in the 
Netherlands, considering the regulators’ budgets.  
 
The figure below displays the scoring of the 12 member states between 2001 and 2005. Austria, 
Ireland, Spain, and Sweden receive high scores. As a result of its budget cuts, the British Ofgem 
achieved high scores in 2001, but only middle scores in subsequent years. Belgium and Denmark 
form the group whose score levelled in the middle. The group attributed by two lows consists of 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. No member state with low scores 
caught up to the middle or even higher score group. Accordingly, no positive gamma 
convergence occurred. Instead, the case of UK shows negative gamma convergence. Although 
the UK falls back, Ofgem still has the highest annual budget in total numbers.  
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Figure 11: Ratio natural gas consumption/regulators budget (2000-2005b) 
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Looking at the member states, no homogenous trend can be identified. On the one hand there is 
Sweden, steadying between 0.23 and 0.20 during 2001-2005. Then in 2005 the regulator 
increased the budget from initially 3.53 million Euros to 7.61 million Euros and thereby 
improved the ratio to 0.9. On the other hand, Ofgem cut its budget between 2001 and 2002 from 
initially 103 million Euros to 58 million Euros. Hence, the budget constraints of the early reform 
years are reflected in a change of the ratio from 0.85 in 2001 to 1.71 in 2005. The German case is 
an exception in two ways. Germany had no regulator until 2005, but when the Federal Network 
Agency came into existence, it only published the budget for regulating multi-utilities. In other 
words, even for 2005 no appropriate data is available.   
 
The group of positive movers whose ratio is steadily declining consists of Ireland, Austria, Italy, 
and France. Within this group, Ireland holds the first rank with a ratio of 0.69 in 2001 
diminishing even further down to 0.35. Austria closely follows with a ratio of 0.93 in 2001, 
decreasing to 0.70 in 2005. Italy’s initially ratio is less favourable, starting with a height of 3.22 
in 2001 dropping to 2.48 by 2005. Similarly, France starts with a high score of 3.86 in 2001 and 
gradually improves the annual budget, closing with a ratio of 2.26 in 2005.   
 
Moreover, we observed sharp declines in Belgium and the Netherlands between 2001 and 2002. 
At that time, Belgium improved its ratio from 1.42 down to 0.9, but reversed the trend a year 
later. By 2005, Belgium’s ratio was at 1.19. The Netherlands considerably strengthened its 
budget which translated into a decrease of its ratio from 8.68 (2001) to 5.79 (2002). In the course 
of the reform, the Dutch ratio lowered even further to 4.96 in 2005. The Netherlands certainly 
made an effort to strengthen its institutional endowment. Nonetheless, it remains behind 
compared with ratios of the majority of the other old member states.     
 
As in Belgium, the Spanish regulator shows contradicting trends with regard to the development 
of its regulators annual budget, though the loops are rather flat. Starting with a very robust ratio 
of 0.91 the Spanish National Energy Commission (CNE) even raises the budget, thereby 
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lowering the ratio to 0.71 in 2004. Surprisingly, CNE cuts the budget again in 2005, thereby 
reaching nearly the old level with one Euro corresponding to a market share of 0.97 Bcm.   
 
The range of the indicator ratio of budget and market nearly halves between 2000-2005, 
shrinking from 8.68 to 4.87. In general, this decrease of variance indicates sigma variance. 
Altogether eight regulators could raise their budgets and thereby improve the ratio expressing the 
market size in relationship to the annual budget. Opposed to our initial expectation (10), a 
moderate degree of delta convergence occurred. This also shows in the mean change of the ratio. 
Formerly, the ratio’s mean was 2,05 in 2001 and then decreased to 1.66 in 2005. Despite the fact 
that the annual budgets did not develop homogenously, we could identify a general trend that the 
institutional endowment is improving towards better practice.   
 
7.5.9 Overview: convergence of regulatory competencies 
This section portrays and summarises the occurrence and degree of the three convergence types 
for the dimension regulatory competencies (see table below). First, we explain the results for 
sigma convergence. Thereafter, we assess gamma convergence from an indicator perspective and 
with the outcome of this we show patterns of regulatory choices from a country perspective. We 
then present the distance towards best-practice is by measuring delta convergence for the 
indicators of the dimension of regulatory competencies.  
 
In comparison to the indicators of the first dimension, those of the regulatory competencies show 
a similar trend towards convergence, though the degree appears at first glance even stronger. 
Sigma convergence occurred in six out of seven indicators. The mean of scores mean for 
regulatory competencies are very stable and only increase slightly from 42 points in 2001 to 51.5 
points in 2005. The range diminishes from 63 points to 43 points. This decrease of variance is 
mainly induced by Germany. The German scores marked the bottom line with a minimum of 7.5 
points in the first two years and a score of 23 points in 2005. In other words, the sigma 
convergence found in the dimension regulatory competencies is partly generated by the 
strengthening of the German regulatory competencies. 
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Table 15:  Occurrence and degree of convergence (dimension regulatory competencies) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The process of harmonisation and directional convergence towards best practice was accelerated 
by countries which moved forward and applied more favourable instruments. Both forms of 
gamma convergence are visible in every country, but the degree to which they occur for each 
indicator varies substantially. For instance indicators such as ‘type of decision-making by 
regulatory authority’, ‘type of regulator’, and dispute settlement show a high degree of positive 
gamma convergence, whereas the other four indicators only reached either a moderate or low 
degree of positive gamma convergence. The degree of negative gamma convergence does not 
vary to the same extent, ranging from 8% to 17% for six indicators. Only the indicator ‘balancing 
conditions approved by’ shows a moderate level of negative gamma convergence which in 
conjunction with a moderate degree of gamma convergence results in an overall low delta 
convergence. Whereas positive gamma convergence is found quite often simultaneously with 
negative gamma convergence or just on its own, negative gamma convergence usually comes 
together with positive gamma convergence. This is not the case for the indicator type of 
regulator, for which negative gamma convergence is absent.   
 
The low degree of positive gamma convergence for the ‘Ratio of consumption of national gas 
market and budget of national regulator’ indicates a reluctance to improve the institutional 
endowment of the regulators. The figures for the indicator describing the ratio market size/staff 
point in the same direction, observing here a moderate level of positive and a low degree of 
negative gamma convergence. Equally we observe a general reluctance to empower the regulator 
deciding the capacity allocation rules, signified by the absence of or a low degree of all three 
types of convergence.  
 
 
Type of convergence  Sigma Gamma Delta 
Indicator 9 Type of decision-making by regulatory authority 
(Exante/expost) X 
(+ ) 75% 
(-) 8.3% 
83.3% 
Indicator 10 Capacity allocation rule decided by 
 
(+) 33.3% 
(-) 16.6% 
33.3% 
Indicator 11 Balancing conditions approved by 
X 
(+) 58.3%  
(-) 50% 
33.3% 
Indicator 12 Dispute settlement 
X 
(+) 91.7% 
(-) 16.6% 
75% 
Indicator 13 Type of Regulator  X (+) 83.3% 83.3% 
Indicator 14 Ratio of consumption of national gas market and 
staff number of national regulator X 
(+) 50% 
(-) 16.6% 
50% 
Indicator 15 Ratio of consumption of national gas market and 
budget of national regulator X 
(-) 16.6% 
(+) 8.3% 
41.7% 
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Section 7.2 introduced four different patterns describing the performance of indicators with 
regard to their distance to best practice. Accordingly, we analyse the indicators performance of 
the second polity dimension in the same manner. Here, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, and Sweden gradually minimise their distance to the best-practice model in the 
form of a steady slope. Even though the incline of the slope differs in total scores, the direction 
of change is the same. In the case of Spain the slope follows the reverse trend, first providing 
high scores which in the course of the reform decline by 5 points. This change reflects the shift 
of governance in terms of the approval of balancing conditions. During the initial years, the 
regulator was responsible, whereas after 2004 the ministry and the transmission operator shared 
this competence. Although Sweden shows an overall upward trend, we observe an outlier in the 
beginning of 2005. Due to changing responsibilities in terms of the approval of balancing 
conditions and capacity allocation rules, Sweden’s score shows a small dip. The UK and Italy 
display only marginal changes with regard to their regulatory competencies and therefore its 
scores resemble a plateau. In contrast, scores of Austria, Belgium, and Ireland show an upward 
and downward trend like a roof. Especially in Austria the changes are significant. The 
Netherlands appear to be not only a country with relatively little low centralization of decision 
power at the regulator but also exceptional regulatory instability. The Dutch regulatory 
competencies show mixed performance without indicating any clear direction. In this context the 
dip at the beginning of 2005 is remarkable. As we see in figure 12, the scores of the Netherlands 
see-saw from 35 in 2004 down to 23 in beginning of 2005 and up again to 40 at the end of 2005. 
The dip is a result of less favourable instrument choices related to dispute settlement and 
capacity allocation that took effect by 2005. 
 
 
Figure 12: Regulatory competencies (2000-2005b) 
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The figure accentuates two peaks to which more attention is given. The first occurs in Belgium 
in 2004. Then, Belgium revised three measures at once. First, the capacity was no longer 
allocated by the TSO alone, but jointly with the regulator. Second, the approval of balancing 
conditions was shared by TSO and regulator. Third, the regulator temporarily employed more 
staff. The next year regulatory staff number and budget decreased and the regulators competence 
for settling disputes was decentralised. The second peak happens in Germany, when the regulator 
was finally introduced in 2005. Reaching only a maximum score of 23 Germany has by far the 
lowest score with regard to its regulatory competencies.     
 
Previously, we demonstrated that the European legal provisions have not determined which 
authority has to be in charge of overseeing the different regulatory functions. Therefore we 
anticipated it as unlikely that the legal provisions induce a high degree of delta convergence for 
the indicators belonging to the polity dimension during our examination. This expectation (10) 
corresponds with a moderate delta convergence of 52% for the dimension regulatory 
competencies. Nevertheless, this does not hold true for all indicators. For instance, ex-ante 
regulation (Indicator 9), dispute settlement (Indicator 12), and type of regulator (Indicator 13) 
showed a high degree of delta convergence. The expectation is strongly confirmed by the two 
Indicators ‘capacity allocation rule decided by’ and ‘balancing conditions approved by’ and to a 
lesser extent by the two ratios describing the institutional endowment of the regulator (Indicator 
14 & 15). 
 
Taking a country perspective, the table below shows the detailed scoring results describing delta 
convergence between 2000 and 2005b.  
 
Table 16: Countries score for the dimension regulatory competencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The countries’ scoring results at the end of 2005 were divided into three different groups. 
Accordingly, a high degree of delta convergence is reached if the country accumulated a score 
between 60-70 points. Ireland and Spain received the highest score with 65 points. A middle 
degree of delta convergence could be found in the United Kingdom (55), France (55), Austria 
 
Rcap 
2001 
Rcap 
2002 
Rcap 
2003 
Rcap 
2004 
Rcap 
2005a 
Rcap 
2005b 
Austria 45 65 65 65 51.7 51.7 
Belgium 42.5 47.5 47.5 60 45 45 
Denmark 48.3 48.3 48.3 48.3 51.7 51.7 
France 22.5 27.5 42.5 47.5 52.5 55 
Germany 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 12.5 22.5 
Ireland 67.5 70 70 65 60 65 
Italy 50 50 50 45 47.5 50 
Luxemburg 27.5 37.5 37.5 42.5 37.5 42.5 
Netherlands 35 40 40 35 23.3 40 
Spain 70 70 70 65 65 65 
Sweden 33.3 33.3 33.3 38.3 35 45 
United Kingdom 60 55 55 55 55 55 
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(52), Denmark (52), and Italy (50), ranging between 50-59 points. The lowest degree of delta 
convergence appeared in Belgium (45), Sweden (45), Luxembourg (43), the Netherlands (40), 
and Germany (22.5). The table below displays the countries ranking describing the dimension 
regulatory competencies.  
 
Table 17: Countries ranking describing the dimension regulatory competencies 
Rank Countries rank in 2005b 
1 Ireland, Spain 
2 France, UK 
3 Austria, Denmark 
4 Italy 
5 Belgium 
6 Luxembourg 
7 Netherlands 
 
 
Strong independent regulators are one of the preconditions to enhance regulatory effectiveness. 
The results do not suggest that this precondition is met. The indicators describing the 
development of regulatory competencies indicate only a moderate degree of delta convergence 
(average 57%). Moreover, we explained that the results have to be treated with caution due to the 
quality of data (staff and budget numbers). Finally, the effectiveness of regulators or regulation is 
not assessed here. This would be a valuable contribution of future research.   
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8. CONCLUSION 
 
The main purpose of this study is to assess how far the regulatory regimes of European gas 
markets converge towards a best-practice model formulated on the basis of economic theory and 
the European legal provisions constituting the gas reform. The analysis shows whether member 
states are ahead or behind best practice in European gas market regulation and thereby indicate 
implementation patterns. Moreover, the study explores the impact of European policy related to 
general policy objectives and energy specific goals on the one hand and sector-specific European 
law on regulation on the other hand. To facilitate this, it is necessary to deconstruct neoclassical 
assumptions of the gas reform and identify key principles of market reform which determined ex 
ante the reform’s market design and form the basis for the methodology.  
8.1 Theoretical and methodological approach 
Drawing on the structure conduct performance paradigm, the European Union strives to increase 
economic welfare by introducing regulation-for-competition in natural gas markets. Thereafter, 
regulation aims to affect market structure and business conduct by applying traditional principles 
of market reform such as competition, third party access, unbundling, and independent 
regulation. These principles function as the starting point for the formulation of a best-practice 
model in the methodology. To define regulatory regimes and variables that shape regulation, we 
applied the framework of New Institutional Economics in the form of Williamson’s (1998) four 
layer model to the natural gas market sector liberalisation. From an evolutionary perspective, 
informal institutions (first level) such as member states’ beliefs, norms, or European (energy) 
policies influence formal institutions such as national or European laws (second level). Those 
informal institutions then shape institutional arrangements (third level). So-called actual 
regulation in turn determines the market structure and market performance (fourth level). In the 
process of applying the model to the gas sector reform, we proposed two additional criteria, 
which enable definition of regulatory regimes and formulation of two hypotheses. The 
application of the four-layer model to the European gas market reform firstly showed that the 
distinction between formal institutions and institutional arrangement is not as straightforward as 
the model originally suggested. In the case of European gas market reform, most of the actual 
regulatory functioning is finally determined on the level of institutional arrangements within the 
member states. Therefore, we distinguish between European legislation on the formal level and 
regulation on the level of institutional arrangements. As we elaborated in the theory chapter, this 
proposition is not a final solution to the demarcation problem. Secondly, energy policy and 
member states’ beliefs (first level) expressed through attitudes towards liberalisation might 
change within an examination period and directly or simultaneously affect the institutional 
arrangements on the third level. Accordingly, intra-variable flows are not only possible but even 
likely in the course of changing governments (see Stern, 1998: 209-210). Earlier empirical 
research on natural gas market organization in Europe attempted to incorporate member states’ 
positions to analyse their impact on the regulatory regime model. For instance, Stern maps the 
pre-liberalisation positions of the continental European governments, distinguishing between 
convinced opponents, willing accepters, and grudging accepters (206-211). Arentsen applies a 
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similar trichotomy, when differentiating the dominant regulatory orientations in 2000 between 
competition-, national gas industry, and national public interest oriented (see 2004: 97). Both 
suggest that those do indeed influence next steps within the EU reform process. So far, a 
systematic analysis of the member states positions has not been undertaken. Our analysis of 
energy policy objectives also showed that there is little knowledge about those countries’ 
positions and actions which are not prominently promoting or opposing the liberalisation 
process. Even less is known about how member states’ positions changed within the negotiations 
on the EU level and what factors evoke possible change of attitudes. It became apparent that 
much more research is necessary to understand the whole causes and regulatory dynamics which 
shape the evolution of regulatory regimes. However, this study starts by assessing those regimes 
and exploring the converging effect of European energy policy objectives and European sector-
specific legal provisions. Expectations about these causal relations were derived from New 
Institutional Economics (North, 1990; Oliver E.  Williamson, 1998) and European Public Policy 
Studies inspired by new institutionalism (chapter 2).  
 
The concepts of policy convergence and regulatory comprehensiveness form the basis of the 
methodology for assessing regulatory regimes in European gas markets. To capture patterns of 
institutional change, the concept of policy convergence enables distinguishing between three 
different approaches to assess convergence. Sigma convergence addresses solely the decrease of 
variance, whereas gamma convergence indicates the rate and direction of change. By introducing 
the distinction between negative and positive gamma convergence, it can be differentiated 
between member states falling behind (-) and countries catching up (+) to best practice. 
Moreover, delta convergence allows measuring the quality of change in form of the distance to 
best-practice model. For this purpose,  we develop a methodology that deduces what the 
European Union anticipates to be best-practice for gas market regulation. The definition of 
regulatory regime and its operationalisation focuses on the formal institutional factors of 
regulatory performance. For the operationalisation of regulatory regimes we refer to the concept 
of regulatory comprehensiveness that suggests organising the indicators along the dimensions of 
regulatory function and regulatory competencies. This distinction allows exploring differences 
concerning implementation patterns that are either attributed to the policy or polity dimension. 
To measure the member states’ distance to the best-practice model for European natural gas 
market regulation, we created an index based on 15 indicators consisting of 23 components. The 
sum of these 23 components, each allowing a ceiling of 10, amounts to 230 maximum possible 
points. Finally, total scoring results and indicator values are attributed to three models: minimum 
model, emerging model, and best-practice model. (See section 6.12, table 9) 
8.2 Convergence of regulatory regimes towards best practice  
Change of regulatory regimes in European gas markets appears to be incremental. Member states 
did redesign their regulatory regimes stepwise. In general, regulatory regimes in European gas 
markets reached only a moderate degree of delta convergence accounting for 54% by the end of 
2005. The overall increase of countries’ scores translated into a decrease of variance in form of 
sigma convergence. Expressed in numbers, the overall range abated from 142 points in 2001 to 
88 points in 2005b, suggesting a moderate sigma convergence. The mean of 123 points in 2001 
increased to 159 points of 230 points by the end of 2005. At the end of the period, the distance 
from the mean scores to the best-practice scores still accounted for 70 points. These observations 
from a birds-eye perspective suggest confirmation of the Northian regulatory inertia assumption 
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(section 2.6). The member states’ reluctance to move towards best-practice becomes even more 
visible analysing the rate and degree of convergence from a country perspective. In doing so, we 
identified four different implementation patterns. 
 
Figure 12: Regulatory comprehensiveness (2000-2005b) 
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The British gas market regulation functioned as a kind of raw model for the European best-
practice. Therefore, the UK was not forced by EU legislation to make any changes, but levelled 
at a plateau of best-practice during the entire period with scores between 200 and 205 points. 
Spain followed up as forerunner and immediately chose the emerging model as starting position. 
The regulatory regime in Spain achieved quite high and relatively stable scores during the entire 
period and in the end received the third rank. Still its changes are too significant to speak of a 
plateau pattern as in the UK. Especially the dip during 2005 from 193 points to 183 points 
suggests a mixed pattern. Austria, Ireland, and Italy managed to move early from the minimal to 
the emerging model. Thereafter, Denmark and the Netherlands followed the example in 2003. 
Belgium joined that group in 2004 and France caught up by the end of 2005. Altogether seven 
countries moved from the minimal model to the emerging model, but none reached the best-
practice model. On the contrary, Germany, Luxembourg, and Sweden voted for the minimal 
model during the entire period. Countries of both groups followed either a slope or a so-called 
roof pattern. The slope pattern indicates a steady movement towards best-practice, whereas the 
roof pattern shows reluctance towards the end of the examination period to adopt best-practice. 
Yet a particular model cannot be attributed to a certain pattern. 
 
The Netherlands, France, Germany, and Sweden steadily increased their scores. The Netherlands 
started with 130 points and reached 177 by the end of 2005. France and Germany considerably 
improved in terms of total scores. Between 2001 and 2005 France added 90 points and Germany 
57 points. This resulted in 153 points for France and 127 points for Germany in 2005. Sweden 
increased steadily but reached only 128 points altogether.    
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Table 18: Countries ranking with regard to regulatory comprehensiveness 
 
Rank Countries rank in 2005b
1 United Kingdom 
2 Denmark 
3 Spain 
4 Netherlands 
5 Italy 
6 Belgium 
7 Austria 
8 Ireland 
9 France 
10 Sweden 
11 Germany 
12 Luxembourg 
 
  
Other countries such as Denmark, Italy, Belgium, Austria, Ireland, and Luxembourg first 
increased their scores, but at some point adopted less favourable measures which translated into 
a roof pattern. In those countries low or moderate negative gamma convergence occurred. The 
top of the roof was not reached during the same year, but in most of those countries 2004 or 2005 
is the turning point. Denmark holds the second rank with 184, closely followed by Spain and the 
Netherlands. Denmark’s dip in 2005 goes back to the rise in average tariffs from 2 to 4 Euros per 
MWh. Italy reached 162 points by the end of 2005. The reverse trend within Italian gas market 
regulation goes back to expanding the minimum booking period to one year in 2005 and the non-
publication of accounts on TSO and DSO level for the same year. Belgium’s reluctance showed 
within the dimension regulatory competencies. Whereas before 2004 the Belgian regulator was 
solely responsible for the dispute settlement, Belgium voted for a hybrid form of executing this 
responsibility thereafter. Moreover, the institutional endowment in terms of staff number and 
budget was induced by data from the third benchmarking report which included the regional 
regulators in addition to the national regulator. In fact, taking this into account, changes within 
the national regulator CREG appear minor between 2003 and 2005. Due to a lack of more 
precise data for that year we can just imagine that the roof pattern is flatter. This case exemplifies 
the general problem stemming from only partially unified data and definitions the analysis was 
facing. In fact, gathering the relevant information to execute sector regulation appeared to be a 
collective learning experience for all actors involved. Austria downgraded from 182 points in 
2004 to 155 points by the end of 2005. Between 2001 and 2004, Austria declared that they 
provided more than ex ante regulation. This was more specified during 2005 explaining the dual 
system of ex ante regulation for inner Austrian transport and ex post regulation for transit 
transport (section 7.5.1). Moreover, since 2005 the balancing conditions are not determined by 
the regulator but instead formulated within the market, although trading is not mature and the 
overall regulatory framework not as advanced as in the UK for instance. Finally, the non-
publication of accounts for TSO and DSO level reduced scoring at the end of the measurement 
(see European Commission, 2005a: 81-82). The latter phenomenon occurred as well in 
Luxembourg and reduced its final score to 118 points. Last but not least, Ireland’s score shrank 
to 154 points due to a sharp increase of average tariffs between 2003 and 2004 and the transfer of 
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regulatory competencies from the regulator to the ministry and the Transmission system 
operator. During the same period, balancing conditions were no longer determined by the 
regulator but jointly formulated by the ministry and the TSO. Moreover, capacity allocation rules 
were shortly commonly elaborated by the regulator and the TSO, before returning to the 
regulators portfolio of competencies.  
 
To conclude, analysing positive and negative gamma convergence from an indicator perspective 
in chapter 7 revealed that the phenomenon of member states falling back by adopting less 
favourable instruments than earlier on is generally not related to a specific set of instruments. 
The only distinctive common feature appeared to be the publication of accounts on the TSO and 
DSO level at the end of 2005. A more detailed analysis of the empirical results from an indicator 
perspective is provided in chapter 7.  
 
The two dimensions of regulatory functions and competencies point in the same direction, 
indicating a moderate move towards regulation-for-competition. The dimension regulatory 
function shows a slightly higher impact on inducing best-practice. This suggests that countries 
are more inclined to change their institutional arrangements by revising a regulatory instrument 
than by transferring decision power to the regulator. In terms of regulatory strategy this suggests 
in turn that progress towards best-practice is possibly more forceful promoted within the 
dimension regulatory competencies, but also more difficult to reach. Analysing how distribution 
of regulatory oversight changed between 2000 and the end of 2005 showed that the struggle for 
competencies does not only take place between the regulator and the transmission system 
operator but to a large extent between national ministries and regulators. As a result, 
governmental institutions and regulators often share regulatory competencies. Re-emphasising 
public service obligations such as security of supply, environmental concerns, or protection of 
disadvantaged consumer groups sometimes brings the government back in. One early example is 
the United Kingdom and the Utilities Bill from 2000. Although the regulation of the sector 
stayed with Ofgem, the Bill provided the government represented by the Secretary of State with 
more formal opportunities to intervene in the regulatory process by imposing social and 
environmental guidance or levy schemes for disadvantaged consumers. Graham judges “It is 
unlikely that these formal powers will actually be used to any great extend but they provide more 
the possibility for informal influence by the government over the Authority’s agenda.” (2000: 
102-103) 
 
8.3 Impact of European law and energy policy objectives on regulation 
Deduced from Williamson’s four-layer model, the effect of two endogenous factors, European 
law and energy policy objectives, on regulation was analysed in an exploratory manner. This 
paragraph gives the concluding considerations about whether the correlations as formulated in 
the two hypotheses held.    
 
 
Regarding the second layer, we expected those subjects of the gas market reform promoted by 
European provisions to converge towards best-practice. On the basis of this general hypothesis 
(1) we formulated several sector specific expectations that have been individually answered in 
the empirical chapter. In general, a low precision of European law corresponds with a low or 
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moderate delta convergence; the results suggest a relatively weak correlation. The sum of 
expectations cannot be confirmed in a straightforward manner, but necessitate a more considered 
answer.   
 
Precise European provisions concerning third party access and TPA to storage translated into a 
high degree of delta convergence. Furthermore, a low precision of legal norms resulted in a low 
degree of convergence regarding trading facilities, capacity allocation rules and balancing 
conditions. Imprecise European legal provisions evoked a moderate move towards best practice 
with respect to components like incentive regulation, minimum booking period, gas release 
programme, and ratios setting the consumption in relation to the staff members or budget of the 
regulator. For legal market opening and unbundling measures the European Commission started 
off with precise but rather lackadaisical regulatory targets. Legal market opening was 
incrementally introduced with relatively low targets set by first Directive and reached only a 
moderate degree of best-practice. The same tendency can be observed for the unbundling of TSO 
and DSO. Whereas legal unbundling achieved a high degree of application, ownership 
unbundling is moderate with respect to TSO and marginal for DSO. 
 
The claim of a positive correlation between the precision of EU legal provisions and a high 
degree of convergence is weakened by reverse observations. The publication of accounts on the 
DSO level for instance, results only in a low degree of delta convergence, although the 
publication of accounts is unequivocally prescribed by the first Directive. On the contrary, 
several indicators were not precisely determined by the EU law and still show a move towards 
best practice. This is the case for components describing network access conditions such as tariff 
structure, type of capacity booking, UIOLI, and balancing, and holds true for the two indicators 
dispute settlement and type of regulator. Thus, this indicates that there are complementary 
factors or mechanisms inducing convergence. One of those is the Madrid Forum mechanism, 
which the European Commission employed to complement the legal instruments. The tariff 
design has been a prominent example where the Madrid Forum was used to promote the 
convergence of tariff structures and capacity booking arrangements. Other regulatory 
instruments not belonging to network access conditions have been subject to the Madrid Forum 
without generating a sufficient consensus among the participating actors. Yet, the success 
conditions of this mechanism are not sufficiently understood.   
 
To sum up, precision of regulatory instruments in European provisions is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition to achieve convergence towards best practice. Setting precise and ambitious 
targets is important. The empirical results confirm that member states tend to apply the 
provisions in the letter rather than in the spirit. Moreover, the example of published accounts 
emphasises that the effect of law is related to the degree of law enforcement stemming from 
action on European and national levels. The first enforcement cycle on the EU level just began. 
Nevertheless, these efforts only can be successful if they are accompanied by a determined 
enforcement practice by the regulatory authorities in the member states.  
 
Chapter 4 traced the evolution of general and sector specific policy objectives to identify the 
impact those endogenous institutions have on regulation. The analysis shows that the general 
economic goals formulated in the Lisbon strategy induced stimuli to follow the liberalisation 
track. At the same time, energy and sector-specific European policy combined goals from two 
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energy paradigms; one setting liberalisation, privatisation, and competition as pivotal; the other 
emphasising security of energy supply and climate change. The first energy paradigm, evolved in 
the 1980s and 1990s when the political economy of natural gas was based on supply competition, 
long-term supply contracts, access capacity and comparably low energy prices. Structural 
changes in the political economy of natural gas and raising concerns of climate change gave rise 
to the new energy paradigm which started evolving around 2000. Since then, the depletion of 
indigenous gas resources, rising energy prices, internationalisation of natural gas markets 
through an increase of LNG, blackouts and transit conflicts between Russia and Ukraine heavily 
influenced the problem perception of the main actors involved and questioned whether market-
based solutions are still the most appropriate answer. Stern adds another dimension to the 
discussion when describing a new security environment for European gas. According to Stern, 
the worsening of geopolitics and increasing global competition for LNG will influence and most 
likely (negatively) revise the supply outlook for the European gas markets as it has been 
projected so far (Stern, 2006). This argument supports the expectation that security of gas supply 
concerns will gain importance in politician’s problem perception. 
 
Until now, the two European energy strategies do not explicitly prioritise one or the other goal. 
The Green Paper on security of supply (2000) served as an initial step to formulate a 
comprehensive European energy policy by identifying structural weaknesses of the current and 
future energy supply. Furthermore, the Green Paper prepared the argument to bring together the 
streams of internal and external energy policy and develop an ambitious demand-side 
management. In 2006 the next Green Paper followed up and combined the goals of the old and 
the new energy paradigms. Thereafter, European Energy Strategy strives to achieve a 
sustainable, competitive, and secure energy supply. The downside of this holistic “as well as” 
approach might be that its strength, the ambition to incorporate several objectives, is at the same 
time its weakness, because it leaves room for ambiguity. Security of gas supply entered the 
sector specific regulation and institutionalised in form of the Security of Supply Directive. In 
chapters 2 and 4, we elaborated on the argument that once security of energy supply enters the 
equation the likelihood alters to employ approaches other than competitive market models. The 
empirical results give weight to our second hypothesis (section 2.6) and first expectation, where 
ambiguous or rival energy policy objectives decrease the probability that member states adopt 
best-practice. Moreover, in the mid and long term it is most likely that liberalisation of the 
internal energy markets will not keep a prominent place on European agenda. The gas sector 
liberalisation has been on the agenda for already more than two decades and for the time being 
the Third Energy Package is supposed to be the last. In future, other subjects like climate change 
or the guarantee of sufficient gas supply for European markets might be perceived as more 
urgent and therefore fill the agendas of politicians. Despite indications for a correlation between 
ambiguous energy goals and convergence of regulation towards best-practice, the claim cannot 
be terminally verified, because this would necessitate checking for more endogenous and 
exogenous factors. For this reason, the scientific exploration of natural gas markets needs to dig 
deeper into the causes that determine regulation and explain with the help of qualitative case 
studies how exactly energy policy objectives such as security of supply come into play.  
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APPENDIX 1  
 
Table 19: European gas market reform, 1998-2007: A road map  
 
DATE  EVENT CATEGORY*
22 June 1998 Publication of Directive 98/30/EC EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas
L
30 September – 1 
October 1999
1st Madrid Forum Me/Inst.
23-24 March 2000 European Council in Lisbon calls for rapid progress** Me
10 August 2000 Implementation deadline for the provisions prescribed in Directive 
1998/50/EC (Art. 29 & Art. 30)
I
11-12 May 2000 Second Madrid Forum Me
26-27 October 2000 Third  Madrid Forum Me
23-24 March 2001 Council meeting in Stockholm without any agreement on the 
timetable for the next steps concerning gas liberalisation  
Me
13 March 2001 First proposal for a Directive amending Directives 96/92/EC and 
98/30/EC concerning common rules for the internal markets in 
electricity and natural gas 
(L)
2-3 July 2001 Fourth Madrid Forum Me
3 December 2001 Publication of the first Benchmarking report Mo
7-8 February 2002 Fifth Madrid Forum Me
5 March 2002 Council Meeting held in Barcelona decides to open the market for 
non-household customers by 2004
Me
13 March EP amends EC’s first proposal for an acceleration Directive Me
7 June 2002 Publication of the amended proposal for a Directive amending the 
Electricity and Gas Directives 
(L)
26 June 2002 Publication of the final report on the Green Paper “Towards a 
European strategy for the security of 
energy supply”
S
2 October 2002 Publication of the second Benchmarking report Mo
30-31 October 2002 Sixth Madrid Forum Me
25 November 2002 Energy Council reaches political agreements on second Gas 
Directive.
Me
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2003 Legal market opening required for new market openers (> 28%) 
and for advanced market openers (> 38%)
I
7 April 2003 Publication of the second Benchmarking report including new 
member states
Mo
26 June 2003 Publication of Directive 2003/55/EC EC of the European 
Parliament and Council concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC
L
DATE  EVENT CATEGORY
*
24-25 September 
2003
Seventh Madrid Forum Me
11 November 2003 Commission decision on establishing the European Regulators 
Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG)
Inst.
1 March 2004 Publication of the third Benchmarking report Mo
26 April 2004 Publication of Directive 2004/67/EC of the European Parliament 
and Council concerning measures to safeguard security of natural 
gas supply
L
17-18 June 2004 European Council meeting discusses next regulatory steps 
(applicability of Regulation 1775)
Me
1 July 2004 Implementation deadline for the provisions prescribed by 
Directive 2003/55/EC (Art. 33 (1)) 
I
8-9 July 2004 Eighth Madrid Forum Me
3 December 2004 Ninth Madrid Forum Me
5 January 2005 Publication of the fourth Benchmarking report Mo
10 March 2005 DG Competition announces energy sector investigation and 
second phase of infringement procedure begun (16 March) in the 
context of the second gas directive 
Mo
15-16 September 
2005
10th Madrid Forum Me
28 September 2005 Publication of Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 EC of the European 
Parliament and Council on conditions for access to the natural gas 
transmission networks
L
15 November 2005 Publication of the report on progress in creating the internal gas 
and electricity market (fifth Benchmarking report)
Mo
16 February 2006 Presentation of the preliminary results of the energy sector inquiry 
by DG COMP
Mo
8 March 2006 Publication of the Green paper. “A European Strategy for 
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy”
S
14 March 2006 Extraordinary Energy Council: presentation of the Green Paper, 
rejection of a common energy regulator, rejection of a common 
European energy policy. 
Me
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23-24 March 2006 Council meeting Me
18-19 May 2006 11th Madrid Forum Me
19 May 2006 Implementation deadline for Directive 2004/67/EC  I
8 June 2006 Energy Council Me
15 November 2006 Initial findings of the energy sector inquiry published by DG 
COMP and TREN
Mo
29 November 2006 Meeting of the joint working group of the MF Me/Inst
11-12 December 
2006
Energy Council without any energy related outcomes Me
DATE  EVENT CATEGORY
*
1 January 2007 Regulation 1775 including Guidelines for Third Party Access 
comes into force 
I
10 January 2007 Publication of the final results of the energy sector inquiry, 
Strategic European Energy Review, and the energy package
S/Mo
15-16 February 
2007
Energy Council rejects ownership unbundling and common 
European energy regulator
Me
8-9 March 2007 European Spring Council adopts the energy Action Plan, but 
confirms rejection of ownership unbundling and a common energy 
regulator
Me
1 July 2007 Deadline for complete legal market opening. DSO exemption for 
legal unbundling expires (Directive 2003/55/EC, Art. 33 (2)).
I
19 September 2007 Publication of the proposal for the Third Energy Package  L
3 December 2007 Energy Council debates about the proposed Energy Package in 
general and the unbundling provisions in particular
Me
 
* Categories: L=Legislation; Mo=Monitoring; Me=Meeting; I=Implementation; S=Strategy; Inst=Institutionalization 
** Please note, only those EU Council meetings have been included which were influential with regard to the  
 reform.  
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Table 20: Tariffs between 2001 - 2005b  
 network 
charges 
2000 
average 
(E/MWh) * 
network 
charges 
2001/2002 
average 
(E/MWh) 
network 
charges 
2001/2002 
average 
(E/MWh) 
network 
charges 
2003 
average 
(E/MWh) 
network 
charges 
2004  
(E/MWh) 
I4 
network 
charges  
2005 
(E/MWh) 
I4 
Austria (2.75) =5** (2.75)=5 (2.75)=5 2.75=5 2.50=5 (2.50)=5 
Belgium (1.50)=10  1.50=10 1.50=10 1.25=10 2.00=10 2.00=10 
Germany (4.75)=0 4.75=0 4.75=0 2.25=5 2.50=5 (2.50)=5 
Denmark (2.50)=5 2.00=10 2.00=10 2.25=5 2.00=10 4.00=0 
Spain (2.25)=5 2.25=5 2.25=5 2.00=10 2.50=5 3.00=5 
France (3.50)=0 3.50=0 3.50=0 2.25=5 1.00=10 5.00=0 
Ireland (2.00)=10 2.00=10 2.00=10 4.25=0 4.50=0 (4.50)=0 
Italy (3.00)=5 3.00=5 3.00=5 2.50=5 2.50=5 2.00=10 
Luxembourg (1.00)=10 1.00=10 1.00=10 1.00=10 1.00=10 1.00=10 
Netherlands (0.75)=10 0.75=10 0.75=10 1.00=10 1.00=10 (1.00)=10 
Sweden (3.50)=0 3.50=0 3.50=0 5.50=0 5.00=0 (5,00)=0 
United 
Kingdom (2.25)=5 2.25=5 2.25=5 2.25=5 2.50=5 2.00=10 
* Euros per Mega Watt hour. Further information concerning source and definition of categories for large users (I4), please 
find in section 6.2.  
** Values in brackets are missing values. The first decimal number expresses the tariff and the second number        after the 
equal refers to the scaling measure.  
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Table 21: Data and scoring of ratio market size/staff (Indicator 14) 
 
 
Ratio staff 
b1 
Ratio staff 
b2.1 
Ratio staff 
b2.2 
Ratio staff 
b3 
Ratio staff 
b4 
Ratio staff 
b5 
  
Austria .18 (0) * .15 (0) .15 (0) .11 (0) .10 (0) .10 (0) 
  
Belgium .33 (0) .20 (0) .20 (0) .14 (0) .21 (0) .21 (0) 
  
Germany . (0) . (0) . (0) . (0) . (0) .66 (10) 
  
Denmark .15 (0) .15 (0)  .15 (0) .18 (0) .12 (0) .14 (0) 
  
Spain .11 (0) .10 (0) .10 (0) .08 (0) .11 (0) .11 (0) 
  
France .54 (5) .44 (5) .44 (5) .37 (5) .29 (0) .29 (0) 
  
Ireland .13 (0) .11 (0) .11 (0) .09 (0) .08 (0) .07 (0) 
  
Italy .92 (10) .67 (10) .67 (10) .56 (5) .61 (5) .57 (5) 
  
Luxembou
rg 
.54 (5) .27 (0) .27 (0) .27 (0) .22 (0) .15 (0) 
  
Netherland
s 
1.05 (10) .63 (10) .63 (5) .63 (5) .53 (5) .53 (5) 
  
Sweden .02 (0) .02 (0) .02 (0) .02 (0) .01 (0) .01 (0) 
  
United 
Kingdom 
.26 (0) .27 (0)  .27 (0) .29 (0) .30 (0) .29 (0) 
 
 
Source:  (Council of European Energy Regulator (CEER), 2005; European Commission, 2001, 2002, 2003a, 2004d, 
2005a, 2005d) 
* Numbers in bracket refer to the scoring values (see section 6.11.6).   
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Table 22: Data and scoring of ratio market size/budget (Indicator 15) 
 
 
Ratio 
budget b1 
Ratio 
budget b2.1 
Ratio 
budget b2.2 
Ratio 
budget b3 
Ratio 
budget b4 
Ratio 
budget b5 
  
Austria .93 (0)* .73 (0) .73 (0) .82 (0) .79 (0) .70 (0) 
  
Belgium 1.42 (5) .89 (0) .89 (0) .79 (0) 1.17 (5) 1.19 (5) 
  
Germany .00 (0) .00 (0) .00 (0) . (0) . (0) . (0) 
  
Denmark 1.78 (5) 1.48 (5) 1.48 (5) 1.78 (5) 1.11 (5) 1.20 (5) 
  
Spain .91 (0) .80 (0) .80 (0) .72 (0) .87 (0) .87 (0) 
  
France 3.86 (10) 3.90 (10) 3.90 (10) 2.93 (10) 2.54 (10) 2.26 (10) 
  
Ireland .69 (0) .57 (0) .57 (0) .34 (0) .48 (0) .35 (0) 
  
Italy 3.22 (10) 3.22 (10) 3.22 (10) 3.12 (10) 2.07 (10) 2.48 (10) 
  
Luxembourg . (0) . (0) . (0) 1.80 (5) 2.45 (10) 2.45 (10) 
  
Netherlands 8.68 (10) 5.79 (10) 5.79 (10) 4.96 (10) 4.08 (10) 4.96 (10) 
  
Sweden .21 (0) .23 (0) .23 (0) .23 (0) .20 (0) .09 (0) 
  
United 
Kingdom 
.85 (0) 1.51 (5) 1.51 (5) 1.53 (5) 1.68 (5) 1.71 (5) 
 
 
Source:  (Council of European Energy Regulator (CEER), 2005; European Commission, 2001, 2002, 2003a, 2004d, 
2005a, 2005d) 
* Numbers in bracket refer to the scoring values (see chapter 6.11.7). 
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APPENDIX 3  
 
 
Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Q1. Which allocation method has been applied in the year 2001? 
   auction 
   first come first served (fcfs) 
   others 
4       planned 
5 ………………. 
 
Q2. Have there been ʹuse‐it‐or‐lose‐itʹ capacity agreements in 2001?  
  yes 
  short‐term ‘use‐it‐or‐lose‐it’ option 
  partial “use‐it‐or‐lose‐it’ option 
6       planned 
7       no 
  
Q3. Has a gas release programme been put in place in 2001? 
 Yes      No 
 
Q4.  In  the  European  Commissions  process  of  benchmarking  the  implementation  of  the  gas 
market reform the Indicator “TPA storage” has only been assessed in 2002. 
Was there Third Party Access to storage available in 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005? 
4.1 In 2001    Yes      No 
4.2 In 2003   Yes      No 
4.3 In 2004   Yes      No 
4.4 In 2005    Yes      No 
 
Q5. Which institution/authority decided the capacity allocation rule for the gas market?  
5.1 In 2001 the capacity allocation was decided by 
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  Regulator 
  Regulator/Transmission Operator 
  Transmission Operator 
 
5.2 In 2002 the capacity allocation was decided by  
  Regulator 
  Regulator/Transmission Operator 
  Transmission Operator 
 
5.3 In 2003 the capacity allocation was decided by  
  Regulator 
  Regulator/Transmission Operator 
  Transmission Operator 
 
5.4 In 2005 the capacity allocation was decided by  
  Regulator 
  Regulator/Transmission Operator 
  Transmission Operator 
 
Q6.1 Who was in charge for the dispute settlement in 2004? 
  Regulator responsible 
  Ministry plus regulator responsible  
  Minister 
  Regulator/regional government 
  Competition authority 
  Hybrid 
8       Not regulated/no regulator 
 
Q6.2 Who was in charge for the dispute settlement in 2005? 
  Regulator responsible 
  Ministry plus regulator responsible  
  Minister 
  Regulator/regional government 
  Competition authority 
  Hybrid 
  Not regulated/no regulator 
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Q7.1 How much staff did the national regulator have in 2004? 
……………………………………………………………… 
 
 <30       30‐80       >80 
 
 
Q7.2. How much staff did the national regulator have in 2005? 
……………………………………………………………… 
 
 <30       30‐80       >80 
Q8.1 How much was the budget of the national regulator in 2004? (in Euros) 
 
………………………………………………………………. 
 
 <10 Million Euros     10‐25 Million Euros       
 >25 Million Euros 
 
Q8.2 How much was the budget of the national regulator in 2005? (in Euros) 
 
………………………………………………………………. 
 
 <10 Million Euros     10‐25 Million Euros       
 >25 Million Euros 
   
Q9. Who decided the network access conditions in 2004? 
 
 Regulator responsible 
 Ministry plus regulator responsible 
 Minister 
 Regulator/regional government 
 Hybrid 
 Not regulated 
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Q9.1 Who decided the network access conditions in 2005? 
 
 Regulator responsible 
 Ministry plus regulator responsible 
 Minister 
 Regulator/regional government 
 Hybrid 
 Not regulated 
 
Q10.1  In which mode was Third Party access regulated in 2004? 
 
 ex ante  
 ex post 
 negotiated Third Party access 
 
Q10.2   In which mode was Third Party access regulated in 2005? 
 
 ex ante  
 ex post 
 negotiated Third Party access   
 
 
 
 
 
